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This thesis examines the programs of study administered by the
Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps used to qualify commissioned
officers as specialists on foreign regions. The Foreign Area Officer
(FAO) programs are compared and contrasted in terms of types of
training, extensiveness of training, and how well each service balances
academic work with practical experience. The post-training missions
of these officers are also reviewed. The opinions of FAOs concerning
how well their training matched their later assignments is extensively
examined by way of an original survey sent to 483 graduates of the
Naval Postgraduate School National Security Affairs/Area Studies
Masters degree program. Respondents are members of the Army,
Navy, and Air Force and data concerning both language training and
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A. STEPS LEADING TO THE SELECTION OF THE TOPIC OF
THIS THESIS
This thesis shall address the selection, training, and utilization of
commissioned foreign area officers (FAOs) in the armed forces. This
topic may seem a strange choice for an Air Force officer who was sent
to the Naval Postgraduate School to study to the Far East, but many
forces came together during the course of my studies that made It the
best choice. As the Chinese say, the longest Journey begins with one
step, and now as I look back on the events that led to my choosing this
subject, I can identify several of the steps that led to this paper. Per-
haps by recounting these steps I can explain my interests and the
procedure I used in creating the material that follows.
I had never heard of FAOs or the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS)
£ind had no idea that officers could attend the Defense Language Insti-
tute when I took the first step that led to this thesis. I explored the
possibility of "cross-flowing" into the intelligence career field from
the missile operations career field in 1987. To my delight, I was not
only allowed to make this move but was offered a free Masters degree
as the first step in leaving the missile world for intelligence work. My
background as an enlisted signal intelligence analyst, my undergradu-
ate degree in Political Science, and my Defense Language Aptitude
Battery score of 122 all seemed to add up to the right combination for
the Air Force program, which was then described as a two-year (or
less, depending on language difficulty) program that started with a
year of academic work at NPS and ended with language training at
DU/FLC.
Although I had experienced a tour in Germany and my back-
ground, both in intelligence and in college, had been Soviet focused, I
was offered a slot studying the Far East and my choice of Chinese,
Japanese, or Korean language training. I questioned the value of each
language in terms of later assignments and was told that most likely
none of these languages would prove to be useful later, but that lan-
guage training was simply part of the degree. Therefore, since I was
equally unfamiliar with all three languages and all seemed to be of
equal difficulty, I chose Chinese, reasoning that the PRC offered the
biggest potential military threat in the region. This choice was my
unknowing second step.
The next step was reporting to NPS in June of 1987 to start the
academic program. At NPS, I learned a number of interesting facts.
First, my fellow students were primarily officers from the Navy and the
Air Force and all of the Naval officers seemed to envy the fact that the
Air Force officers would get to "use" their area specialist education
immediately after completing the degree, while they (the Naval offi-
cers) would be returning to sea duty after graduation. The Air Force
officers, in turn, had been told (by officers at AFMPC) they would not
be using their language skills as "most would be assigned to DIA after
graduation" and could not understand why they had to go to DLI/FLC
when many of the Naval officers were getting the same degree with
just two more quarters of education and no language training.
On top of all this confusion were rumors about why no Army offi-
cers were in the area studies curriculum with us and why they had
been present a few years before but had since been withdrawn. Added
to this were the letters which some of the Army officers who had
graduated sent to their professors, many coming from the regions the
Army officers had studied and written during some type of training
these officers called "in-country" training. Luckily, one of my profes-
sors was a Reserve Army officer and a Foreign Area Officer who was
able to explain the Army's program to me.
The third step took place when I was approached by a fellow offi-
cer about entering the Air Force Human Resources Intelligence pro-
gram as a special duty assignment. I became very interested in this
possibility (as it offered an interesting alternative to a DIA desk job)
and filled out the required paperwork to apply. To my surprise, I
found in the course of the application process that my upcoming Chi-
nese language training would be a drawback to my being accepted. It
seems that, since this training is so long and expensive, the officers
that run the HUMINT section are not keen on accepting officers with
languages they will not be able to use. While my Asia-oriented educa-
tion, and background in operations and intelligence, made me a desir-
able candidate, my Chinese training could not be used or justified by
the jobs they had in mind.
The final step that led to this thesis topic was when I later had
difficulty in the Chinese language course itself. Specifically, I could not
learn the ideograms (Chinese characters) that are used in Chinese
writing at the pace necessary to successfully complete the course.
Early in September 1988, I began to explore the options that might be
available if I found myself unable to pass Chinese. I was told that two
options were available: either I could start a different language or I
could return to NPS and complete the degree in the same manner as a
Navy student by taking two additional quarters of academics and writ-
ing a thesis. Before doing anything else. I tried extra tutoring and
other means of continuing in Chinese, but by late in the month, the
writing appeared to be on the wall. Therefore, I contacted the Air
Force Military Personnel Center, which sent me to NPS to ask their
advice. I was told that they could foresee no assignment that required
Chinese and they did not care which of the other options I chose as
long as I graduated on time.
I chose to return to NPS and write a thesis. I did so for three rea-
sons: the other languages in my area would all take a full year to com-
plete, the two primary languages in my area (Japanese and Korean)
both used Chinese characters extensively, and I wanted to find some
answers to a number of questions that had arisen from this situation.
Among these questions were: Why are the training programs so differ- \
ent between the services? Is it true that Air Force officers do not use J
their language training and, if so, why does the Air Force insist on lan-
guage, unlike the Navy? Why does the Navy not send its officers to /
language training? Do Naval officers ever use their area studies educa-
tions and, if so, how?
The result of trying to answer these questions is the following
thesis. Along the way, I discovered that many of the answers I wanted
did not already exist in a book where I could simply read them.
Instead, I found that no one had bothered to ask the people who could
answer these questions for their thoughts, a problem I solved by cre-
ating, administering, and analyzing a survey that accounts for about half
of the information to come. This work does not answer all the ques-
tions that exist on this subject, but it does lay the foundation for more
study and it can serve to abolish some of the myths that pervade this
subject.
B. THE PROBLEM
The purposes of this thesis are to:
• examine the selection, training, and emplo5mient of the FAO by
each service branch;
• identify what philosophy each service employs in designing a pro-
gram to train FAOs; and
• determine whether the current methods are bringing about the
desired results.
In order to establish the success of the services in preparing their
FAOs, we will rely on the survey responses of FAOs who are actually
functioning in missions in which they use their specialized FAO train-
ing and see how they evaluate the appropriateness of their training
experiences to their real-world missions. It appears that all four
branches of the Department of Defense believe that there are certain
duties in each service that are best filled by FAOs. Furthermore,
because the roles and missions of the armed forces differ, these dif-
ferences are reflected in the services' FAO training programs. How-
ever, I will attempt to show that the commonalty of FAO missions
should have more influence on the design of FAO training programs (to
include the mix of language and area expertise skills as well as the mix
of academic training and practical experience) than the self-perceived
service differences. Along the way, recommendations will also be made
to improve the services' individual programs by highlighting unique
innovations of one service's program that could be readily adapted by
the others. This attempt to make each service aware of what the
others are doing is important because all four services define the skills
of a FAO in very similar ways. In my research, no one I Interviewed in
any service had more than a cursory knowledge of what the other
services' programs entailed. Furthermore, some of the information
which exists and is relied upon is incorrect, resulting in each service
grappling individually with similar problems without much opportunity
of learning something from each other's past experiences.
n. THE NEED FOR FAOs
WHAT ARE FAOs AND WHY DO WE NEED THEM?
Foreign Area Officers are commissioned officers In the Army,
Navy, Air Force, or Marine Corps who are fully qualified in some mili-
tary specialty and have a specialized knowledge of a foreign country or
region. At best, he or she should be intimately famiiliar with the his-
tory, culture, geography, climate, politics, military, economy, and reli-
gions of the area, as well as be familiar with one or more languages of
that area. Also, the FAG should have lived in the region of interest for
an extended period of time in order to have a measure of personal
experience to supplement his or her professional training. Therefore,
the ideal FAQ is an accomplished military officer with a graduate
degree in a region, a fluent grasp of one or more languages spoken
there, and a background of personal experience gained first-hand in
one or more relevant countries. This FAG would be "ideal" because he
or she would offer a blend of fact and theory gained through education
with practical experiences gained first-hand in the region. This bal-
anced t3^e of approach to FAG training could be depicted as in
Table 1.
The above represents Just a sample of the possibilities of combin-
ing the academic with the practical and, clearly, in any of the given
cases a FAG who experienced just one side of this list would be less
knowledgeable than one who had experienced both, and thus be less
than ideal. This ideal FAO is achievable (in fact, the Army can boast of
having several hundred at the present time), but the ideal FAO's
training costs approximately $195,000 per officer and cannot be com-
pleted in less than two and one-half years (and may take much longer,
depending on language demands). ^
TABLE 1
EXAMPLES OP BALANCED FAO TRAINING EXPERIENCES
Academic Practical
Language training at DLI/FLC Daily use of language in-country
Study of religions Visits to shrines, temples, etc.
Study of geography Personal trips in the region
Study of military Participation in local exercises
Study of culture Living among the people of the
region and socializing with
them
Study of politics Observation of local political
culture
iData on costs comes from Major Gary, Chief of the Army FAO Pro-
ponent Team at the Pentagon, and is also based on the following Army
estimates:
Language training at DLI/FLC- $323.00 per week, with average
course length of nine months.
Cost of a civilian graduate school— $14,250.00 for 18 months.
Cost of in-country training- $30,000.00 for 12 months, with an
additional $10,000 for regional travel.
Three permanent change-of-station (moving) costs— $4,500.00
each.
Adding all the above, plus the salary of a senior captain (0-3) during
this training, results in a total of $195,000 per FAO.
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For some of the services, this ideal FAO price is seen as too high,
so they attempt to economize in one way or amother. The FAOs that
result are certainly not as well trained as their more expensive coun-
terparts but may be just as effective, depending on the missions they
are given. Also, in view of the prospects for shrinking budgets, cer-
tainly an argument could be made that $195,000 is too high a price to
turn out an officer who is bilingual and well educated about some for-
eign land. The current deemphasis on civilian education and concur-
rent push to reward officers for staying in operationad jobs (particularly
in the Air Force) might also be cited as good reasons to keep training
time to a minimum for FAOs, if they are needed at alll Surely spending
a couple of years getting a Masters degree in international relations or
area studies and another year or so learning a foreign language will not
help an officer advance in his or her career as fast as would spending
that time in command positions or doing his primary job. What Is it
about FAOs that makes the expense to both the government and the
officer worthwhile? What do we need them for?
Military forces have always needed people who have comprehen-
sive knowledge of other nations. We must remember the classic
admonition of Sun Tzu. who said,
If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear a
hundred battles. If you know yourself, but not the enemy, for every
victory you will suffer defeat. If you know neither yourself nor the
enemy, you are a fool and will meet defeat in every battle. (Ref. 1]
In the past, it was easier to know who the "enemy" was. In fact, we
often made heroes out of men who were particularly adept at
"knowing the enemy" in our American popular culture. Men with
names like Davy Crocket and Kit Carson were the de facto FAOs of
their time. They and other "Indian scouts" had the same skills we
demand today— knowledge not only of the martial skills but of the
geography, culture, and language of their adversaries. These and other
skills have come to be equated with acquiring intelligence on the
enemy, and indeed today we find the FAO is best suited for a host of
intelligence positions in the services. Later FAOs like Joseph Stilwell
and Evans Carlson are more modem reminders that the FAO is still
just as needed in combat operations as in intelligence work or In
diplomacy [Refs. 2, 3].
The modern world provides even greater demands for FAOs than
we find in the past for two reasons. First of all, it is getting increas-
ingly difficult to identify the enemy. One can no longer simply point to
the Soviet Union as the sole enemy and then rush out and train offi-
cers in Soviet subjects and the Russian language. There are new
demands, such as in the Middle East, and even new sources of poten-
tial threats as we find economic power starting to rival military power
as a reason for concern over our national security. The very nature of
the United States* global power status results in our having global
interests £ind no one can predict where in the world our interests will
be threatened next. Therefore, Just as the U.S. must bear the expense
of maintaining large and mobile military forces in the modem world
because threats appear too quickly to give us time to build up to meet
a challenge (as we did in World War II and so forth), so too must we
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maintain at least a cadre of officers whose specialized regional knowl-
edge, when taken together, covers all areas of the world. Who knows
when the next Grenada-type invasion will take place or where U.S.
citizens might need to be rescued from some terrorist threat? The
lives saved by maintaining a corps of officers who both understand the
requirements of the military and are experts in foreign regions make
the cost of this training very bearable indeed.
The second reason the demand for FAOs is rising is more related
to peace than to conflict. Dramatic breakthroughs in international
negotiations that result in treaties like the INF treaty and the South-
west Africa treaty also create a need for FAOs to serve on treaty com-
pliance evaluation teams like the On-Site Inspection Agency (OSIA)
and on peacekeeping forces. Of course, these organizations can be
staffed by non-FAOs, but the choice between sending an officer who
speaks the local language, knows the customs, understands the politi-
cal situation, and is fully competent in relevant military matters vice
one who holds only the last qualification is a poor choice indeed. The
chance is great that non-FAOs will be less effective as inspec-
tors/peacekeepers, themselves commit some gaffe to embarrass the
United States, or end up endangering themselves and others through
ignorance.
This growing second need, to provide the military manning to
fulfill our growing treaty obligations, has already been demonstrated by
several mini-crises. To provide the manpower for the OSIA (which
must be equally staffed by the Army, Navy {including the Marine
11
Corps}, and Air Force), each service had to frantically search for
Russian linguists in their ranks, run them through a quick course in
Russian nuclear terminology, and put together teams who could escort
Soviets who visit the United States and/or who could themselves
travel to the U.S.S.R. on inspection tours. Luckily, the U.S.S.R. has
long been the primary focus of the U.S. military and the required
number of linguists was eventually found. However, if we were to
acquire a similar mission that required Chinese linguists or face a
need for Africa specialists, it is doubtful that we would succeed nearly
as well.
Looking at Europe, there is a good chance that the future will
bring a conventional arms treaty similar to the aforementioned INF
Treaty. If this treaty is ratified, the Department of Defense will face an
even greater demand for Russian linguists and new demands for FAOs
who speak Polish, German, Hungarian, Romanian, Bulgarian, or
Czechoslovakian. One would hope that the services would today be
getting ready for this; instead, we find the single largest institution on
which all branches of the armed forces rely for language training, the
Defense Language Institute/Foreign Language Center (DLI/FLC), is In
the process of ending its language training programs for the Hungar-
ian, Romanian, and Bulgarian languages [Ref. 4). 2 Therefore, when and
2a1so being cut are Norwegian, Serbo-Croatian, Pahtu and Dari
(two Afghan dialects), Indonesian, Malaysian, and Cantonese. Even the
Vietnamese and Japanese departments are at risk, although they are
not on the current list for closure.
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if the conventional arms treaty is signed, we should expect to find the
Department of Defense again scrambling to meet increased demands
with fewer trained resources. Once programs like the language train-
ing programs at DLI/FLC are lost, they cannot be brought back quickly
or effectively because many instructors will retire and/or move out of
the expensive Monterey area. The United States needs officer FAOs in
the OSIA and similar agencies, in our intelligence organizations, in
attache positions, in security assistance missions, £ind In positions to
train other soldiers, sailors, airmen, and Marines who cannot all be
sent through extensive programs. This need may be even greater if the
"post-Cold War" era actually dawns and we face a more complex world
that offers enhanced opportunities for the nation that is best prepared
and more numerous pitfalls for the ignorant.
^
^The need for FAOs in Intelligence positions, including desk ana-
lysts, indications and warning positions, and long-term strategic
analysis positions is discussed by John Godson [Ref. 5]. The Air Force
currently runs a program for quickly training members of security
assistance teams on country- and region-specific issues, to include
cultural sensitivities. The director of this program. Lieutenant Colonel
Stanley Wilusz, would like to staff his regional instructor roles with Air
Force FAOs who have graduate degrees on these regions but has diffi-
cult getting these officers due to bureaucratic reasons that will be cov-




m. THE U.S. ARMY FAO PROGRAM
A. OVERVIEW AND fflSTORY
Without a doubt, the United States Army has the best FAO training
program in the Department of Defense because it offers the most
complete combination of academic training balanced with practical
experience. The Army's four-phase program is the envy of the de facto
FAQs in its sister services and is the result of more than 40 years of
experimentation and evolution. Far from stagnant, it continues to
evolve today with the most recent development being the separation of
the Civil Affairs/Psychological Operations training from the rest of the
FAO program, which is actually a return to a previous situation. With its
own long history, replete with FAO heroes like General Joseph
Stilwell, the Army FAO program has served as the subject for numer-
ous papers at the Army War College and other institutions. Although
this paper will focus on current programs, I believe the large measure
of experience the Army brings to this subject makes it worthwhile to
pause to briefly review some of the history of its program.
The most comprehensive single overview of the history of the
Army FAO program exists in a paper written by Captain David W. Davis.
This paper is undated and provides only the name of the author; no
additional information is available regarding the origin of the paper. It
is entitled "The Foreign Area Officer Program: An Overview of the His-
tory of the Program" and was given to me by Major John Caiy, who Is
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the current head of the Army FAO Proponent Team. He was given the
paper at the John F. Kennedy Center for Special Warfare Training in
1987. The information it contains has been verified by him smd by
another Army captain, John Stoner, who also used it as a reference
when he wrote his own study, "Taking the Plunge: The Army's Foreign
Area Officers." Given these endorsements, one may confidently be
assured that Captain Davis' work is accurate; it is certainly interesting.
Davis starts out by tracing the roots of the Army FAO program to
the Language and Area Training Program (LATP) created by the
Department of the Army Circular Number 83, published in 1947.
Although others might argue that the roots could be traced further
back, extending to the language training programs Stilwell and others
attended prior to World War II, to consider earlier programs would
only tend to confuse FAO-specific training programs with general
attache training and further muddle the two concepts. Therefore, for
the purpose of this paper, the line of distinction between the FAO and
the attache is that the attache is an officer who is specifically trained
to represent U.S. interests in a specific country, while the FAO must
be more regionally minded and may be used in many different jobs
within the region, attache duty being only one of them.
Davis described the twists and turns the Army has taken on the
road to creating the modem FAO. The number one cause for changes
in the program is the infighting between the Army intelligence com-
munity and the operations community over who would control the FAO
program. Between 1947 and 1957, the intelligence community clearly
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held the upper hand: not only did the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intel-
ligence (ACSI or G-2) office determine who would be selected, the
applying officer had to be eligible to work in either that office or in the
attache system to have a hope of being picked [Ref. 6].
The course of instruction during this period can be divided into
several phases. First, the officer spent a year stud5rlng Russian, Greek,
Chinese, Persian, Turkish, or Arabic at Colombia, Yale, Princeton, or
Stanford (depending on which region he was assigned)."* The officer
then would spend a second year at that university studying the coun-
try's geography, history, culture, etc. Finally, the officer would go
abroad and spend an additional year or two primarily studying the lan-
guage and "soaking up" the culture. Often, programs set up by the
Department of State for training its Foreign Service Officers (FSOs)
were broadened to allow the participation of these early FAOs [Ref.
6:p. 51.
In 1953, an additional course requirement was introduced as the
Army intelligence community further tightened its control over FAO
training by requiring all FAOs to attend a "strategic intelligence
course." At this point, the program was renamed. The LATP became
the FAST or Foreign Area Specialist Training and the governing direc-
tive was now Special Regulation 350-30-80-1, published In 1952
[Ref. 61
^Other languages and other universities were added as the pro-
gram progressed.
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It was at this time that the Army operations community, led by
the Deputy Chief of Staff for Mihtary Operations (DCSMO) began to
gain more clout in running the FAO program. Under the ACSI, the eli-
gibility requirements had become much stricter. Only three officer pay
grades were eligible (0-2 through 0-4), both an officer and his wife
had to be U.S. citizens by birth, and other such potential disqualifying
rules seemed destined to continue to proliferate.
By 1956, the regulation governing FAST changed. This time it was
issued as Army Regulation 350-23 and the program rapidly moved
from the management of the intelligence group to operations. Among
the ramifications of this switch in leadership was the extensive broad-
ening of the program goals to meet the needs of all the branches of
the Army (to Include even the Judge Advocate General Corps and the
Corps of Engineers, among others). In addition, the sponsorship of the
program moved from the G-2/Intelligence shop to the Adjutant Gen-
eral's office. This regulation also resulted in dropping the requirement
for Intelligence schooling, marking a significant bureaucratic defeat for
the intelligence community, although it did continue to fill one-half of
each year's openings with its own men and shared the control over
the direction of the program with the operations group.
The Army soon again broadened its objectives to include the need
to have all of its officers become bilingual and published this goal in
Army Regulation 350-24 the following year. This push to get ever
greater numbers of officers trained in foreign languages (but not in
other FAO skills) finally caused the sponsorship of FAST to move to the
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office of the Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel. In the 1957-
1967 period, more languages and more universities were added until
any officer who had the ability and desire to learn a language would be
accepted. Needless to say, in this rush to expand the FAST progrsim,
quality control was significantly reduced.
^
The support for the Army FAO program benefitted significantly
during this period from the growing interest in unconventional war-
fare and the establishment of such specialized training centers as the
John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center at Fort Bragg, North Carolina.
The influence of the Vietnam War can further be seen in the decision
made in 1967 to direct FAO training at "individual countries rather
than areas." [Ref. 6:p. 9]6
As the demand for FAO-type officers grew with U.S. commitments
in Indochina, the Army commissioned two panels to review its train-
ing procedures and recommend changes. The first was the Haines
Board, 7 which recommended that the FAST program be further
expanded to encompass all the civil affairs, psychological operations,
and similar politico-military affairs programs that were expanding to
^For an excellent overview of how poor language training became
during this period, see "Vietnamese Language Training in the
Department of Defense 1955-1973," by Dr. James C. McNaughton,
Command Historian for the Defense Language Institute [Ref. 7).
SThis change was part of AR 621-108. published in 1967.
TWhich, Davis points out, issued The Report of the Department of
the Army Board to Review Army Officer Schools." [Ref. 6:p. 10]
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meet the war's demands. For unknown reasons, the Chief of Staff
decided that additional study was needed, and a second panel, known
as the DCSPER 40 group, met. This group recommended an opposite
approach to the problem, that the FAST and the new programs be
kept separate and that the new programs be grouped under a new
name, the Military Assistance Officer Program (MAOP). This recom-
mendation was accepted in 1969.
Evidence exists to suggest that these two programs, FAST and
MAOP, were kept separate in spite of the similarity of their goals
because of the Army officers' negative perception of advisory assis-
tance duty. It appears that the FAST program was more highly
regarded as a way to gain some language training and work one's way
into a combat command, which every Army officer needed in his
records if he hoped for high rank. MAOP, on the other hand, had con-
notations of advisor duty, which was to be avoided if one wanted a suc-
cessful career. As Davis put it, "MAAG duty is looked on as a deviation
from the normal or ideal combination and succession of schools, staff,
and command billets that lead to promotion. Some officers consider
MAAG tours a waste of time— even a retrograde step from a career
standpoint." [Ref. 6:p. 16]
The obvious contradiction created by having two such similair pro-
grams finally resulted in the MAOP and FAST being merged in 1972,
despite objections from both. In a letter to each officer. General
Westmoreland informed the 422 members of the MAOP and the 560
members of the FAST program that they were henceforth Joined [Ref.
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6:p. 16]. This merger, which was finalized on 6 March 1973 by Army
Regulation 614-142, created the foundations of the modem FAO pro-
gram we see today. On top of this foundation have been added changes
recommended by the Hutton Study of 1982, an Officers Professional
Management Program study in 1983, the FAO Enhancement Plan of
1985, and, most recently, the spin-off (again) of civil affairs and psy-
chological operations into their own separate program and the estab-
lishment of Special Operations as a separate branch [Ref. 6:pp. 22-29;
Ref. 8:pp. 7-918
Of these later studies, the FAO Enhancement Plan of 1985 is by
far the most important. It
formally put in motion the recommendations of the Hutton Study,
DCSOPS assumed proponency, the number of FAO billets was
streamlined, a typical FAO career path was established, and the
four phases of training were reaffirmed. [Ref. 8:p. 8]
More specifically, the 1,300 FAO "slots" were weeded down to about
760 true positions. Captains were barred from the program until they
were deemed to be "fully qualified" in their primary branch (infantry,
armor, military intelligence, etc.). This "fully qualified" status is gen-
erally accepted to mean successful command of a company. The
emphasis on FAO training was returned to creating regional expertise
(vice country or Job-specific expertise) in an effort to turn away from
the earlier push to prepare advisors for duty in specific nations.
8For insight into the new Civil Affairs/Psychological Operations
functional area (FA 39). see Reference 9.
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The new, streamlined program also meant a drop in new acces-
sions from 250 to 300 officers per year to around 135. This number is
still significantly greater than the other services, but the Army has
maintained this level and promised to ensure all 135 volunteers that
they will be "fully trained." The criteria for selecting these 135 offi-
cers was also enhanced, accepting only volunteers (who may indicate
their volunteer status in their fifth yeair of service but who will not
normally begin training before their seventh year) who are "branch
qualified," have acceptable scores on the Defense Language Aptitude
Battery (DLAB) (acceptable scores vary by proposed language diffi-
culty), have baccalaureate degrees and pass the Graduate Record
Examination with scores that would make an officer eligible to attend
a "prestige university," are eligible for a security clearance, and whose
health would allow for assignment world-wide [Ref. 101.
Obviously, the individuals who are accepted must meet some fairly
stringent standards before they begin training. But before I describe
the four phases of the Army FAO training program, let us review
specifically what the Army wants a FAO to be when the long training
process is complete.
B. ARMY GOALS AND TRAINING FOR THE FAO
To answer the question of what the Army wants In a FAO, I would
offer the following excerpts from a letter sent to newly selected FAOs:
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Congratulations on your selection and designation as a Foreign
Area Officer!
..2. The FAO selection process is stringent because the profes-
sion of "Soldier-Statesman" demands that officers acquire and
maintain skills and qualifications unique to the specialty:
a You are expected to be a SOLDIER. The professional exper-
tise and skills of your basic branch and the competencies, ethics,
and values demanded of all commissioned officers are the founda-
tion of your credibility as a FAO. Your assignments will alternate
between branch material and FAO functional area positions.
b. You are expected to be a LINGUIST in a foreign language of
your designated regional area of concentration (AOC). Your ability
to communicate orally and in writing with foreign officials
involved in political-military affairs is critical to your credibility
and effectiveness, and will contribute materially to accomplishing
U.S. foreign policy objectives.
c. You are expected to be a POLITICAL-MILITARY SPECIAL-
IST, with an in-depth knowledge of U.S. and foreign politicail-
military relationships. This knowledge includes understanding the
processes of formulating U.S. national security and foreign poli-
cies, the political role of military forces in government, and the
interface of political, economic, socio-cultural, and military envi-
ronment in the development of national policies.
d. You are expected to be a REGIONAL EXPERT, with a
detailed understanding of the region's politics, economies, cul-
tures, military forces, geostrategic importance, and applicable
U.S. interests/policies. The analysis of regional issues— as a basis
for advice to policymakers— is the principal function FAOs perform
in the Army and the Department of Defense. [Ref. Ill
The goal set by the Army is a hard one to reach. To create a com-
bination soldier/linguist/political-military specialist/regional expert is
a difficult task and one that takes time, money, and prodigious effort
by the officer, yet the Army accomplishes this goal year after year
through the four-phase program which begins with a mere seven-day




The first step to becoming an Army FAO, the Foreign Area Officer
Course, has seen almost as many changes as the Army FAO program in
general. It was born at the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare School at
Fort Bragg, North Carolina, and for many years was six months long.
During those six months, officers were given a host of "quick courses"
to try to cover their lack of more formal education (in many cases) and
to get them into field positions more quickly. From talking to past
graduates of this course as well as interviews with officers who are
currently reviving the progrsim to use in the new Functional Area
39/Civil Affairs, the author has learned that officers were given 40
hours of training on their region of interest, 20 hours on other
regions, and additional training on civil affairs, psychological opera-
tions, fundamentals of intelligence, and similar courses. It is safe to say
that the course eventually died from lack of interest, as less than 45
percent of Army FAOs attended the full course, with the number
dropping to less than 30 percent at the end.^
This course did not, however, remain dead. It has been resur-
rected and shortened into an extremely useful one-week course, given
}
twice a year at the Defense Language Institute/Foreign Language Cen-
;
ter in Monterey, California. I attended the January 1989 class of the !
^These percentages were provided by Major Cary and confirmed
by LTC Wise at DLI/FLC.
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FAOC and, although the course is geared for an Army FAO, I found the
training to be very useful.
Lieutenant Colonel Christopher Wise, U.S. Army, runs the course
and provides a very full week of presentations by guests from the aca-
demic community and various government agencies, by FAOs assigned
to DLI/FLC, and by their spouses. I found the inclusion of spouses to be
a particularly good idea because the officer's full family needs to adjust
to the demanding program of language school, graduate schooling, and
the in-country training that comes later.
The week starts with LTC Wise, members of the Army FAO Propo-
nent Team, and representatives for the Army's military personnel
center telling the new FAO exactly what this program will mean to
their careers. FAOs are told exactly what is expected of them In each
phase of the training and reassured that their language training and
graduate schooling will be utilized during their in-country training
phase and again, later in their careers. Questions are taken after each
briefing, at the breaks, and at every other opportunity throughout the
day. This procedure helps new FAOs get a clear understanding of
where they are going from the start and provides a long list of names
and phone numbers of people to turn to if problems arise as their pro-
grams progress.
As the week progresses, new FAOs are introduced to the world of
international relations from a political science rather than from a
military perspective. They are also given briefings on the Department
of State and. since most FAO's will be depending on a U.S. embassy for
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support during the final phase of their training, a detailed discussion
of how an embassy works is provided.
The next topic covered Is a discussion of the U.S. intelligence
community. Although the FAOs are repeatedly reminded that they will
not be functioning in any type of intelligence role throughout their
four phases of training, the intelligence community continues to need
trained FAOs for many assignments and the briefings provided are
often the FAO's only training on this area.
Along with possible future assignments in intelligence, the FAO
might expect to be selected for a job in the attache corps or in secu-
rity assistance. Therefore, speakers from the Defense Attache system
and the Defense Security Agency each get a day to discuss their roles
and needs for FAOs. In both cases, experienced FAOs who have held
positions in these areas provide insights from their own experiences.
Finally, the role of political-military staff officer is discussed by
LTC Wise, who also provides a case study to demonstrate the roles
FAOs play in helping to formulate and Implement U.S. foreign policy.
This week-long program consists of the above lectures and two panel
discussions, the panels being staffed in one case by FAOs from varying
regions at different stages in their careers, and in the second case by
their wives, who gave their side of the stories. It gets the new FAO
family started off on the best possible footing. The strong support net-
work begun through this first phase is continued throughout the lan-
guage portion of the FAO's training by way of "mentors," senior
officers at DLI/FIX: who are Individually assigned to help each FAO, and
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by a regular newsletter that keeps FAOs informed about changes in
their new career field. LTC Wise has added an even greater informa-
tion access channel through the creation of a computer Information
network called FAONET.
The FAO course that died from neglect at Fort Bragg is thriving at
DLI/FLC due to the direct interest taken by the Army in the program.
The program is staffed and run at all levels by FAOs who are experts in
filling the needs of the Army. The FAO Proponent Team benefits both
from having direct access to the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations
through his office for Strategy, Plans, and Policy and from its direct
relationship with the individuals involved in making FAO assignments.
The FAOC sets the goals for the FAO to achieve in each of the next
three phases.
D. LANGUAGE TRAINING
The second step in the FAO training process is language training
and, although I intend to look at language training in much greater
detail in a later chapter, I think it is important to look at how the
Army views language training.
The Army views language training as progressive. Rather than
expecting DLI/FLC to turn out a fluent linguist in a year or less, the
Army sees only the foundation for fluency as being laid there. On top of
this foundation, further language skills will be built at both graduate
school and, most importantly, through in-country immersion.
This outlook, coupled with the expressed willingness to switch
the FAO to a different regional language if the first one proves too
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difficult, is very productive. Taking the language first and not pushing
for immediate fluency allows officers to better handle this extremely
difficult phase of training. They are motivated by the knowledge that
they will put the language to good use both in graduate studies and in
the time abroad and are reassured that they will have a chance to
greatly improve their language skills before ending their training.
This is not to suggest that the officer is not encouraged to achieve
the highest level of language proficiency possible at DLI/FLC. There is
a standardized measurement scale for language proficiency within the
armed forces that ranges from to 5, as established by a multi-service
commission. On this scale, 0+ is equated with a very limited language
capability, able to translate, for example, only the occasional word or
phrase, while a 5 level is native speaker proficiency. The goal of the
FAO is to achieve a 2 level (or "working proficiency") at the end of the
DLI/FLC tour and eventually raise this to a 3 level (or "general profes-
sional proficiency") by the end of all language training (to include
tutoring and/or other in-country training).
Depending on a host of factors, to include the difficulty of the lan-
guage, the officer's previous exposure to it, the officer's general lan-
guage learning aptitude, and the type of language test administered,
the 2 level goal may or may not be a reasonable expectation. Again,
language will be discussed in greater detail later and the important
point here is merely to note that the Army is flexible on the language
taken and provides the FAO the opportunity to study the language in
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three of the phases of its training program (at DLI/FLC, graduate
school, and in-country).
E. GRADUATE SCHOOL
The next phase of the Army program is the graduate schooling
phase. During the 18 months of graduate education the Army pays for,
it expects the FAQ to pursue "in-depth academic studies on a given
regional area leading to a Masters degree from a recognized high
quality academic institution. "(Ref. 12]
When the FAO Enhancement Program reduced the number of FAQ
slots by more than 600 positions, certain high-level officers in the
Army decided that the remaining FAOs would be afforded the oppor-
tunity to attend "prestigious" schools. The idea was that these officers
would attend universities like Harvard, Yale, Stanford, and other Ivy
League schools in order to have impeccable credentials that would
match any State Department Foreign Service Officer, lo
To date, this plan of the Army to turn out only "Ivy League FAOs"
has not fully succeeded. In spite of the requirements of having ORE
scores of 1100 or better and acceptable undergraduate records to
i^o identify what "prestigious" schools would be acceptable, the
Army turned to the Department of Education listing of schools that
have qualified for matching government funds under Title VI of the
National Defense Education Act. This act, set up as a result of concerns
about the quality of the American educational system in the wake of
the Sputnik launch, provided matching funds for universities that
would set up centers for language and area studies. For a complete
review of this subject, see Reference 13.
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qualify for admission to top-level universities, the 135 FAO applicants
per year do not all find themselves in Harvard. Yale, Stanford, and the
like. What results is numerous waiver requests as FAOs scramble to get
into schools that often are not "name" schools and which in some
cases do not have programs in their area of study. Many a FAO has
found himself in a history or political science department, trying to
create an area studies program by picking and choosing from a laundry
list of courses, or, worse, majoring in departments like Chinese Lan-
guage and Literature and learning more about Han Dynasty poetry than
about the People's Republic of China or contemporary Asia in
general. 11
The Army at least tries to point the student in the right direction
by providing a two-page list of "graduate school educational objectives"
but a number of factors get in the way of the officer fulfilling these
objectives. Among the problems officers face at civilian colleges are
continuing ill feelings toward having a military student on a civilian
campus, the difficulty in creating a policy-oriented graduate program
when the academic bureaucracy has assigned responsibility for "eirea
studies" students to a non-policy-oriented department, the relative
inflexibility created by the Army student's schedule of 18 months (e.g..
11 Interviews with the Army FAO Proponent Team brought this
problem to light. In response, the Army has sent surveys to the col-
leges that they currently use to find out how well these schools are
prepared to meet the Army's need for more policy-oriented courses.
To date, most of the colleges have not bothered to reply.
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if a professor is on sabbatical or if for some reason a course is not
offered during those months, the elements that make a program
"prestigious" may be missing from the Army FAO's program), and the
fact that Army students are terminal Masters degree students (as
opposed to many of their peers who will be seeking Ph.D.s) may all
lead to a less than satisfactory educational experience.
Many of the FAOs I interviewed during the FAO course at DLI/FLC
told me they had applied to a number of prestigious schools at their
own expense, but expected to attend a college in their home state
where relatives could help with housing difficulties and other prob-
lems of living in a civilian community for 18 months. Many of the new
FAOs also told me they were particularly handicapped in trying to get
into a good university by the fact that their language training would
end in the late fall or early winter, while most universities required
them to start in August or September.
In 1985, the Army ended its relationship with a military school
that had been satisfactorily fulfilling its graduate education needs. The
United States Naval Postgraduate School is an accredited graduate
school which offers Masters degree programs in area studies and is
located less than five miles from DLl/FIX!. For many years, it served as
one of the primary sources of graduate education for Army FAOs^2 and
it continues to serve the needs of the Air Force, the Navy, and most
i2The alumni list 1 used for mailing surveys lists 241 graduates
from the Army.
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recently the Marine Corps. The Department of National Security-
Affairs at the Naval Postgraduate School provides area studies special-
ization in several regions, including the Soviet Union and Europe,
Latin America, the Middle East, and North Africa, and the Asia-Pacific
sub-regions. However, as an institution that is fully funded by the fed-
eral government, its name cannot appear on the DOE Title VI list of
schools that receive matching federal Junds, so the Army has disquali-
fied it from the list of possible FAO schools, although Army officers
continue to attend NPS for other degrees. This "Catch-22'' situation,
and the Army's focus on equating a school's presence or absence on
the Title VI list as a rating of its "quality," are all that prevent the
Army from saving an average of $8,000 per FAO by using the same
school the other three services use.^^
When the Army moved the FAO course to DLI/FLC. it saved a per-
manent change of station (PCS) move and the associated costs for its
officers between Fort Bragg and Monterey. Additional money could be
saved by similarly using NPS for its graduate schooling. Not only would
the officer not have to move after language school but NPS would also
provide housing for the FAO throughout his time in Monterey and
would offer the officer the option of completing his degree in 12
i^These savings are based on the average cost of civilian graduate
education, $14,000, as provided by Major Cary, versus the cost of an
NPS degree. $6,000.
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months rather than 18 months if need be and would allow the officer
to start in either June or January, instead ofjust in the fall.^"*
F. IN-COUNTRY PHASE
Finally, when graduate training is complete and the officers have
their degrees in hand, the fourth and final phase of training begins.
This is the in-country phase of the Army program and it is unique to
the Army and Marine Corps. During this phase, the FAO is administra-
tively assigned to the Army's Intelligence and Security Command but
will most likely be directly supervised by an Army attache at a foreign
embassy. Programs vary widely for in-country training and, in fact, this
phase of training may force modifications in the other phases. As the
types of in-countiy training can best be subdivided into five different
patterns, a survey of these patterns will serve to clarify my point.
1. The "Foreign MiUtary School Pattern"
This is the most favored pattern of most FAOs because it pro-
vides opportunities to interact with military elites in one's area of
interest, additional training in the target language, and a chance to live
and travel in the foreign country. This pattern usually follows the
"normal" path of FAO training: first the one-week FAOC, then language
training at DLl/FLC, followed by graduate schooling. Next, the FAOs go
i"*! was informed by Dr. Edward Laurance, who was the original
Academic Associate and co-author of the area studies curriculum at
NPS, that these factors accounted for the original decision by the
Army to begin sending student to NPS (Ref. 14].
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to a country in their region of training and attend some form of formal
military training school. These schools are usually roughly equivalent
to our Command and General Staff Colleges and are taught in the for-
eign tongue.
Because officers are immersed in the foreign language and
must function academically as well as socially in it, they must quickly
gain fluency. Tutors are provided from Army funds when necessary
and, in most cases, this pattern is limited to cases in which the for-
eign language is relatively easy to master.
2. The "Tough Language Pattern"
This is the program used when the target language is Chi-
nese, Japanese, Korean, or Arabic— all four of which are rated as the
most difficult for English speakers to master. ^ 5 jn this pattern, we
again see the FAOC, followed by a full year at DLI/FLC, and then gradu-
ate school. Following these three phases, the FAO will be sent to Hong
Kong, Japan, Korea, or Morocco (respectively) for an additional year to
18 months of language instruction and regional travel.
As in the past, the Army utilizes State Department training
facilities, under the control of the Foreign Service Institute, for train-
ing its FAOs. This reliance on civilian facilities occasionally results in
^^In a study of the DLPT scores obtained by all officer students
over a three-year period at DLI/FLC, after a 47-week basic course less
than 18% scored an L2/R2/S2 in Chinese, less than 34% scored an
L2/R2/S2 in Japanese, less than 7% scored an L2/R2/S2 in Korean,
and less than 14% scored an L2/R2/S2 in Arabic.
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some friction because the FAOs are often frustrated by their lack of
contact with military terminology and native speakers from the armed
forces, but on the whole the program does very well. There is a heavy
emphasis in the fourth phase of this pattern on trying to bring the
FAOs up to a 2 or 3 level in their language, but time is still set aside for
numerous trips and tours to provide real-world opportunities for lan-
guage use as well as to improve the FAO's knowledge of the area. In
' fact, soon after arriving, each FAO must draw up an Individual program
I
of instruction (POI) which spells out the intended accomplishments of
!
the in-country tour in addition to language skill improvement. This
i
plan is approved by the defense attache and the FAO Proponent Team
and is tracked throughout the tour.
FAOs will also accomplish a mid-tour report and an end-of-
tour report while in this phase, detailing changes to their original
plans, describing their experiences, and making recommendations for
future students. Additionally, each FAO is required to file a trip report
after returning from any form of in-country or regional travel. These
unclassified trip reports are unusually useful sources of information on
the current conditions within countries and copies are provided to the
FAO Proponent Team, the staff of the FAOC, the language departments
at DLI/FI>C, and other interested agencies. FAOs who are in their sec-
ond phase of training are encouraged to read and correspond with the
writers of these reports because these individuals are a useful source
of information about what is ahead.
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3. The "Soviet Pattern"
Of course, some countries are not agreeable to letting Ameri-
can Army officers come to their country, study their language, and
wander around the area on their time off. The Soviet Union is one
such nation and, due to the interest the U.S. continues to have in this
nation, qualifies for its own pattern. This "Soviet Pattern" also follows
the norm until the last phase is reached. The FAO attends the FAOC,
then DLI/FLC, then graduate school, and then travels to the city of
Garmisch in the Federal Republic of Germany. Here the FAO will
attend the Army's Russian Language Institute and will earn the virtual
equivalent of another Master's degree. The differences between this
second degree and his first degree are twofold: the degree earned in
Garmisch will take a full two years and all courses will be taught in
Russian. Once FAOs survive this four and one-half year gauntlet (i.e.,
FAOC, year of Russian at DLI/FLC, 18 months of graduate school, and
two years at USApy), they will be absolutely proficient in Russian and
may, in fact, find their next assignment as a member of the White
House-Moscow communications link team.
4. The "Pure Regional Travel Pattern"
The fourth pattern is used when travel is not a problem but
finding an acceptable military school and/or deciding what language
would be best to study in a region are. For obvious reasons, this pattern
is labeled the "Pure Regional Travel Pattern" and it is most often used
in Africa. FAOs are usually assigned to one of the U.S. embassies and,
just as in the other patterns, must create and follow a POI, but they are
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much more free than their counterparts in the other patterns to set
goals and travel at will.
5. The "Indian Subcontinent Pattern"
The fifth and last pattern differs from the rest in interesting
ways. First of all, language training under this pattern usually takes
place in-country and lasts for only six months. Following this, the FAO
attends a full year of military schooling and will then spend an addi-
tional six months in regional travel. The graduate education phase is
"fit in," either before the FAO starts the above program or afterweird.i®
None of these patterns is carved in stone. Reporting dates for
foreign military schools have frequently been known to force FAOs to
alter their plans. Also, unique opportunities to serve with foreign offi-
cers on United Nations peacekeeping forces or in similar organiza-
tions may be deemed to be suitable substitutes for more formal
in-country training. The important point is that the Army FAO pro-
gram has such plans, has the support of the highest levels of its com-
mand structure in implementing its plans, and keeps the program
going by only using FAOs to run the program. The result, at the end of
training, is a highly trained specialist who is ready for employment in
intelligence functions, attache duty, security assistance duty, political-
military assignments, or any such related field. Therefore, the next
logical question is, what does the Army do with its newly minted FAO?
i^All of the patterns I discuss were presented to me in interviews
with LTC Wise. The names for the patterns are his also.
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G. THE EMPLOYMENT OF THE TRAINED ARMY FAO
It is emplojring their FAOs once they are fully trained that the
Army runs into some problems. Remember, we started this training
with young Captains who were entering their seventh year of service
(in most cases). Now, after spending six months to a year at DLI/FLC,
18 months in graduate schooling, and one to two years in in-country
training, they emerge from the training pipeline as new Majors— hav-
ing been away from their branch (infantry, armor, etc.) for three to five
years! This is a long time for an officer to be in "training" and the
result usually is that the newly trained officer will not be used as a FAO
but rather will return to his or her branch of origin to serve as a
battalion-level executive officer or on a staff for three to four years.
The Army term for this cycle of spending a tour with one's basic
branch, then doing a FAO-type tour, and then repeating is "The Dual-
Track" system. Captain Stoner talked about this system extensively in
his paper and, in his words,
This dual-track career path forces FAOs to make awkward choices
throughout their military service. These choices potentially affect
their chances for promotion. Senior Service school selection, and
the quality of life their families will face. This issue is one of
career uncertainty for officers considering the program. [Ref. 8:p.
b. Executive Summary]
Ideally, the dual-track career system would work as follows: following
the FAOs' completion of training, they would return to their branches
of assignment as executive officers or battalion-level staff officers. After
this tour, he or she would then have a FAO tour, serving in
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intelligence, in security assistance, as an attache, or in a similar politi-
cal-military job. 17 Following this FAO tour, the officer would ideally
take command of a battalion or serve on a battalion staff and then,
again, return to a FAO tour. During this alternating assignment pattern
the officer would, of course, be promoted to 0-5 and 0-6 and find time
to attend a senior service school.
However, fitting all of these assignments and schools together in
the real world is an extremely difficult chore, owing as much to luck
as to good planning to work. This fact is not so much due to problems
in the FAO program or the dual-track system as the enormous difficul-
ties involved in running the complex Army personnel management
system. After talking to officers who work in the Army personnel sys-
tem at the FAOC, it appears that they do not have the time or man-
power to actually ensure that positions in either track are assigned to
meet the individual FAO's career needs but rather must quickly find a
"qualified" individual to fill a vacant position. Often, being a warm body
who is eligible for reassignment will clinch a choice assignment for an
officer even if said officer is not the best possible choice for the job.
i^Actual FAO positions by job type are provided by Stoner [Ref. 8:p.
27] and are reproduced below:
FUNCTION POSITIONS (%)
Attache 133 (17.4%)
Senior Security Officer 90 (11.8%)
Political-Military Officer 418 (54.8%)
• Plans/Policy 228 (29.8%)
• Intelligence 191 (25.0%)
Instructor (language) 122 (16.0%)
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The internal politics that play an ever-increasing role in an officer's
life as field and flag grades are reached and command positions
become increasingly attractive provide disincentives for the FAOs to
take jobs outside their branches (as attaches, etc.) at the very ranks
where such FAO-type job opportunities expand dramatically (i.e., 0-5
and 0-6).
The problem of trying to create and maintain an individual who is
both a soldier and a statesman has no ideal solution. Although some
officers, Stoner included, would argue that the Army should offer a
single-track FAO career field to members who would desire such a
career this suggestion undermines the credibility of the program. If
only a linguist/regional expert/political-military specialist were
needed to fill a FAO role, then the State Department could fill the
position with a FSO. Instead, the Army must try to keep its FAOs cur-
rent on their military skills (or, in their terms, keep them "green") as
well as keep the FAOs current in their language amd regional expertise.
The fact that most of the writers who urge a single-track system forget
is that FAOs must be first and foremost military officers. Their greatest
contributions will be in planning military actions in their areas of
expertise, not in their diplomatic skills.
With the above fact in mind, few suggestions to improve the
Army's dual-track system can be made, even if this system does cause
"difficult career choices." Other recommendations can be made for
improving this already extensive program.
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H. PROBLEMS AND RECOMMENDATIONS CONCERNING THE
ARMY FAO PROGRAM
The first suggestion is that the Army reconsider its graduate
schooling decision. Having read what they themselves want their FAQs
to learn during their graduate school phase and knowing what is actu-
ally taking place as far as where FAQs are going to school, it appears
that the Army is missing a major opportunity by not also using the
program available at the Naval Postgraduate School.
More importantly, the Army's decision to leave NFS and the drive
to crate what could be called "Ivy League FAOs" has eliminated the
chance to train FAOs from all services together in a joint environment.
Many of the FAOs from all services will eventually serve in the joint
arena (as attaches, on security assistance teams, with DIA, at the Major
Commands, etc.), and the absence of the Army is all that prevents joint
working relationships being established among FAOs very early in their
careers. The Naval Postgraduate School and the Defense Language
Institute/Foreign Language Center could serve to help and strengthen
one another if this "prestige" question could be resolved. Already. NPS
informally allows FAOs at DLI/FLC to audit courses if they so desire yet
there is no obvious effort underway to reverse the Army's earlier deci-
sion. If lost, the unique opportunity NPS offers for officers of all ser-
vices to study foreign areas and U.S. policy toward those nations
together will not be regained. By allowing even a fourth of the 135 new
FAOs the Army brings in each year to attend NPS. the Army would
greatly contribute to joint education in foreign area studies and get a
better educated FAO in the bargain.
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The second recommendation is that the Army review the effects
the FAO program has had on its intelligence career field. I have talked
with several organizations that employ FAOs and In an interview at one
of the largest, the Defense Intelligence Agency. I came across an
interesting attitude. ^^ It seems that the Army FAO program's product
i
is so well respected that agencies like DIA are afraid to ask for non-
FAO-trained officers. As one official in charge of DIA personnel selec-
tion told me, if DIA does not request a FAO to fill an Army slot in its
military manpower pool, it tends to get an "under-educated Army
intelligence officer who only understand tactical intelligence. We then
have to try to educate him or her on the strategic intelligence
environment."
Thus, the "all or nothing" approach to training Army FAOs has
tended to create increasing demands for them in jobs that may or may
not really require FAOs and disdain for non-FAO Army assets. The FAO
officer who fills one of these slots is likewise likely to feel underuti-
lized, as demonstrated in a letter by Army FAO Major George G. Boyd
[Ref. 15).
Major Boyd is a Southeast Asia FAO who completed the Royal Thai
Command and General Staff College as his in-country training and had
hoped for a "utilization tour" (i.e., FAO assignment) with the Joint U.S.
iSDecember 1988.
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Military Assistance Group in Thailand. Instead, he was assigned to the
Intelligence Center, Pacific (IPAC) as an intelligence analyst. He wrote,
As a desk officer at IPAC I have spent the last year learning the
military analyst's trade. I was pretty well equipped to handle the
information concerning my countries, and I can deal with the
writing requirements— no complaints there. And I have had many
opportunities that the other desk officers, who are not FAOs, have
not had. nor do they seem to have a requirement for. Many do not
have the advantage provided by the area-orientation program
during FAO in-country training. In the civilian marketplace I
would probably be out of a job because I would be "over-qualified."
[Ref. 15 (emphasis added)]
This officer appears to be thoroughly discouraged by his situation
and can hardly be blamed. After a full year of Thai language training, a
graduate degree, and his excellent in-country experience, he finds
himself spending yet another year "learning the military analyst's
trade" alongside officers from other services who have not been
through his experiences but. as intelligence professionals, are perhaps
more capable of carrying out the mission at hand. He also writes that,
in his opinion,
...our Thai-FAO training program is unproductive (in the long-
term), that our FAO branch managers are unable or unwilling to
assist in correcting assignment procedures which have the
potential to damage individual careers because of command mis-
management and misunderstanding.
One may or may not agree with these assessments, but the result is a
need for the Army to begin either sending more Intelligence officers
through the FAO program (less than 20 percent of FAO slots go to
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intelligence officers currentiy)^^ or to create and advertise alternative
programs to enhance the ability of the Army intelligence officer to
handle strategic intelligence missions.
Finally, it would be highly advisable for the Army to start demand-
ing that the other services pull their own weight in filling FAO needs.
In interviews with Army officials, I was told that the Army member of
Defense Attache Offices (DAOs). joint peacekeeping forces, and similar
operations was often relied on to serve as chief interpreter, point of
contact between American forces and the host country, head of proto-
col, etc. because he was a "known quantity." In other words, the other
services were able to avoid the costs borne by the Army FAO program
because joint missions would include an Army FAO and could make do
with less qualified officers from other services by letting him take care
of most of the details. This "free rider" position on the part of the
other services (the Air Force and Navy in particular) is not in anyone's
best interest and violates the intent of having joint-service missions.
As the federal budget tightens, the Army should demand that the
other services beef up their own programs to better share the FAO
burden.
i^According to the Army FAO Proponent Team Briefing slides.
Combat Arms branches (Infantry, Armor, Air Defense, Aviation, and
Special Forces) get more than 70% of Army FAO slots, 23% are given
to Combat Support branches (which include not only Military Intelli-
gence but also Military Police, Signal Corps, and Engineers), and the
remaining 5% is given to Combat Service branches (Adjutant General,
Finance, Chemical, Ordnance, Quartermaster, and Transportation).
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IV. THE FAO PROGRAMS OF THE MARINE CORPS AND NAVY
A. THE MARINE CORPS FAO PROGRAM
1. Goals
The goals of the Marine Corps FAO Program sound much like
those put forth in the Army program. Specifically,
The FAO Program is designed to train selected officers in the lan-
guages, military forces, culture, history, sociology, economics,
politics, and geography of selected areas of the world. A secondary
purpose of the FAO Program is to identify those officers who, by
virtue of family, academic or professional background, already
possess a level of linguistic and area expertise comparable to that
gained by those officers trained under the auspices of the FAO
Study Program. The goal of the FAO Program is to identify and
prepare participants for future assignments to high-level Marine
Corps/joint/combined staffs in operations, planning, or intelli-
gence billets, and for duty with the Defense Attache System. [Ref,
16:para. 31
2. Selection and the "Formal Study Track"
Major Walter McTernan is currently the head of both the FAO
Proponent Team and the Personnel Exchange Program at Headquar-
ters, United States Marine Corps, in Washington, D.C. There, he con-
centrates on finding Marines to meet the above-stated goals. To do
this, he relies on the FAO program laid out in Marine Corps Order
1520.11C.
Currently, the Marine Corps also has a type of "dual-track"
FAO program, the difference being that their two tracks are means of
acquiring FAOs rather than using the term for a post-training man-
agement system. The two tracks have been labeled the "Formal Study
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Track" and the "Experience Track" and both offer a way of speedily
increasing the number of Marine FAOs, either by voluntairy recruit-
ment or by "capture."
The Formal Study Track currently starts four Msirine officers
a year on a two-year course of study which will result in the awaird of
Military OccupaUonal Specialty (MOS) 994X.20 The first stop for these
four will be the Defense Language Institute/Foreign Language Center
(DLI/FLC), where one will take Chinese (Mandarin), one will take Rus-
sian, one will take Spanish, and one will take Arabic. As all of these
languages, except Spanish, require a full year of study, only a single
year remains available for additional study due to the strict require-
ment that FAO training take no more than 24 months [Ref. 16:p. 6,
subpara. 8]
After completing their language training, each officer pro-
ceeds to in-country training (called "Phase 11" training). For the Chi-
nese and Russian student, Phase II will mean some formal education,
with the former attending the National University of Singapore and
the latter going to the U.S. Army Russian Institute (USARI) in
Garmisch, West Germany. However, neither will receive a degree from
20The final numeral in the MOS code designates the region of
specialization. MCO 1520. IIC lists the following codes and meanings:
9941- Latin America 9944- Middle East/North Africa 9947-West Europe
9942- U.S.S.R 9945- Sub-Saharan Africa 9948- East Asia
9943- P.RC. 9946- Southwest Asia 9949- East Europe
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his respective school because both will be withdrawn from the pro-
grams after a single year (due to the strict time limit).
The Spanish and Arabic students will receive less than the
single year of training their counterparts get but will instead travel to
Valparizo, Chile, and Rabat, Morocco to continue their studies without
the benefit of formal educational guidance. During this time, both will
enroll in whatever local language schools and/or academic programs
they can set up. They are also eligible to be called on to act as transla-
tors for American forces that visit their regions for exercises. Also,
both will normally make contact with their host country's military
forces and act as informal liaisons between these forces and the
Marine Corps.
Regardless of program, all are given ample time and money to
travel throughout the country in which they are assigned and through-
out the region. In addition, all four will be put into some type of addi-
tional language training/tutoring to try to bring their linguistic skills
up to the desired 2 or 3 level.
In the Marine philosophy regarding FAOs, language skills play
a very strong role. In fact. Major McTernan would go so far as to say
the Marine Corps seeks an officer who is "one-half linguist and one-
half a country expert" in their FAOs [Ref. 17] They, like the Army, are
willing to invest the time and money to send FAOs to their region of
interest where they can be immersed in the target language. They,
too. cite DLI/FLC as a place for building a foundation with the goal of
achieving a skill level of 2, but stress that this goal is often unachiev-
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able in difficult languages for officers without previous training and are
satisfied with a 2 level aifter the added second year of language
training.
The Marines have not been willing to Invest their money in
graduate degrees for their FAOs. As mentioned before, only two of the
four Formal Track FAOs a year go on to academic programs other than
simply additional language training, and even these two officers are
withdrawn before finishing an academic program. This situation will
change in the summer of 1989. when the first two Marine officers
report to the Naval Postgraduate School to begin graduate programs in
the East Asia and Latin America programs.
Technically, these two students cannot count their graduate
schooling as part of their official FAO program. The strict two-year
training rule prevents this "official" addition of graduate education to
the FAO program but nevertheless the Marines being sent were
selected to attend the Naval Postgraduate School in preparation for
the start of their FAO training. This change is part of an expansion of
the Marine FAO program that will result in the doubling of inputs to
eight Marines per year and the coverage of regions such as Eastern
Europe and Southeast Asia, which have been neglected in the smaller
previous program. As currently envisioned, one of the four added FAO
inputs will study Portuguese (to expand Latin American coverage), one
will study a East European lamguage with the possibility that a second
Russian student will be substituted in alternating years, one will study
an Asian language other than Chinese, and the fourth will study
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Hebrew or an alternative non-Arabic language. No coverage for Africa is
foreseen at this time.
3. Selection and the "Experience Track**
Officers who hold regular, unrestricted commissions (as
opposed to a reserve or limited duty commission) have between seven
and 14 years of service, are serving as Captains or Majors, are college
graduates (baccalaureate degree), and pass a few other restrictions^
i
may apply. Their applications go through a screening process that
includes the Marine Deputy Chief of Staff for Manpower's office and
will ultimately be decided upon by a board that convenes each August
for the purpose of picking FAO candidates. The Marine Director of
Intelligence's office also gets involved, helping both to provide mem-
bers for the board and to fund the program.
Of course, as mentioned before, the Marine Corps does not
rely solely on this voluntary recruitment/board selection method to
gain needed FAOs. When 1 last visited Major McTeman at his office in
December 1988, he was pleased to tell me that he had added 14 more
FAOs to the Marines rolls that very day— at no cost to the Marine
Corps! The way the Marines manage to increase their FAO ranks so
quickly and cheaply is the other track for becoming a Marine FAO— the
21 Other requirements include a good record, a Secret clearance,
medical clearance for world-wide duty, U.S. citizenship (including U.S.
citizenship for all members of the officer's immediate family), and
Defense Language Aptitude Battery score of 110 or higher (within the
previous three years). [Ref. 16:pp. 4, 5]
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"Experience Track." Basically, what this involves is reviewing the
records of Marine officers who have had FAO-type Jobs in the past and
"capturing" them (to use Major McTernan's preferred phraseology)
for the FAO program. Therefore, any Marine officer who has served in
a Defense Attache position, on a security assistance mission, attended
a foreign military school through an officer exchange program, or lived
overseas for an extended period of time as an Olmstead or Fullbright
scholar, etc. is eligible to be "captured" by Major McTeman (i.e., have
the FAO MOS added to his records as an additional MOS), although
former attaches and Olmstead scholars are the most likely "victims."22
4. Problems and Recommendations
Certainly good arguments can be made both for and against
this non-voluntary program (i.e., the Experience Track). On one hand,
these officers have gained particular skills at government expense that
the Marine Corps should be able to tap as demanded. On the other
hand, although these officers might be easier to get up to speed on
language and area knowledge than an officer without their background
experiences, they cannot be expected to be current in their language
or regional knowledge and should not be accepted as "experts" Just
because they have some language skills on their records and they have
spent some time In the region. To bcc fair, those officers who are
22Major McTernan says that through these two programs the
Marine Corps FAO ranks have grown from 33 officers in 1987 to 97
officers today.
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notified that they are eligible for the FAO MOS should not be relied
upon in policy-making jobs unless they are willing to invest the time to
become knowledgeable on the current issues in their region.
This brings us to what may safely be identified as the major
failing of the Marine Corps FAO program: its need for education and
training more oriented toward specific regions. Aside from the two
officers who will be getting complete graduate educations at the Naval
Postgraduate School and the partial educations the Soviet and Chinese
FAOs currently receive in Garmisch and Singapore, the Marine FAOs
are generally expected to gain regional expertise through individual
study. The officers are not even provided a suggested readings list and
must rely on whatever material is available in the local marketplace.
Some of the more resourceful officers at DLI/FLC who can
find the time come to the Naval Postgraduate School informally for a
class or two or at least request reading guidance from the NPS profes-
sors. Others cannot even find the time to audit any classes and often
turn to magazines at DLI/FLC and/or NPS for their information. Given
the possibility that these same officers will eventually be looked to as
the "experts" in the Fleet Marine Force and other billets, I believe the
Marine Corps should immediately take steps to improve this situation.
One positive step the Marines have already taken has been to
begin sending their FAOs through the week-long regional courses
taught at the U.S. Air Force Special Operations School at Hurlburt
Field in Florida. Here courses are taught on Southeast Asia, Latin
America, the Middle East, and other regions by Air Force officers who
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are often graduates of the Naval Postgraduate School area studies pro-
grams. In the single week, the Marine FAO at least gets an introduc-
tion to the geography, history, culture, and religions of his region
through a series of films and lectures presented by the Air Force
instructors or, more often, by visiting experts from academia and
government.
I attended one of the Southeast Asia courses given at this
school to evaluate how well these courses famiiliarize the student with
a region in such an incredibly short time.23 What I found was an
intense yet entertaining course that gives the novice FAOs some basic
direction from which they can begin their self-study programs. The
lectures given by both the staff and visitors were interesting and
provided brief overviews of the countries and issues of the region.
More importantly, sample sources of more comprehensive
information, such as the Far East Economic Review and Asian Defense
Journal were distributed and the school's small library was well
stocked with books on individual countries and the region as a whole.
The programs offered at this school are probably the best, if not the
only, "short course" for FAOs currently available.
The Marines use other "short courses" in addition to the
U.S.A.F. Special Operations School to prepare their FAOs. Before the
two years are over. Marine FAOs can expect to attend a course on
23February 1989.
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terrorism awareness at Fort Bragg, a defensive driving course in
Washington, briefings by the Foreign Service Institute, and a number
of other classes offered by the Departments of Defense and State. Still,
these courses are not good substitutes for a complete graduate educa-
tion, which brings us to the subject of recommendations for the
Marine Corps FAO Program.
The Marine Corps has always had a reputation for being more
concerned with fighting than studying, and Major Les Stein demon-
strated that the Marine officer still questions the need for graduate
education. For example, only 35 percent of the officers Major Stein
polled stated they felt an officer's career suffered if he or she did not
have a graduate degree, and only 49 percent thought a graduate
degree would improve an officer's job performance (Ref. 181. However,
graduate training for a Marine FAO in a program designed to "train
selected officers in the languages, military forces, culture, history,
sociology, economics, politics, and geography of selected areas of the
world" [Ref. 16:subpara. 3] is not a question of "square-filling" or
"ticket punching"— graduate-level education is vital to fulfilling the
requirement. Therefore, I strongly recommend that the Marine Corps
increase the academic opportunities it affords its FAOs. At first, this
could simply be done by allowing the two officers who are going to the
National University in Singapore and the U.S. Army Russian Institute
to stay and complete the academic programs in which they are
enrolled. Also, as already mentioned, two Marine officers will begin
graduate training at the Naval Postgraduate School in the summer
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quarter of 1989. These two should serve as "test cases" and, providing
that the Marines are pleased with th education these two officers
receive, efforts should be made to expand this program, with an even-
tual goal of sending all eight Marine FAO Inputs to graduate school
each year. Here again, the Army's FAO program cam serve as a guide for
sequencing of training as it would be best for the Marines to continue
to send their officers to language school first, and then to graduate
school.
As for the Marine FAOs on the Experience Track, the Marines
should either arrange for refresher language courses and academic
opportunities for them to bring them up to the same level as the For-
mal Education enrollees or else designate their less than fully qualified
status by adding an additional code letter or number to their FAO MOS.
This is vital because the only thing worse than having a non-FAO offi-
cer in an important policy position is would be to have an unqualified
FAO officer in that position. If the FAO, regardless of service, is to have
continuing credibility, then all FAOs must be fully qualified to hold the
title. The Marine Corps is doing a pretty good job of upholding its side
on a tight budget and with a small officer corps to choose from.
Therefore, overall, I would rate their program second best to the Army
because the Marine Corps FAO program fails to provide the balanced
training in both language and area studies. They do meet the ideal bal-
ance criteria discussed in the previous chapter on the language side of
training; basic language training is balanced with practical language
experience opportunities offered by in-country training. However, the
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Marines lack the theory and education that would make their regional
travel and personal contacts with the target region culture useful. As
previously discussed, the FAO cannot fully absorb the lessons offered
by living in the region without a strong foundation of knowledge con-
cerning what he is experiencing.
This "second-best" rating should concern the Marine FAOs
because, when the time comes for them to be assigned to FAO billets,
they will very likely find themselves working side by side with Army
FAOs. Aside from a limited number of Marine FAO billets at Headquar-
ters Marine Corps and the Fleet Marine Forces, the majority of billets
are on joint staffs, at the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), on allied
and United Nations commands, and with the war-fighting commands.
While on one hand these chances for "joint duty" may prove to be a
strong boost to an officer's career and induce more Marines to seek
FAO designation, on the other hand these "joint duty" positions could
be extraordinarily damaging to the FAO's career if he or she is ill-
prepared for the demands entailed. Marine FAOs could quickly find
themselves in a difficult and embarrassing position if their views on
ground warfare issues clash with Army FAOs while they are both
advising a third party and the Marine FAO is viewed as less qualified
than the Army counterpart. Since "jointness" appears to be the wave
of the future, the Marines, like the Navy and the Air Force, must
reevaluate the costs involved in turning out FAOs who can match the
Army or. if not. reconcile themselves to continuing to let the Army
dominate the decision-making process in the joint arena.
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B. THE NAVY PROGRAM
1. Different Goals and Different Philosophy
Ironically, it is the Navy, which owns the Naval Postgraduate
School that has trained hundreds of FAOs and continues to meet any
service's needs, that does not have a real FAO program.24 Nor does the
Navy appear to be interested in establishing a FAO program in the near
future. The closest thing the Navy does have to a FAO Proponent Team
is OP-602, which is the Navy office in the Pentagon that is charged
with managing the political-military (Pol-Mil) subspecialist in the
Navy's ranks. Captain Figueras, USN, who heads OP-602, gave the Navy
views that follow and, in doing so, tried to explain how the Navy's self-
perceived role in the Department of Defense has led it to turning out
FAOs for others yet not for itself.
The fundamental philosophy the Navy uses in setting up its
program differs radically from the other services. According to Captain
Figueras, the Navy expects an officer who has just completed the area
specialist program here at NPS (or elsewhere) to have an awareness of
24The stated objective of the National Security Affairs curricula of
NPS is:
To provide graduate subspecialists in the field of security affairs
with regional area specialists. Specific objectives are: familiarity
with a geopolitical region in terms of its global strategic impor-
tance; ability to assess major trends relating to policy choices in
domestic and foreign affairs; familiarity with regional military and
political relations and regional defense agreements; knowledge of :
the geography, principal resources, political relationships of the
region to the rest of the world, culture and religions of the region,
|
and current religions. [Ref 19]
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staff work and research skills, to basically understand the Washington
scene (i.e.. political realities as applied to military programs), and a
foundation established on which the specific skills needed can be
built. It is more important for the new Pol-Mil specialist to understand
concepts such as how treaties influence decision making than try to
train someone who can walk in and do any job right off the bat. The
officer may not know exactly which issues are hot at the moment, but
he or she should understand the relations of the area well enough to
see how the issue of the moment will affect regional relations. He gave
an example of a country wanting to purchase a specific weapon sys-
tem—the new officer might not know all about that country or weapon,
but he should be able to make some educated guesses as to what the
repercussions of such a sale would be in a region.
2. Training and Utilization
Language training for Naval officers in this specialty Is by
exception. Only if the specific follow-on assignment requires the skill
will the officer be sent. Otherwise, all Naval officers now pursue a
straight 18-month course of instruction at NPS and write a thesis.
This allows the officer to take a greater number of courses, both of a
regional nature and in related subject areas (e.g., strategic planning.
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maritime strategy, advanced economics, terrorism, and arms trajjs-
fer/security assistance classes).25
This type of program makes particular sense due to the
unique "ship-to-shore" rotation schedule Naval officers follow
throughout their careers. Since duty at NPS is considered shore duty,
the vast majority of male Naval officers will rotate back to sea duty
immediately after graduation. Female Naval officers also often fill
"department head" tours at Naval Air Stations and other activities
rather than performing immediate payback tours. In both of these
cases, language skills gained would be quite eroded before any use
could be made of the foreign language.
Utilization tours are required for Naval officers who attend
the area studies programs at NPS. Navy "detailers" (i.e., the Naval
officers who make officer assignments) are directed to attempt to
schedule this tour for the officer's next assignment after the sea duty
(usually three years later). The detailer handles all officers of specific
year groups and, since most officers attend NPS at approximately the
same career point, the group comes up for paybacks in a glut.
25There is still some room for flexibility in this area by the Navy.
Officers who are particularly interested in learning a related regional
language or who already have some language skills can still be trained
at DLI/FLC. I personally know of two Naval officers who obtained addi-
tional language training there as "auditing" students, which allowed
them to carry full course loads at NPS and sit in on classes at DLI/FLC
without having to stay for a full seven-hour day there and accomplish
the three to four hours of homework every night that is the norm for
that school.
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preventing many from being used in politico-military subspecialty
positions for several years, if ever.
The Bureau of Naval Personnel selects officers for entry into
this subspecialty. Fitness reports are the primary instrument used in
making the selections and the officers picked are in the top 50 per-
cent of ratings Navy-wide. Twice as many officers are selected by each
board as can attend. Individual officers are notified of the selection and
then the officer and the detailer work out the specifics. Apparently,
the specific curriculum the officer will attend is also fairly flexible, as a
number of officers start in one school and then switch to another. Fur-
thermore, when the Navy was sending officers to DLI in concert with
this program, they were allowing the officer to pick any language in
the region for study, not assigning languages as is the custom of the
other services. After notification of selection, officers have a five-year
window in which to work out a specific time to go to NPS.
Captain Figueras said that approximately 1,503 Naval officers
possess the Pol-Mil subspecialty but only 333 billets need filling. Most
officers gaining the Pol-Mil subspecialist code are from the unre-
stricted line officer community and, much like with the Army's dual-
track system, most must return to fill department head positions at
sea if they are to remain competitive for promotion. Officers may also
gain the code through prior experience, working in the Pol-Mil area
without the formal education.
Still, since the Navy has the same requirements to fill vacan-
cies in the attache, security assistance, and intelligence areas, I could
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not understand why the political-military area was emphasized while
other FAO-type positions were ignored. My question continued to be,
why did the Navy not have FAOs. especially in light of the fact that the
Navy onfe had a FAO-like program in the 1970s called the "Country and
Regional Specialist Program" (CARS)?26 According to Captain Figueras,
the Navy tries to manage each and every officer's c£u*eer as If that offi-
cer were on track to become the future Chief of Naval Operations. It is
for this reason that the vast majority of Naval officers who come to
NPS or civilian schools return to sea tours (or other department head
tours) when they leave rather than fill a utilization tour. Frankly, like
the Army officer, the Naval officer who does not return to an opera-
tional billet after spending 18 months to two years in education is
giving up his or her chances for advancement. It is possible for the
Naval officer to create a strictly "Pol-Mil officer career path" by
working with his detailer, but to do so will almost certainly mean the
26CARS was first announced by the Chief of Naval Operations,
Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr.. in NavyOp 73. issued in 1971. Accord-
ing to a report in the Navy Times [Ref. 19]. this program was supposed
to create CARS officers who would "have specialized in politico-mili-
tary affairs, strategic planning, and foreign areas" and ensure these
officers became "true specialists in their regions of expertise and be
fully utilized to meet commitments for area-trained officers." Today.
CARS still exists, and by meeting the provisions laid out on page
1420310 of the Naval Militajy Personnel Manual, a Naval officer may
still be designated a CARS officer. The requirements for CARS desig-
nation are extremely tough and include an S3/R3_rating on the DLPT
and such other in-country experience, family~background, and/or
graduate training to convince the Navy one is suitable for "highly visi-
ble" assignments abroad and "occasional special assignments not
involving a permanent change of station."
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officer will not advance beyond the 0-4 (pay grade) level. The Navy
highly discourages this type of specialization.
The above does not mean that the officer who graduates from
the Department of National Security Affairs or is one of the four offi-
cers a year sent to civilian colleges for graduate area studies education
by the Navy will not use his area specialist training. The truth Is this
"payback tour" probably will occur, but it will be a little later In the
officer's career. Two prime points for this tour are following the
officer's tour as an executive officer aboard ship (usually as a senior
0-4, awaiting the 0-5 board) and/or after serving in a command at sea
position. In both cases, a two-year gap can easily be identified where
the "payback tour" can be plugged in. Still, Captain Figueras believes
that not more than 50 percent are ever used In a Pol-Mil billet but that
the training is not wasted because the Navy benefits from having "area
specialists" at sea who can be tapped at any time a need arises.
The Pol-Mil subspecialist field remains a real "buyer's mar-
ket" in the Navy, with 1,503 qualified officers regularly vying for 333
billets. To maintain this pool, the Navy Inputs 24 officers a year into
NPS but OP-602 does no control how many go into the area specialist
side of the NSA house and how many go into related training in either
intelligence or strategic planning. Users of these graduates include
OP-06 (the single biggest employer), fleet staffs, numbered fleets, the
Naval Academy and War College, JCS, the Unified and Specified Com-
mands, and others.
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3. Problems and Recommendations
The harmonious picture painted of the Navy's program was
not completely shared by the above-mentioned OP-06, which was que-
ried for additional views on this subject. This organization, which is
the Politico-Military Policy and Current Plans Division for the Navy, has
a continuing need for Navy FAOs and a growing desire for language-
qualified FAOs. Recent events, such as the difficulty in finding a suffi-
cient number of Naval officers who are qualified to support a planned
ship visit by the P.R.C. to Pearl Harbor, have reinforced the need for
such officers. However, the OP-06 official I interviewed^^ was quick to
point out that he still did not believe language training was necessary
for all Na\y FAOs and to attempt to extend it to all such officers would
be a waste of money. Captain Robert Hofford, the Deputy Director of
OP-06, went on to point out that he has received a steady supply of
politico-military subspecialists to fill his needs and that he felt Navy
thinking on how to best train its specialists was cyclical in nature. In
his view, the current deemphasis on language training for Pol-Mil sub-
specialists would probably shift in time to a return to a push for lan-
guage skills and. in general, he felt the Navy is making steady
improvement in obtaining and using its version of FAOs. He cited the
need for the Navy to adopt and support an Army-like, dual-track
career system which would bring officers back into assignments as
attaches, on security assistance teams, and in other Pol-Mil work two
27April 1989.
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or more times in their career. He would oppose the creation of a
"single-track" system and, like others, said the officer needed to stay
current in his operational skills in order to be most credible and
useful in his subspecialty assignments.
Since the Navy seems to be happy with its system, sugges-
tions for change are unlikely to be heeded. Many factors come
together to make the Navy rather unique in its needs. It is the service
in which the majority of the officers will have the most direct expo-
sure to foreign areas by nature of its seagoing mission, yet it is des-
tined to be the service with the least in-depth knowledge of these
regions if it continues to forego a real FAO program. The Navy, like the
Air Force, is affected by the highly technical nature of its operations,
by its tendency to carry out missions autonomously, and by its ability to
operate in overseas areas with little or no direct contact with the for-
eign nationals. Still, the Navy, like the other services, must provide
officers in attache, security assistance, intelligence, and politico-mili-
tary billets, often involving joint duty and/or direct contact with for-
eign nationals. For this reason, I would recommend the Navy at least
match the Marine Corps in providing four to eight officers a year for a
full FAO program. The Navy should also ensure a sufficient number of
its quota of NFS students each year are enrolled in the area studies
program to provide a mix of service views. This, in turn, could lead to
the certification of the NFS program as a joint education assignment,
to the mutual benefit of all the services.
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The Navy, thus far, has been concentrating on building its
own forces and strategies and has yet to be strongly affected by some
of the current trends that have rocked its sister services. This situa-
tion could change, and change quickly, if some form of naval arms
limitation agreement were reached between the U.S. and Soviet Union
involving on-site inspection. If such a scenario were to occur, the Navy
might find itself in a difficult position, sorely lacking the FAOs it needs
to man the openings that would be created. Unless and until such an
event occurs, however, it is very doubtful any suggestion to change the
current program would meet with approval, so I will end by recom-
mending that the Navy have, at a minimum, the mechanisms in place
to expand (by training at least four FAOs a year, complete vrith
in-country training) so that they can avoid possible future embarrass-
ment and create a small core group of "Sailor-Statesmen" for FAO-
type assignments today.
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V. THE AIR FORCE FAO PROGRAM—FASP
A. BACKGROUND
If you ask almost any officer in the Air Force, including field-grade
officers in the upper reaches of the Headquarters Air Force policy-
making branches, whether the Air Force has a FAO program, they will
almost certainly tell you it does not. This answer is both right and
wrong. The Air Force FAO program was formally established on 5
March 1987 and is designated the Foreign Area Studies Program
(FASP). However, after months of research, I believe the program
should instead be called the Foreign Area Studies "Stealth" Program
because neither the Air Force hierarchy, the student officers
"participating" in it, nor the Military Personnel Center officials who
assign Air Force "FAQs" knows much at all about it.
The documents that were familiar to all parties were the two reg-
ulations that had long been relied on to create what the Air Force
called "area specialists." These were the 3 August 1984 version of Air
Force Regulation 36-16. entitled U.S.A.F. Area Specialist Program and
chapter 35 of Air Force Regulation 36-23, known as the Intelligence-
Career Progression Guide.'^^
28The second regulation, chapter 35 of AFR 36-23, devotes only a
single paragraph to the issue of Air Force FAOs. On page 202, under a
discussion of specialty code prefixes, the following is included:
(b) "L"— Area Specialist Officer (Second Lieutenant through
Colonel). This prefix reflects requirements of about 4 percent of
the total intelligence authorization. It designates positions
requiring special geographic or language expertise which is
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The old AFR 36-16 was Just three and one-half pages long with a
single attachment to provide a breakdown of the regions by special
experience identifier (SEI) and advanced academic degree (AAD)
codes [Ref. 22). There was no mention of language under the old reg-
ulation's paragraph on "program objectives." In fact, under the old
regulation, the goal was merely to help officers prepare for assign-
ments which "...require special knowledge and understanding of
countries or geographic regions of the world."
Language was by no means left out entirely. In fact, it was to be
provided for all officers in the program and a Listening level of 2 was
expected to be maintained by program graduates. A Listening level of 3
was required for attaches. However, reading and speaking levels were
not mentioned. Also, further down in the regulation, it said that
"knowledge of a regional language is a key to understanding the cul-
ture of a people."29
Under the old regulation, £in Air Force Area Specialist was some-
one who filled three squares:
1. was fully qualified in an Air Force Specialty Code (AFSC),
normally obtained by advanced academic study. [Ref. 21,
emphasis added]
This regulation is still current as far As I knc.v, even though its
provisions directly conflict with the new version of AFR 36-16.
29The old regulation may have meant to say that a skill level of 2
was required in all three DLPT areas {i.e., listening, speaking, and
reading), but the use of the alphanumeric L2 as it actually appears in
the regulation is officially construed to mean a skill level of 2 in the
Listening portion of the DLPT.
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2. had "formal academic training in a geographic area of the world
and is well versed in the political and economic conditions, cul-
tural environment, threats to stability, and U.S. foreign policy
toward a region," and
3. had an L2 (L3 for attache) on the DLPT.
Once these few requirements were met, an "L" prefix was placed in
front of the officer's AFSC and the appropriate AAD code was placed in
the officer's records. In later assignments, this AAD code would be
used to match officer with region when making assignments flanguage
was only considered in special cases, such as attache duty).
B. FASP—NEW GOALS FOR A NEW AIR FORCE PROGRAM
In March 1987, a new version of AFR 36-16 was released. Entitled
Foreign Area Studies Program (or FASP), this new regulation outlined a
much larger program designed to create true Air Force FAQs for the
first time. The stated goal of the program is
to produce, sustain, and effectively utilize a resource of qualified
Air Force officers for worldwide assignment to designated posi-
tions that require a special knowledge and understanding of a
country or geographic area of the world and a related foreign lan-
guage. A key function of FASP officers is to provide sophisticated
linkage between, understanding of, and influence on foreign and
U.S. political and military institutions and personalities. Foreign
area officers, specifically, possess the comprehensive, up-to-date
knowledge of the language, military services, geography, history,
economics, politics, culture, religion, and sociology of a specific
foreign country or area required to make sound decisions and
estimates concerning U.S. military activities. The FASP designa-
tions should be assigned to any Air Force specialty position in
which the above knowledge would enhance mission accomplish-
ment through an individual's ability to relate with foreign nation-
als and interpret events and behaviors. [Ref. 22]
Following this statement of purpose, the regulation goes on to
discuss the four levels of training that may lead to the FAO designation.
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namely designation as a "foreign language [qualified! officer," designa-
tion as a "country specialist," designation as an "area specialist," and,
finally, designation as a "foreign area officer." Officers may qualify for
one or more of these titles either by attending formal courses of
training or by applying for direct designation if they already have the
required level of language proficiency (L2/R2/S2), a "minimum of a
master's degree in area studies or a similar bachelor's degree with
extensive knowledge and experience in a specific geographic area,"
and "have in-country or in-area training and experience." [Ref. 22:p. 4]
On first reading, this regulation appears to be a close approximation of
the Army FAO program, complete with a list of in-country training
programs broken down by region, a liaison office at the Air Force Mili-
tary Personnel Center to act as a proponent team, and the administra-
tive details (i.e., identifiers of areas of expertise, levels of experience,
etc.) worked out so that FAOs could be properly tracked and utilized
throughout their careers. Although the old regulation provided the Air
Force with officers who had limited language sills and masters degrees
in area studies, the new program added the chance for added language
training and a chance for practical experience needed to create a well-
balanced FAO training program. Unfortunately, this has not been the
true result to date.
C. FLAWS IN FASP
Although much more could be written about the new AFR 36-16,
to include a discussion of the division of responsibilities for the pro-
gram and the in-depth outline of academic objectives for FASP
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officers, to do so would be a waste of time. This regulation is severely
flawed, unknown to most of the Air Force, and ignored by those agen-
cies that are aware of its existence. It is not consulted by the Air Force
Military Personnel Center (AFMPC) when assigning officers to language
and/or graduate area studies programs, nor, apparently, does AFMPC
solicit FASP inputs when assigning officers who complete these pro-
grams to billets that require advanced academic degrees and/or lan-
guage skills. As of this writing, the Air Force has exactly one FAO in its
ranks— a Lieutenant Colonel at DIA who obtained the honor through
direct designation and only after months of battling obstacles erected
by the current administrators of FASP, the Intelligence Training
department under the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence. Currently,
the FASP is "unfunded" and. reportedly, will soon be the subject of a
functional management inspection by the Air Force Inspector General.
This inspection, which reportedly was requested by the Deputy Chief
of Staff for Intelligence, will find a program that is based on a regu-
lation that could not have been written by FAOs and is in need of
numerous corrections and clarifications.
For example, language training is called one of the "keystones" of
the FASP and, although the requirements for direct designation list a
requirement for "2" levels in all three DLPT areas. Attachment 1 to
this regulation states that officers who wish to obtain the FAO designa-
tion must obtain an L3/R3/S3 on the DLPT. This is just one of the
contradictions in the document.
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Another contradiction involves area studies education. While the
program states that a FAO must have a full Masters degree in area
studies (or a related discipline) and that this degree is required to
even obtain "Area Specialist" designation, another section suggests
the Air University can design non-degree programs "to provide the
amount of academic training required for follow-on assignments [Ref.
22:p. 5]. Even the Army Foreign Area Officer Course, the Defense
Intelligence College, and the Defense Institute of Security Assistance
Management are listed as sources of "area studies related course-
work." [Ref. 22] These courses, while useful for preparing the trained
FAO for specific duties (as in the cases of DIC and DISAM) and helping
the new FAOs learn what is expected of them (as in the FAOC case) are
hardly adequate sources of FAO academic training. By listing such pos-
sibilities, the FASP quickly loses its credibility as a guide for quality
FAO training.
Other, less important examples of flaws in this regulation include
the listing of the Philippines under the "Far East" rather than
"Southeast Asia" in Attachment 2, failing to list a language school for
additional Japanese treiining even though the Foreign Service Institute
runs a well-known school in Japan that the Army FAOs attend, and the
complete omission of the Soviet Union from any form of advanced
training. Currently, due to its "unfunded" status, no form of in-country
training takes place for Air Force officers other than that available
through DIA, the Olmstead Scholar program, and similar arrange-
ments that long predate FASP and are wholly unrelated to it.
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D. SELECTION AND TRAINING OF AIR FORCE FAOs—REALITY
The above is not to suggest that Air Force officers are not being
trained in foreign languages and areas. Rather, Air Force officers con-
tinue to receive language and area studies training and fulfill roles
requiring this training throughout the Air Force and in joint missions.
The program remains virtually the same one which the 1984 version
of AFR 36-16 sponsored.
The Air Force Institute of Technology runs numerous programs
through which Air Force officers can obtain a Masters degree at gov-
ernment expense. The program that directly affects the Air Force's
need for officers who are particularly knowledgeable on foreign areas
is administered by the Civilian Institutes Special Programs division of
AFIT. The degree offered is a Master of Arts in National Security
Affairs with emphasis on area studies (Soviet Union, Middle East, Latin
America, Far East, or Africa). The sole school used by the Air Force is
the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California.
Officers who are interested in entering this program begin by
requesting an evaluation of their undergraduate records by AFIT and by
taking the Graduate Record Examinations. If these records and scores
pass AFIT's standards they are notified by mail that they are academi-
cally qualified to apply.
The next steps are to indicate this desire to attend to AFMPC on
the assignment preference form, take the Defense Language Aptitude
Test and score in the 90s or better, and begin working with one's
appropriate assignments officer to help obtain one of the 10 to 20
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slots allocated each year. As most of these slots go to the Intelligence
section of AFMPC, the officer has the best chance of winning a slot if
he or she is in or "cross-flows" to the intelligence career field. A sec-
ond steady source for slots is the Office of Special Investigations,
which gives the officer another possible career choice.
E. GRADUATE SCHOOL
Once selected, the Air Force officers will normally attend the
Naval Postgraduate School for one year, during which they will be
exposed to a mix of area studies courses and broader national security-
related courses. A normal year will begin with officers enrolled in four
four-hour courses for each of their four quarters of education. Each
quarter, two classes will be in the area of interest, starting with broad
history, geography, and culture classes, and two courses will be out-
side this area. Each officer is required to take a course in American
defense policy, research methods (statistics), international relations,
and international economics. Other electives offered can provide an
officer with some foundation on the U.S. intelligence community,
military history and strategy, international law, nuclear issues, and a
host of related topics. Officers are also well schooled in past and pres-
ent U.S. foreign policy toward their region and take courses on "the
current problems of government and security" in individual nations in
their area.
At the end of the year, the officers usually take a comprehensive
examination on their areas. Every officer is given the option to write a
thesis, but most find they are unable to take on such a task in a
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four-quarter program. Navy officers, who attend the same course of
study, remain for two more quarters in most cases gmd are required to
write a thesis. Occasionally, an Air Force officer does remain for a full
18-month program and, in this case, a thesis is also required. In addi-
tion, an Air Force officer with particularly strong background in area
studies occasionally can validate certain courses and/or elect to com-
plete a thesis within a four-quarter program.
Following the academic year at NPS, officers move across town to
DLI/FLC. Language training at DLI/FIX is counted as part of the Mas-
ters program and, upon successful completion of this training, a Mas-
ter of Arts degree is awarded by NPS. The officer then is reassigned
out of AFIT and, if not already qualified as an intelligence officer, OSI
agent, attache, or other career field that funded the degree, is then
sent to accomplish this training.
After all training is complete, the officer's records have a special
four-letter code added to indicate that he holds an advanced academic
degree (AAD) involving knowledge of a specific area of the world. ^^ in
practice, this four-letter code, in conjunction with the officer's Air
Force Specialty code, is then all that is used in assigning the graduate
30The following four-letter codes are used to identify areas of spe-
cialization [Ref. 22:Attachment 2):
OYLA- Western Eiorope OYLE- Sub-Saharan Africa OYLJ- Southeast Asia*
OYLB- Eastern Europe OYLF- Middle East OYLK- Caribbean
OYLC- U.S.S.R OYLG- South Asia OYLL- Latin America




officer to FAO assignments. 3 ^ By regulation, only officers with the right
AAD can fill certain positions and AAD-holding officers must perform a
tour in an AAD position to "pay back" the Air Force for the education.
As with the other services' FAOs, most of these AAD positions are on
joint staffs, in intelligence organizations (particularly DIA), and over-
seas as attaches or in security assistance missions.
F. PROBLEMS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Of course, what is obviously missing in the above Air Force pro-
gram is the in-country training that the Army and Marine Corps rely
on both to complete their FAOs' course of language training and to give
them personal experience through living in the region. Therefore, it is
not uncommon for the Air Force "expert" to be assigned to a position
which might require policy advice even though he or she had never
even visited the area in question. Additionally, depending on the
assignment the Air Force FAOs draw, they may never have a chance to
use the sometimes limited language skills they acquire at DLI/FLC. The
fact that their language training may very well never be used is
revealed to the student officers by their assignments branch at AFMPC
(which invariably tells the officer he or she will end up as an analyst at
DIA or on a joint stciff somewhere). This has an undisputable negative
3iTo be absolutely fair, the factors used for making Air Force
officer assignments rank as follows: (1) Officer's AFSC and AAD, (2) Air
Force needs, (3) Officer's overseas duty vulnerability. (4) Officer's
preference sheet data, and (5) Intangibles to include past record of
assignments, levels of duty, need to broaden career, etc.
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impact on the officer's morale while in language training. Unlike the
Army and Marine Corps FAOs, who are absolutely sure they will at least
use and improve their language skills in-country. Air Force FAOs know
that they will be lucky to use their language as tourists and that no
effort will be made to maintain or improve their skills unless they later
get assignments as attaches, in security assistance, or a similar
assignment that would result in an officer attending language school
without being in the Air Force FAO program. Of course, in-country
training is provided for by the new AFR 36-16, but, as mentioned
before, this provision only exists on paper due to lack of funds.
Currently, it appears that the Air Force is not sure what its needs
are as far as officers with special language and area studies training.
One effort was made to determine these needs by the office that is
currently responsible for FASP, Headquarters Air Force/INFP (which
handles all intelligence-related educational programs). The survey,
entitled "Foreign Area Studies Program (FASP) vs. Language Desig-
nated Position (LDP) Requirements," was mailed in the summer of
1987. Reportedly, the goal of the survey was to determine exactly what
requirements for language and/or advanced academic degrees existed
among the agencies the Air Force helped staff. However, for unknown
reasons, the survey contained a statement that made many of the
potential respondents unable to honestly respond with their needs for
officers with AADs and/or language. At the bottom of the survey was the
following statement: "In all cases, if you designate a position as a FASP
requirement, AF Form 1779 (Request to Establish/Change an
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Advanced Academic Degree) must be accompanied by an AF Form
1780 (Request to Establish/Change Foreign Language Designated Posi-
tion)." Therefore, the true result of the "survey" would have been that
all agencies that desired Air Force officers with advanced academic
degrees in foreign area studies would be forced to say the Job also
required a foreign language. This is not the true situation most poten-
tial respondents found in their organizations.
Many agencies reacted like the official I interviewed at DIA— they
simply ignored the "survey." Other agencies, including some of the Air
Force's own major commands, simply wrote their requirements on
the survey form and returned it. In the case of the Tactical Air Com-
mand, the reply was something like. "We have 1 1 AAD requirements,
five of these also require language skills and six do not."32
The reasoning behind this office sending out such a product is
unclear, just as other behavior on the part of the FASP program man-
agers is questionable. According to sources at the Defense Intelligence
Agency Attache Affairs Directorate, in recent months this office (INFP)
also announced its intention to inform the Undersecretary of the Air
Force for Low Intensity Conflict that the Air Force had no require-
ments for FAOs under the definition of AFR 36-16. Possibly they had
come to this conclusion as the result of the above-mentioned "survey,"
but only the timely intervention of the DIA Attache managers, who
321 was only given brief access to these replies when I visited the
office in question, in spite of my repeated requests for this material.
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filed seven requests for fully trained Air Force FAOs. prevented this
announcement and the possible demise of the program.
The confusion surrounding the current condition of the Air Force
FAO Program. FASP, lends itself to many possible recommendations
for improvement. However, any suggestions made must hinge on an
eventual decision by the highest levels of command on whether the Air
Force truly wants a FAO program. In order to make this decision, a
complete, impartial evaluation of Air Force requirements must be
made. A new survey, without the "note" that skewed the results of the
last survey, should be carried out in order to find out what specific
skills are needed by the major commands. Furthermore, regardless of
which direction the Air Force decides to pursue in the future, AFR 36-
16 must be revised. To this end, if the Air Force elects to build an
effective FAO program in the future, a new FAO Proponent office
should be established, possibly at Randolph AFB in order to ensure
close coordination with the officers who make assignments.
1 believe a complete study of Air Force FAO requirements will
reveal that FAOs are needed and that the Air Force is possibly the only
service that could easily support a "single-track" FAO system. One
could easily envision such a system in the intelligence career field,
with different degrees of training being offered depending on the
planned utilization for each officer. By piecing together parts from the
Army, Marine Corps, and Navy programs, the Air Force could create a
multi-tiered FAO program that would fill all needs and save money too.
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Of course, the simplest suggestion would be for the Air Force to
mimic the Army FAO program entirely. After all, based on our ideal
model for balanced FAO training, the Army has the best and most bal-
anced program. However, I will not suggest the Air Force try to take
on such a large task for two reasons: cost and its special need to limit
non-flying time for pilots.
The first reason, cost, is self-explanatory. Even though the Army
finds the funds for sending 135 officers a year through its program
and the Air Force would only need 25 or so, I cannot really foresee the
Air Force spending $195,000 for each and every FAO. What would be
reasonable to suggest is that the Air Force match the Marine Corps
and fund four to eight officers per year for a complete program of
language study, graduate study, and in-country training. If these offi-
cers were then to be made available for attache assignments, in light of
the generally held belief that attaches need the best language skills
possible, then the pay-off for this investment would be certain.
Another lesson the Air Force could learn from the Marine Corps
would be to build up its FAO ranks by identifying and "capturing" offi-
cers who have the experience to be immediately certified as FAOs.
Attaches, Olmstead Scholars, and officers with similar backgrounds
should be actively brought into the FAO program and designated FAOs.
Officers who believe they have the necessary prerequisites to be des-
ignated FAOs should be able to apply and receive judgment on their
applications with minimum red tape. A new FAO Proponent office, if
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established, should make identifying and recruiting Air Force officers
that can be quickly certified as FAOs one of its primary objectives.33
From the Navy, I think the Air Force should adopt the practice of
separating graduate schooling from language training. As was discussed
in the last section, the Navy no longer sends its NFS students to
DLI/FLC automatically for language courses. Rather, the student is
given 18 months of graduate education and the opportunity to write a
thesis. Language training can then be given if the officer's next
assignment requires it, or, if the officer is certain to need a language
and the Navy wishes to get that officer to his next station more
quickly, the option of a combination of one year of academic work and
a language course is still available.
^ The Air Force would have much to gain through adopting this
policy. In many cases, where the language course would have taken a
full year, the six-quarter/academics-only option brings the officer back
to work six months earlier. An academics-only option would also give
every officer a chance to write a thesis, the topics for which could be
suggested by Air Force agencies. This could lead to expanded research
on policy options and strategic questions by Air Force students at a
time when increasing pressure is being brought to bear on the ser-
vices to reduce their headquarters staffs and made do with fewer
^^From my own survey, I could immediately identify not less than
20 active-duty Air Force officers that would be called "Experience
Track" FAOs in the Marine Corps and could be equally acceptable to
Army FAO standards.
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workers. The benefits of such an arrangement are limited only by the
imagination of the staffs and students involved.
Furthermore, by eliminating language training unless the officer is
certain to use it, either in £in assignment or in in-country training, the
Air Force would eliminate the widespread perception that this train-
ing was being wasted. Language skills, particularly in difficult Asian and
Arabic languages, are too easily eroded to expect officers to retain
them on a long-term basis after only a single course at DLI/FLC. If the
Air Force cannot afford to send every officer to an in-country tour, why
should it send every officer to language training? The time saved could
be used to expand the officer's regional expertise and to carry out
research projects that could benefit the Air Force. If the goal of the
language training is just familiarity, with the idea being that officers
need to know something of the language in order to better understand
the indigenous people of a region, then the Air Force should experi-
ment with substituting short, intensive language courses (as are
offered at many universities nation-wide in the summer on a one- to
three-month basis) or some type of general familiarization course on
one or more than one language(s) spoken in an area through a cooper-
ative arrangement between DLI/FLC and NPS. Either of these options
would probably be just as beneficial to the officer as the current pro-
cess of requiring language, funding only minimal training, and then
letting these limited skills erode.
Of course, all the above would require the current AFR 36-16 to
be completely rewritten, an idea I strongly endorse. If the Air Force
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wants to use different terms to identify officers who have special area
knowledge but who are not fully qualified FAOs, this is acceptable, but
the current four-phased process is the wrong way to approach the
problem. Once a new, objective survey is carried out to identify what
skills Air Force officers really need, then a new set of terms can be
created or the current terms can be redefined.
What 1 belive a new survey of Air Force needs would reveal (based
on part on my own survey, which will be discussed later, by which I
asked the FAOs themselves what skills they use in their jobs), is that
the Air Force has many needs for officers with AADs but little or no
need for officers who only have language skills. Therefore, having lan-
guage skills as the basic requirement on which all other training is
added, as the current AFR 36-16 reflects, makes this regulation fatally
flawed from the start. The second level, "Country Specialist," is like-
wise a useless term because every Air Force or joint position I can
identify requires regional knowledge, not just knowledge of a specific
nation. The world is much too interdependent today for such out-
moded, limited "specialists" to be needed. These two ideas, having a
"language officer" and a "country specialist," may have been worth-
while in the pre -World War II time frame but today they are
antiquated.
Due to this situation, and because positions exist for AAD officers
without languages and for full FAOs, I suggest that the Air Force retain
the term "Area Specialist" to identify the former and the term "FAO"
for the latter. In addition, I suggest that the same FAO proponency
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team handle both in the future, that all FAOs and those Area Special-
ists with current "2*' level language skills be identified by the addition
of the "L" prefix to their Air Force Specialty Code, and that these lan-
guage-skilled officers be paid their language proficiency pay as long as
they have the AAD and current qualifying DLPT scores in their records.
By adopting the above recommendations, the Air Force would
obtain a small core group of highly qualified FAOs, have a larger pool of
"Area Specialist" officers who could quickly be trained up to the FAO
level as needed, and gain a free source for professional research in the
future. These changes would also be morale-enhancing because each
officer would be sure that he would use the training he received and
could, in coordination with his assignments branch, work out the best
program for his own situation.
The flexibility of having programs that range from a low of 18
months to a high of several years to obtain full FAO designation, would
make the program more attractive for our pilots, who, as the primary
operations element of the Air Force, are expected to fill attache and
security assistance roles, but who should not be forced into multi-year,
non-fljring duties. By having the multi-tiered system I suggest, we
could limit the amount of time it would take to educate pilots who
might someday fill command and /or policy positions that require spe-
cial knowledge of the dynamics of an area without forcing them to take
unnecessary language training and, at the same time, give them time
to research thesis topics that could not be handled as well by a non-
rated officer. If language skills were needed or desired, that option
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would still be available (under the one year of academics and language
training system we use almost exclusively today), and, in cases where a
pilot was needed for an exchange program that involved flying, the Air
Force could easily wind up with a complete FAO from the deal (with
the exchange program counting for in-country training).
Of the four programs examined in this paper, the Air Force FASP
appears to be the one with the least chance of matching training to
stated goals. This "paper FAO program" benefits neither the officers
enrolled in the programs that are functioning nor the managers who
must fill the needs of the various commands and joint missions, and it
does not help prepare the Air Force officers to meet future demands.
Although adequate academdc training is being provided, the language
training is incomplete and the lack of in-country training severely
handicaps the credibility of the Air Force FAO. The Air Force needs to
completely reevaluate its programs and rewrite AFR 36-16. Ideally this
will be accomplished before some performance failure brings the
shortcomings outlined above to the attention of a wider audience, with
the concurrent possibility that the "fixes" put in place in response
might further damage the Air Force's ability to contribute to meeting
future DOD needs.
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VI. EMPLOYMENT OF MILITARY FAOs
A. SOURCES OF INFORMATION
Now that we have covered the training programs of each of the
services, the next subject Is how these officers £ire employed. In order
to examine this, one might examine the list of potential assignments
each service publishes and subdivide these positions into the cate-
gories of attache, political-military officer, etc., as Stoner did in
"Taking the Plunge." [Ref. 8]34 However, this approach has a signifi-
cant flaw. In the modem military, the presence of slots for FAOs in any
of the aforementioned FAG fields (attache, intelligence, security assis-
tance, and political-military officers) does not automatically guarantee
that FAOs will be employed in the same percentages. Therefore,
although 17 percent of the Army's FAO-designated positions are in the
attache area and 54 percent of the Army's FAO-designated positions
are in the political-military area, this does not ensure that more Army
FAOs will actually hold political-military jobs than attache jobs. The
truth is that many slots, both FAO-designated and otherwise, go
unfilled year after year. The Defense Department has been steadily
required to "make do" with fewer officers to fulfill its stated needs for
many years. Therefore, looking at authorized billets as an indication of
34Reproduced in the chapter on the Army program.
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how the services employ their FAOs is insufficient and could be
misleading.
This fact was one of the motivators for me to try to contact indi-
vidual FAOs to discover first-hand how they had been used as well as
how well their individual training programs had prepared them for
their later assignments. In order to accomplish these objectives, a
survey was prepared in order to poll the FAO population concerning
their opinions on their training and employment. A list of 483 gradu-
ates of the area specialist programs given at the Naval Postgraduate
School was obtained, complete with their addresses. A copy of the
survey (included in Appendix B) was mailed to these graduates. Within
the next three months. 270 of the graduates replied and, although not
all graduates had completed all parts of the survey, 82 Army graduates,
118 Air Force graduates, and 46 Navy graduates gave specific infor-
mation on whether they had held FAO jobs since graduation and the
specific type of positions they held. The experience of these 246 offi-
cers (24 of the 270 did not provide assignment information) provides
a sufficient sampling to answer the following two questions:
1. Do the services use the specialized training?
2. If so, how do the services use the officers?
B. WHAT PERCENTAGES OF TRAINED SERVICE FAOs GO ON TO
HOLD FAO JOBS?
The specific question dealing with FAO employment asked on the
survey was:
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Since graduation form the Naval Postgraduate School, have you
worked as any of the following: Foreign Area Officer, Area
Specialist, Country or Regional desk specialist in an intelligence
organization, a Political-Military officer, in the attache field, or as
a member of a security assistance team in the region you studied
here?
The officers were also asked to indicate whether they had performed a
"payback tour" (i.e., assignments to "repay" their services for costs
involved in the education program, which are required by all services).
If the officers answered positively to either question, they were asked
to provide specific information, such as job titles, on their FAO
positions.
In the case of the Army, 87 percent of the respondents had held
FAO jobs. However, the Army was not the most successful in employing
graduates in FAO positions, perhaps due to the previously discussed
dual-track employment difficulties. It was the Air Force, rather than
the Army, that employed the highest percentage of respondents in
FAO positions. A full 93 percent of the 118 Air Force officer graduates
had held FAO jobs since graduation. The Navy, true to Captain Figueras*
prediction, had the fewest graduates going on to hold FAO jobs, with
only 52 percent of the Navy respondents indicating they had held
these positions.
C. TYPES OF FAO JOBS HELD
Starting with the Army, 70 out of the 76 officers have held FAO
jobs in the four previously outlined FAO-oriented mission areas:
attache/liaison, intelligence, security assistance, or political-military.
Six of the officers had used their FAO skills in an area not previously
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mentioned. They had been employed in educational assignments,
teaching other officers at the Military Academy at West Point or
teaching more senior officers at the Army War College and in similar
institutions about their areas of specialization. Although this •*fifth FAO
job" was also found in the other services, it will be treated as a special
mission and not considered a true FAO position for the purposes of
this thesis.
As mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, an analysis of the
actual positions held by the respondents did not correspond to the
breakdown of slots for FAOs in Army manpower documents. Although
the allocation of FAO slots would lead one to rank the need for Army
FAOs in the following order.




Security Assistance 1 1%
the actual division of respondent answers by job type was as follows:
Percentage of Officers





The Air Force officers reported similar numbers in their
responses. Like the Army, the majority of the Air Force officers who
had FAO jobs had worked in intelligence (45 percent). The second
most often reported FAO mission for the Air Force FAOs was in the
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attache /liaison area, with 39 percent reporting having served in
Defense Attache Organizations. Ranking third among Air Force
respondents were reports of duty in poUtical-military positions: 26
percent of the Air Force officers reported performing this type of duty.
Finally, well below the rest, came reports of security assistance duty. A
mere four percent of Air Force officers had such duty, and an equal
number (4 percent) had worked in education positions since gradua-
tion. With the recent expansion of graduates going to teach at the
USAF School of Special Operations, as discussed in the chapter on
Marine Corps and Navy programs, this number could exceed the num-
ber of officers with security assistance experience within the next two
to three years.
The Navy, like the Army and the Air Force, sent a large number of
its officers who did hold FAO assignments to work in the intelligence
area. Unlike its sister services, the number of Navy FAOs in intelli-
gence (21 percent) was exactly equal to the number of Navy FAOs who
worked in political-military jobs. The next most popularly reported
assignment for Navy FAOs was in educational duties (8 percent). Both
the attache career field and the security assistance career field did
appear among the lists of Navy FAO assignments. Coincidentally, both
accounted for 4 percent of Navy FAO jobs.
These results are not only interesting in an of themselves, but
they bring out certain points that must be highlighted before we can
go on to look at the opinions these officers gave on how well their
language and area studies training prepared them for their later
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assignments. For example, when we later attempt to define what
degrees of language and area studies training are most useful to an
attache, the data primarily will be based on answers given by Air Force
officers. This is, of course, because 63 percent of the officers who
responded that they were attaches came from the Air Force in this
sample. Similarly, 34 percent of the attaches came from the Army and
only 2 percent were Naval officers. This raises the question as to
whether the skills needed to be an Air Force attache differ from those
needed to be an Army or a Navy attache. Apparently, the Department
of Defense does not believe the needed skills differ, for attaches from
all services currently are trained together prior to being sent abroad.
Likewise, security assistance team members are trained together and,
in the past, intelligence officers from different services have been
trained in joint classes. A similar comparison of political-military offi-
cer training cannot be made as no particular course of training exists
for these officers in any service. Therefore, because all indications
point to the generally accepted assumption that the FAO missions dis-
cussed above do not require service-specific training and the sub-areas
of language training and area studies have been (and in most cases
continue to be) performed in classes composed of officers from the
different branches of the armed forces learning together, we will
assume that needs stated by FAOs holding a particular FAO-type job
will be equal for all services, regardless of the particular service with
which the respondent is affiliated. Each job type will also be discussed.
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both as a whole and service by service, and where disparities do exist
between answers, these differences will be highlighted.
With the above assumptions established, we can now turn to the
next question pertaining to FAO training: How Important is foreign
language training for FAOs?
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VII. THE NEED FOR FOREIGN LANGUAGE SKILLS BY FAOs
A. INTRODUCTION
The issue of foreign language training for Americans has filled vol-
umes of books, served as the subject for countless theses and editori-
als, and has even been the basis for the creation of blue-ribbon
commissions. The report issued in 1979 by one such panel. The Pres-
ident's Commission on Foreign Language and International Studies,
aptly discussed the recurring theme that few Americans are able to
function effectively in a language other than English. Some of their
findings included the fact that 91.9 percent of Americans used only
English at home during childhood, only 30 percent reported stud5rlng
a foreign language in school, and "overall, more than three Americans
out of four cannot speak, read, or write any language other than
English." [Ref. 23:p. 78]
However alarming one does or does not find these figures to be,
the focus of this thesis is not on the American population as a whole
but on a specialized group of American military officers. Figures such
as those given above or focusing on slots such as one commission
member of this panel did can give misleading information, as we have
seen before. Still, it is interesting to note that this commission mem-
ber. James R. Ruchti. a Foreign Service Officer with the Department of
State, in his chapter of the report, entitled The U.S. Government
Requirements for Languages," pointed out, "Of 5.5 million total
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civilian and military positions in the USG on 1/1/79, only a small per-
centage required language competence other than English, 29,000 or
about 0.5%." [Ref. 23:p. 197]
Contrasting with this apparent diminution of the military's need
for foreign language-trained officers is a host of correspondence con-
cerning specific needs for language training that circulates around the
Pentagon on a daily basis, much of which concerns efforts to obtsiin
monetary incentives for military personnel to gain and/or maintain
their language skills. This high level of interest is the result of years of
experience by the military and the presence of an active lobby for '
funding for the Defense Language Institute/Foreign Language Center in
Washington, D.C. Part of this experience is based on lessons learned
over the past 40 years, stretching back to the language classes created
during World War II. Stories concerning the origins of DLI/FLC and the
accomplishments of its graduates have reached near mythic propor-
tions in the services and, before we can look at how modern officers
replied to questions concerning the need for foreign language skills,
the roots of the service's interest in language training must be
explored.
B. OVERVIEW OF THE HISTORY OF THE ARMY AND NAVY
LANGUAGE PROGRAMS
The roots of the Army and Navy language training programs reach
back to the earliest days of American officers filling overseas posts as
attaches. The opportunities for such assignments grew and fell with
the general interest of the United States in overseas relations and.
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predictably, were comparatively few in the isolationist period between
World War I and World War II. The rare officers who managed to obtain
foreign language training and, more importantly, lived and worked
overseas during this time, found their special skills in great demand
during the second world war. This fact allowed men like Joseph Stil-
well and Evans Carlson the chance to be given great responsibilities;
their successes sealed their places in history as great officers and
FAOs.
Once the war was underway, additional language-qualified officers
were also called for but few could be found. To help meet this need,
the Rockefeller Foundation stepped in. The Rockefellers provided
$50,000, a tremendous sum in 1941, to the American Council of
Learned Societies to help set up intensive language training in a host
of unusual languages. ^5 Included in the languages to be taught were
Arabic, Burmese, Chinese, Dutch, Fanti, Finnish, Greek, Hindustani,
Hungarian, Icelandic, Japanese, Kurdish, Malay, Mongolian, Pashtu,
Persian, Pidgin English, Portuguese, Russian, Thai, and Turkish. Pur-
posely omitted were the four languages most commonly taught in col-
leges and universities of the period: French, Spanish, German, and
Italian [Refs. 24, 25).
35For more Information on the early training programs, see Refer-
ences 24 and 25. This information on ACLS is drawn heavily from the
former, particularly pages 3-14.
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This effort, plus the realization that the war would demand offi-
cers who could speak to allies and enemies, and the fact that victories
along the way as well as eventual occupation duty would require a
number of officers in combat duties and civil affairs work to talk to the
native populations— all resulted in the eventual establishment of the
Defense Language Institute/Foreign Language Center. Drawn from the
college campuses the Army Specialized Training Programs and Navy
Japanese Language Schools had originally called home, and combined
with the various military language training camps such as the one
created at Camp Savage, Minnesota, the job of training U.S. military
personnel in foreign languages was eventually centralized at DLI/FLC
despite service protests that their "unique" language needs made joint
training a poor idea.
It is important to note that, even with the urgent wartime
demand for linguists, descriptions of the language training programs
all point to one fact: language training could not be rushed. Even dur-
ing the height of the war, it still took a full 18 months to create a
Japanese linguist. This 18-month time requirement is particularly
interesting when one notes that students were trained in a "total lan-
guage immersion" environment: they lived together in all-Japanese
language student barracks, had Japanese magazines, newspapers, and
movies available throughout their training, ate together with the
instructors, and generally were encouraged to speak Japanese at all
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times. 36 In contrast to this, modern students of Japanese at DLI/FLC
are only given 12 months to learn the language, do not necessarily live
or eat together, and only see their instructors during four to five hours
of class time each day.
One would assume that such Intense training resulted in
extremely competent Japanese linguists, but "guessing" is the only
option available on this point. As both Miele and Matthew point out in
their histories of this period, no systematic study was ever undertaken
to determine the success of these language training programs!^^
36The same was true for all languages. To the extent possible, all
students of a language were housed together and were exposed to
their target language throughout the day. In addition, English-speaking
Americans actually taught the vocabulary and grammar to the students,
while the "native speakers" were used to let the students practice the
language and to coach on pronunciation. It was not uncommon for a
student to be exposed to 10 to 20 native speakers during his training,
as opposed to the four or five teachers a modem DLI/FLC student may
see. at best.
s^Miele states,
The ASTP trainees were scattered around the globe in every the-
ater of operations. There was no "feedback" mechanism of an
official and reliable nature to rate the overall performance of these
language trainees in the field. No one has calculated the numbers
of these specialists in languages who were actually assigned to
duties in which they employed their language in an official capac-
ity. There were individual reports, individual observations, but no
scientific machinery set up to measure achievement or success.
[Ref. 24:p. 6]
Matthew is even more succinct. He states. "There is little if any
objective data available to substantiate the many claims that have been
made of the success of the courses." [Ref. 25:p. 13]
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Thus, without any real substantiating facts, the "successes" of
these early programs have been carried down in the language training
programs still used today at DLI/FLC, although these programs are
obviously not even as complete and comprehensive today as they were
in the 1940s (i.e., not the "total immersion" environment they
achieved at that time).
Lacking real, quantifiable data on the success of these programs,
some officials at DLI/FLXD point to the individual success stories that
emerged from World War II. They would point to individual acts that
led to U.S. soldiers being awarded medals for achievements like talk-
ing groups of Japanese into surrendering or yelling "cease fire" in the
enemy language (which fooled many enemy soldiers) and thereby
gaining the upper hand in battle. Indeed, many buildings at DLI/FLC
are currently named in honor of these men. What such arguments
overlook is that fact that these men often had names like "Nakamura"
and, in every case 1 could find, had language training from sources
other than just the military program prior to being sent to war.
Indeed, many were only second- or third-generation Americans and
had spoken the target language at home before learning English.
Similarly, the officials at DLI/FLC point to the role the early
graduates of the military language training programs played in the
occupation of Japan. It is argued that the positive relations that
resulted between the Japanese and their American occupiers is an
indication of the success of their school in preparing these officials for
their duties. Here again, a closer examination of history erases what
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has become a popular myth. RatJier than improving relations between
the American occupiers and the occupied, the Japanese language
training (and concurrent study of the Japanese culture) turned out to
be too limited for the circumstances under which the military forces
were employed.
The historical fact that has been lost on many of the officials who
point to occupation duty as a general Indicator that these early pro-
grams were beneficial is that many of the individuals trained for Japan
were instead sent to Korea to perform occupation duty. This situation
was the result of the change in the plan to occupy Japan directly (i.e.,
using the native government officials minimally and instead substitut-
ing our own troops in government positions under martial law) to one
of indirect occupation (i.e.. continuing to use the native government
officials in place as much as possible). The direct occupation plan had
been drawn up during a period in which U.S. officials believed the
home islands of Japan would have to be invaded with occupation gov-
ernments having to be set up in controlled areas while the fighting
continued elsewhere. When Japan surrendered, General Douglas
MacArthur himself demanded that the officers who had been trained
to take direct control be sent elsewhere, specifically to the Japanese
possessions of Korea and Taiwan, where direct rule would be
necessary.
While MacArthur's orders appeared to be logical from a military
standpoint (i.e., officers trained to run a government directly would be
sent where this type of government was needed), the results of this
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last-minute switch were disastrous. Arriving in Korea, unable to speak
any foreign language but Japanese and ignorant of the intense hatred
the Koreans felt toward the Japanese (who had occupied their country
since 1905), the Americans got along better with the defeated enemy
than with the liberated Koreans. The first order the Americans had
was to disarm the Japanese, but when the local population began to
attack the defenseless Japamese soldiers, the Americans returned
some of the weapons to the Japanese and reestablished order with
their help. This infuriated the Koreans, who frequently could only
explain their actions to the Americans in Japanese, a language they
had been forced to learn and despised using. Although the Japanese
were soon disarmed again, this poor beginning to post-war U.S.-
Korean relations should be remembered as a warning of what can hap-
pen if training is too specific. If there had been even a little more
regional training in the curriculum of these officers, then many of
these difficult situations could have been avoided.^s
One last lesson, also from Korea, deserves to be mentioned before
closing this section on history. This is the lesson provided by the USS
Pueblo concerning the possible cost of reljring too much on records of
language training and not understanding how these skills can erode. In
the case of the Pueblo, there were two Marine Corps noncommis-
sioned officers on board who had the responsibility to monitor the
38For more information concerning the trials of the U.S. forces in
liberated Korea, see Korea, the Untold Story of the War [Ref. 26].
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North Korean maritime radio traffic. Both of these individuals, to their
credit, had protested prior to being sent on this mission that their
Korean language skills were woefully outdated and eroded. In spite of
their protests, both were told that they were to take part in this mis-
sion, the attitude being, "If It says In your records you are a Korean
linguist, then you are a Korean linguist." The results of this tragic
decision are, of course, history. The "linguists" could neither under-
stand the radio traffic that might have alerted them to the hostile
intentions of the North Koreans nor could they even understand the
shouted commands when the North Koreans boarded their vessel. The
lesson is, even if Mr. Ruchti is absolutely right In writing that less than
0.5 percent of the jobs in the United States Government (USG)
require one to know a foreign language, at times this knowledge can
mean the difference between life and death for those USG employees
who rely on this skill.^^
C. MODERN TRAINING OF MILITARY OFFICER LINGUISTS
Having reviewed the origins of DLI/FLC, which trains the vast
majority of military linguists, we next turn to the current results of
language training. As discussed in the previous chapters, different ser-
vices see the language training at DLI/FLC in different ways. For the
Army and Marine Corps, DLI/FLC provides the foundation of foreign
language skill upon which they can build until they obtain the desired
39The information in this incident is drawn from Reference 27.
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^T level language skills. The Navy does not apparently specify the
level of skill it desires from its graduates but continues to recognize
the "1" level as sufficient for its Masters degree candidates at NPS and
holds out for "3" levels for its CARS officers. The Air Force specifies a
*"1" level for its language officers, country officers, and area specialists,
and a "S" level in speaking, reading, and writing for its FAOs. It,
unlike the Army and Marine Corps, expects these levels to be reached
without providing any formal training beyond DLI/FLC.
This broadly common objective, to have officers achieve a 2/2/2
or a 3/3/3, led me to question how well officers perform on DLPTs
after taking only the basic class and after taking higher-level classes at
DLI/FLC. The answer to this question came from the DLI/FLC Test and
Evaluation Division and, more specifically, from a computer search of
DLPT test results made by Dr. John Lett and Mr. Victor Shaw for me.
Through this program, all DLPT scores achieved by all officers and
warrant officers over the three-year period 1986-1988 were analyzed.
A printout was created listing 27 languages taught and the score
achieved by the officers who completed these languages on each of the
three parts of the DLPT (i.e., reading, writing, listening).40 As the
chance the officer would receive a 2/2/2 on a DLPT is no greater than
the then smallest number for that language, it is easy to see from the
partial list provided below that the 2/2/2 goal is not easy to achieve at
"^^Copies of these printouts are on file with my thesis advisor.
Dr. Edward Laurance, at the Naval Postgraduate School.
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DLI/FLC for most languages.^i Using this formula, the changes of FAOs
scoring 11211s on their first DLPTs out of the DLI/FLC basic courses
are as follows:
Chinese- 17.4% Japanese- 30% Korean- 6% Arabic- 13.6%
Russian- 57.9% French- 46.4% German- 40.7% Spanish- 52.6%
Thai- 29.4% Turkish- 11.1% Greek- 84.5% Italian- 59.5%
As one can see. the chances of scoring a 2/2/2, even in a relatively
"easy" language such as French or German, are less than 50-50,
according to the figures provided by DLI/FLC. However, these figures
were drawn from all officers and warrant officers who attended
DLI/FLC and tested during this period (1986-1988); this was not a
FAO-specific list.
D. THE ROLE OF LANGUAGE IN CONTEMPORARY FAO
MISSIONS
In order to obtain information on the need for foreign language
skills by modern FAOs, we must again turn to the data provided by the
survey of the graduates of the NPS area studies program. In the
"^^For example, in Chinese, only 17.4% of the officers scored a 2
or better in listening. 34.7% scored a 2 or better in reading, and
26.1% scored a 2 or better in reading on the DLPTs given between
1986 and 1988. Therefore, the chance that an officer would score a
2/2/2 is no greater than the lowest number, or 17.4%. There is even
some disagreement among the instructors and administrators I
interviewed at DLI/FLC concerning the chances being this high. Some
of those I talked to thought that the person who scores one 2 is likely
to score other 2s, while other officials thought that individual students
tend to do very well in one of the three areas but less well in the other
two, thus the person who scored the listening 2 would more likely
score lower in the other areas.
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subsection of the survey devoted to questions on lainguage skills, 213
officers responded: 114 respondents were from the Air Force, 75
from the Army, and 24 from the Navy. The extremely small number of
responses in this area from the Navy, due primarily to the Navy's pol-
icy of not sending officers to language training unless the immediate
follow-on assignment from NPS demands these skills, makes the
answers provided by these officers of margin£il utility. Therefore, the
following paragraphs will focus on the responses provided by the Army
and Air Force alumni.
First, we will consider the Army responses. Approximately 60
percent of the Army officers polled reported that they had in fact used
their foreign language skills in later assignments. When the replies
were further divided between those officers who had held FAO jobs
and those who had not, the population that held FAO Jobs and had
used their foreign language skills grew to 65 percent. This population
was then further examined to find out how frequently they used these
skills and how important these skills were (in the opinions of the
respondents) to successfully performing their missions.
In response to the question, **How frequently do you use your lan-
guage skills in your official duties." 51 percent replied that they use
their foreign languages "daily," 7 percent replied that they use their
skills "weekly," another 19 percent answered that they use their
skills "monthly," 7 percent said they only use their skills "infre-
quently," 3 percent said they only use their skills "quarterly," and the
remaining 9 percent gave various other answers (to include "once a
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year"). In response to the question, "How necessary are your language
skills to carrying out your official duties," 45 percent answered
"essential," 41 percent answered "helpful," 7 percent answered
"unnecessary," and 5 percent provided other replies.
On the Air Force side, although an equal percentage of officers
replied affirmatively to the question concerning whether they had
used their language skills, the Air Force responses concerning the
frequency and need for these skills differed slightly from the Army.
Like the Army, approximately one-half of the Air Force FAOs who used
their language training in their later jobs said they used their skills
"daily." but in contrast to the 7 percent of the Army officers who said
they used their skills "weekly," 26 percent of the Air Force officers
appeared in this category. This increase over the Army in the
"weekly" use category was balanced by a lower number of officers
falling into the "monthly" category, 19 percent for the Army versus 10
percent for the Air Force, and, finally, 1 percent of the Air Force
officers answered the question with "infrequently." Unlike the Army,
the Air Force did not have any officers who only used their skill on a
"quarterly" or "once a year" basis. Table 2 summarizes these findings




USE OF LANGUAGE SKILLS BT PAOs
Army Air Force
1. Used language 65% 64%
2. Used language daily 51% 49%
3. Used language weekly 7% 26%
4. Used language monthly 19% 10%
5. Used language other 19% 1%
E. ROLE OF LANGUAGE BY JOB TYPE
Turning now to the issue of how the FAQs rated their need for
their language skills in light of the types of FAG Jobs they held, we find
different jobs definitely call for different levels of skill. As one might
expect, those FAOs who worked as attaches or liaisons most often
rated their need for their languages highly. In the case of the Army
FAOs, 91 percent of the officers who held attache/liaison positions
replied that they had used their languages. For the Air Force, this
number was a much lower 77 percent. The Navy, which had only two
respondents who had worked as attaches, resulted in one FAO using
the language and one FAO not using the language. Table 3 summarizes
these findings.
As a whole, more attache-FAOs used their language (80 percent),
reported they used it more frequently than any other career field, and
rated the need for language skills more highly. Table 4 gives the fre-
quency of language use, and Table 5 represents the perceived need for
their foreign language skills:
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TABLE 3
NEED FOR LANGUAGE SKILLS BY FAOs^z
Army Air Force
1. Language was essential 45% 40%
2. Language was helpful 41% 45%
3. Language was unnecessary 7% 7%
4. Other 5% 7%
TABLE 4






42For the Navy, of the five officers who replied to this part of the
survey, four said they used their skills "dally" while one replied he
only used his language "infrequently." Also, concerning the need for
language skills by their jobs, only one said his language was
"essential," while the other four all replied that these skills were










FAOs who had later worked as intelligence officers reported less
need for their foreign language skills in all services. Less than half of
the Army FAOs who had worked in intelligence reported they had
even used their foreign language skills (48 percent). Interestingly, a
higher percentage of Air Force FAO intelligence officers reported that
they had used their language skills (54 percent), but further study
revealed that many of the affirmative answers had come from two spe-
cial categories of Air Force intelligence work: the officers assigned to
the Office of Special Investigation and the Human Resources Intelli-
gence career field. If these special cases are excluded, the percentage
of Air Force FAOs who used their language skills in intelligence
assignments drops to 40 percent. The Navy, with only ten respon-
dents who had taken language training and then gone on to perform
intelligence missions, had only two officers reporting that they used
their languages.
The relative weights FAOs in intelligence assignments gave to the
frequency their languages were used and the need they saw for these
languages is represented in the Tables 6 and 7.
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*To include "Infrequently"- 6% and "Quarterly"- 6%.
TABLE 7






Wide disparities between the Army and the Air Force responses
did occur in the security assistance career field. There are several
possible explanations for these differences, including the large differ-
ence between the number of Army FAOs channeled into this field (17
percent) versus the number of Air Force FAOs who reported experi-
ence in this area (4 percent) or the fact that English is the language of
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the air.'*^ Regardless of reason, 91 percent of the 11 Army FAOs in
security assistance roles reported they had used their language skills
in accomplishing their missions, while only 66 percent of the Air
Force FAOs gave similar replies. There were no Naval respondents who
had been through language training and had subsequently served on
security assistance teams.
Those FAOs who had been in this role had found their foreign lan-
guage skills useful, but not to the degree the attache/liaisons reported.
Their replies to questions concerning frequency of language use and
need for language skills are provided in Tables 8 and 9.
TABLE 8






43For more on the role of English in this career field, see the arti-
cle "English Language Training: An Essential Component of Security
Assistance," by Michael L. Layton [Ref. 28]. In it, he quotes an article
from the 18 February 1985 issue of U.S. News an4 World Report that
well illustrates this point. "When an Argentine pilot lands his airliner
in Turkey, he and the ground controller talk in English." It is also for
this reason that the Air Force runs the Defense Language Insti-
tute/English Language Center at Lackland Air Force Base, Texas.
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TABLE 9






Finally. FAOs in political-military assignments were also analyzed
to determine their needs for language training. In this case, again the
replies made by the Army and the Air Force were much more similar.
Sixty-four percent (64%) of the Army FAOs and 66 percent of the Air
Force FAOs in political-military assignments replied that they had used
their foreign language training in their work.
Tables 10 and 11 show the replies given by the FAOs in political-
military roles concerning frequency of language use and need for these
skills.
TABLE 10






To include "Infrequently"- 2% and "Quarterly"- 2%.
108
TABLE 11







From the above Information, some interesting conclusions can be
drawn. First of all, regardless of service, FAQs who are assigned to
intelligence missions have the least chance of using their foreign lan-
guage skills in their duties. Also, even when used, these skills will
often only be "helpful" in carrying out the mission.
The remaining possible FAG assignments do not lend themselves
to such easy generalizations. Based on the answers given, it would
appear that the Army FAG s have an equal chance of using their foreign
language skills in either attache or security assistance team assign-
ments, a reduced chance of using these skills in political-military
duties, and the least chance to use them as intelligence officers. This
list is different when one looks at Air Force FAGs, with clearly the best
chance of using languages falling to the attaches, a much reduced
chance of using these skills in either the security assistance or politi-
cal-military career fields, and a slightly better than 50 percent chance
of using this skill in intelligence work (unless the FAG is assigned to
human resource intelligence-related activities). It would be interesting
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to see this exercise replicated with a larger population of FAOs being
polled in order to determine how closely the Navy and Marine Corps
follow the patterns shown above. It would only be through an expanded
study that we might determine more precisely whether language usage
in FAO assignments is more influenced by the FAO's service affiliation
or by the job held, a situation we see some indication of in the data
presented here. Until this larger study is done, however, the answer
to this question will remain uncertain.
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VIII. THE NEED FOR GRADUATE EDUCATION BY FAOs
A. INTRODUCTION
The need for graduate education by military officers, like the need
for language training, has been a topic of debate in the armed forces
for a long time. Often this debate has centered around questions
concerning whether the exposure to a civilian-dominated academic
environment is or is not good for officers in and of itself. Officers, pro-
ponents argue, gain broadened perspectives through such programs,
these programs reinforce the acceptance by the officer of civilian con-
trol, and such programs help break the officer away from the "military
mindset." These broad questions are beyond the scope of this paper,
but some of the programs created as the result of such discussions will
be examined in the next section, dealing with the history of FAQ area
studies programs. Since all four branches of the armed forces cur-
rently appear to agree that advanced education is beneficial for the
creation of FAOs, we will dispense with following this debate and rely
on the opinions provided by FAOs on this topic to determine how nec-
essary graduate education is to the training of a FAO and what specific
types of courses FAOs say they need in order to better perform in their
subsequent assignments.'*^
43For information concerning the debate over graduate officer
education, see References 18 and 29.
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B. OVERVIEW OF THE HISTORY OF AREA STUDIES AND FAO
TRAINING
Area studies programs were virtually nonexistent before the
1930s. The programs that did exist had often grown out of the history,
language, and early anthropology departments at a handful of universi-
ties. Of note during this period were the programs run by W. Norman
Brown at the University of Pennsylvania, by Raymond A. Kennedy at
Yale University, and by Philip K. Hitti at Princeton University. These
programs on South Asia, Southeast Asia, and the Middle East, respec-
tively, along with a few scattered Latin America studies, provided the
few trained area specialists [Ref. 30).
The war brought funds and officers that the Army and Navy
wanted prepared to take on the task of governing foreign-occupied
lands, able to understand the native peoples in those lands, both lin-
guistically and culturally. However, even as the Army and Navy rushed
to prepare their officers for similar duty, they set up their programs
differently. This was done because, while the Army
had an interest in military government on a broader scale and in
which the trainees were assigned for study in a specific area, the
Navy schools could not know in advance the exact area to which
the officers were to be assigned. Consequently, the individual
trainee had to learn all that he possibly could about several vast
regions of divergent characteristics. Ideally, he had to emerge
with a full knowledge of the land and people of the whole Pacific
region, a thorough understanding of the psychology of each racial
group in 'the region, a grasp of the economic organization and
financial problems of all the widely different island groups, and a
mastery of the techniques of conducting military government— not
to mention the pertinent languages. [Ref. 25 :p. 291
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When many of these "specialized" Army troops later found themselves
in Korea rather than Japan, their country of training, they may have
wished they had had a broader program like the Navy.
Still, regardless of service affiliation, many of the universities that
currently boast area studies programs can trace the roots of these
departments back to these World War II organizations with strange-
sounding acronyms like ASTP and CATS. Pure military schools were
also established to supplement these civilian programs at sites like
Charlottesville. South Carolina (home of the Navy School of Military
Government and Administration) and Fort Custer, Michigan (where
the Army's Civil Affairs Training School was located) [Ref. 25:p. 5]
What was the course of study like at one of these schools? Unlike
the 18 months allotted for language training, graduate education was
rushed as much as possible. Often officers were withdrawn prior to the
actual completion of the programs, with the hope that they had
learned enough to get by. However, if one was able to complete the full
course of study, the material covered would probably not be unlike the
following discussion of a nine-month Navy program.
The nine-month program was to be broken up into three succes-
sive terms. This meant giving basic instruction during the first
term in the law and technique of military government, geography,
anthropology, the history of earlier belligerent occupations, and
basic language training. The second term was to concern more
intensive study of the areas involved, begin study of naval courts
and boards, and undertake the study of elective or supplementary
languages. For the third term, the officers' classr.oom work was to
be devoted to what was called "laboratory work," involving proj-
ects requiring the development of military government plans for
assigned areas. Along with these courses, there were numerous
lectures on distinctly naval subjects... (Ref. 25:pp. 29-30]
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The end of the war did not mean the end of Interest in area stud-
ies education. Instead, the rush of servicemen home, with their G.I.
Bill education money in hand and their keen interest in global affairs,
resulted in the dramatic expansion of area studies programs. By 1946,
22 universities boasted 45 area studies programs, with 16 on Latin
America. 14 on the Far East, and 11 on East Europe and/or the
U.S.S.R. [Ref. 13:p. 11]. This pace continued— 10 years later the num-
ber of universities offering programs had risen to 40 offering 80 for-
mal programs. However, by this time the Korean War and other
activities in Asia had brought about the replacement of Latin America
as the most studied area. The Far East, with 18 programs available for
students, was now number one. Latin American programs continued to
rank second, with 16 programs, and were closely followed by Russian
programs (13). The remainder of the list read as follows: Near East (or
Mid-East)— 9. East Europe— 6, West Europe— 6. Southeast Asia— 5.
South Asia- 4. and Africa- 4. [Ref. 31:p. 16]
C. Dale Fuller, in writing on the "Strengths and Weaknesses" of
these programs in his book. The Training of Specialists in International
Relations [Ref. 31], surveyed graduates of some of these programs in
1957. including 12 military officers, some of whom were probably
FAOs. Opinions expressed by two of these officers were included in his
book and are worth noting here. The first officer wrote,
1 attended graduate school as a Regular Army officer knowing that
I had to be, by Army regulations, put into a job utilizing the educa-
tion I received at government expense. I received this type of
assignment but found my political training left me in a rather
peculiar position. My superiors and contemporaries in the Army
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who had not had this type of outside civilian training thought I
was a rather confused, permeable politician whose mind no longer
comprehended military realities. My compatriots in other depart-
ments of government, with whom I had to coordinate and
collaborate daily, thought I had a stupid, backward, inflexible
military type of mind. I am not sure whether my position was
complimentary or not but it was interesting and challenging.
I think Defense did well to send some of us "militarists" to
school to learn international politics. I believe the interdepen-
dence of military realities and political maneuverings today are
such that the Department of State would do well to send more of
its people to our high-level military schools. [Ref. 31 :p. 99]
The second officer wrote more succinctly, "Practical examples
were not stressed enough. There is too great a tendency on the part of
instructors to teach theory and not tie it up with everyday problems
we face." [Ref. 31]
Also relevant to this study are the opinions expressed more
recently by two members of the 1979 President's Commission on
Foreign Language and International Studies, one concerning whether
it is really possible to train area specialists and the second concerning
the need of the United States Government for such training. The first
was a personal statement inserted by one of the commission members,
Betty Bullard, into the final product. In this statement, she wrote:
Unless students are diligently and progressively prepared in a
step-by-step fashion for "globe-wide perspective," it is not practi-
cable suddenly to impost such a perspective upon them in college
or later, no matter how splendid college and university programs
in global studies may be or become. V^e must be reminded that
international education is cumulative; it is a building process. It is
not enough that students be given substantive, cognitive learning
about other cultures; these must be accompanied by attitudinal
changes of a radical sort. [Ref. 23 :p. 2]
On the question of the need for this type of trgdning by the United
States Government, another committee member wrote.
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A statistical study of all US Government (USG) positions in the
listing of the Office of Personnel Management shows that only 1 of
3 USG employees at a profession level currently on the rolls is
using the area specialty— even approximately— in which he or she
holds a Bachelors degree or higher. An examination of area spe-
cialists by their particular specialty shows that only those with
degrees in Russian or Slavic studies approach a 1 in 2 chance of
using their skills in a USG job. For African specialists, the chances
are 1 in 6. Thus, many area specialists are employed in the various
agencies for reasons other than their main academic preparation.
[Ref. 23:p. 190]
Still, all of the above was the situation in the past and is based on
manpower data and individual opinions of persons who are not active,
modem-day FAOs. To get up-to-date information on what impact FAOs
perceive their graduate educations to have had on their subsequent
careers, we must again turn to my survey.
C. FAO OPINIONS ON THE ROLE OF GRADUATE EDUCATION
In the opinion study carried out among the FAO graduates of the
Naval Postgraduate School, a number of questions were devoted to the
issue of how well the courses they took at NPS prepared them for later
FAO assignments. The objective was to explore the following questions:
1. Did the graduates think their advanced degrees had particularly
helped them with their subsequent assignments?
2. Looking back, did the graduates now wish they had attended a
civilian school for their education rather thsin NPS?
3. Could certain core courses be isolated that were seen as useful by
the graduate FAOs, regardless of their service or later assignment
type?
4. Would there be more difference in the types of courses cited as
helpful when the answers were analyzed by service or by type of
FAO job held?
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Overall, 94 percent of the graduates polled replied that they
believed the attainment of their Masters degrees in National Security
Affairs had helped them better carry out their subsequent assign-
ments. This number included both graduates who had gone on to hold
FAO jobs and those who had returned to the general officer population
following graduation. When asked if attending the Naval Postgraduate
School (as opposed to a civilian institution) had been particularly ben-
eficial, 88 percent replied affirmatively. Only 6 percent disagreed with
the view that attending NPS had particularly helped them perform in
their later missions, while 3 percent had no opinion in this area.
Finally, in a question at the opposite extreme, graduates were asked If
they wished they had attended a civilian school rather than NPS for
their degrees. A slim 14 percent replied that they do regret not hav-
ing attended a civilian school, while a majority of 56 percent disagreed
with this view (34 percent just disagreeing and 22 percent replying
that they "disagreed strongly").
Having determined that the majority of respondents believe they
did benefit from their educational experiences at NPS, the question
arises as to what courses in particular were seen as helpful. In order to
accumulate date in this area, graduates were asked to rate how closely
they agreed with statements concerning the importance of various
courses. For example, a statement like the following was made: **!
believe taking courses that dealt with Arms Control issues helped me
perform my subsequent mission{s)." The respondent could then indi-
cate whether he or she "agreed strongly," "agreed," had "no
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opinion.*' "disagreed." "disagreed strongly," or believed the question
was "not applicable."
In analyzing the results, I concentrated on those graduates who
had held FAO jobs after graduation and, by combining the "agreed
strongly" and "agreed" responses to particular statements, have cre-
ated Table 12 to show, in order, the levels of Importance various
courses held in the opinions of FAOs.
TABLE 12
COURSES LISTED BY FAOs AS HELPFUL TO
PERFORMING SUBSEQUENT FAO JOBS
Course Type % Who Cited
1. Courses on Country and Regional Studies 96%
2. Courses on International Relations/Comparative
Foreign Policy 95%
3. Courses on American Foreign Policy toward a
Country or Region 94%
4. Courses on Economic or Defense Resource
Allocations 77%
5. Courses on Military History or Naval
Warfare/Strategy 65%
6. Courses on Arms Control Issues 63%
7. Courses on Research Methods/Comparative
Analysis 54%
8. Courses on International Law or Law of the Sea 50%
This list, while interesting, still is insufficient to determine pre-
cisely what courses FAOs need to prepare for their later assignments.
Therefore, a second section of the survey listed the above courses and
others and asked the respondent to rank the five most important
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courses taught in the National Security Affairs Department at NPS.
This ranking was to be based on the respondent's current opinion,
given all the assignments he or she had held since graduation, not on
the individual's own transcript. Therefore, even if the graduate had
not had the opportunity to take a course on international economics or
terrorism during his or her own time at NPS, If subsequent experi-
ences made them wish they had taken such a course, this desire could
now be indicated.
D. OPINIONS CONCERNING COUNTRY AND REGIONAL STUDIES
COURSES
When the results of this section were tallied, courses on foreign
countries and regions were again cited as the most Important. A full
53 percent of the respondents picked this area as the most important
type of course over the 14 other possibilities. No other course area was
close to this mark. In addition to the first-place rating given by 53
percent of the graduates, another 13 percent rated country and
regional studies as the second most important course area, 7 percent
rated it third 5 percent rated it fourth, and 3 percent rated it fifth. In
all, then, only 46 of the 260 graduates who responded to this section
did not rate country and regional studies as one of the five most
important courses offered. Table 13 shows how this course was rated
by members of each service.
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FAOs were even more adamant about the importance of this course
area. Of the FAOs with attache experience, 80 percent rated country
and regional studies-type courses as one of the five most important,
with 60 percent citing this type of course as their choice for the num-
ber one position. FAOs who had gone on to intelligence positions were
similarly minded: 54 percent rated country and region studies first
and 81 percent placed them somewhere among the top five. For FAOs
with experience with security assistance teams, these figures were 59
percent rating it first and 90 percent rating it within the top five, and
for FAOs with political-military backgrounds the ratings were 48 per-
cent placing it first and 82 percent rating it in the top five.
These high ratings for courses concerning countries and regions
are very logical. For FAOs, these courses are the basic foundations of
their study of their areas of interest. For an East Asian FAO, for exam-
ple, this course area would begin with a course on "History,
Geography, and Cultures of Asia," progress with more specific courses
on "The Problems of Government and Security of Japan" (and
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equivalent courses on Korea, China, and Southeast Asia), and be
capped with courses such as "Asia and the Soviet Union" and "Future
Problems of Asia and the Adjacent Oceans." Through such courses, the
student FAO is Introduced to the region as a whole, studies individual
countries and relates them to the region, and studies the role the
region plays in global affairs. Therefore, it would be surprising If this
course area was not the most important area studied in the view of the
FAOs and it is logical that the courses on United States foreign policy
toward these regions (which the FAO will later be called upon to help
shape) was cited as the second most important course areas.
E. UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY TOWARD A COUNTRY OR
REGION
Just as the FAO must understand the geography, history, cultures,
and other aspects of a region, so too must he or she know the past and
present U.S. foreign policy toward the region. Even non-FAOs may find
this type of education useful and this fact is readily recognized by the
respondents, as demonstrated by the high rating they gave this course
area. Although only 7 percent cited this course area as the first most
important, 31 percent rated it second and 73 percent rated it in the
top five. Among the Army students, 11 percent rated it first, 42 per-
cent rated it second, and 79 percent placed it in the top five. Just 5
j
percent of the Air Force students placed it first, 25 percent placed it
second, and 70 percent rated it in the top five. For the Navy students,
6 percent rated it first, 28 percent rated it second, and 65 percent
rated it in the top five.
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The raUngs the FAOs gave, by Job type, are provided in Table 14.
TABLE 14
FAO RANKINGS OF THE IMPORTANCE OF




First 7% 7% 9% 10%
Second 35% 33% 40% 27%
Third 13% 23% 27% 21%
Fourth 11% 5% 9% 10%
N/A 21% 23% 9% 27%
The above chart shows that a ranking of how important a course on
U.S. foreign policy is toward a country or region by FAO job type would
put the FAO jobs in the following order: Security Assistance (80 per-
cent). Attache (75 percent). Intelligence (73 percent), and Pol-Mil
(70 percent). It would be interesting to speculate (as well as further
investigate) why those officers involved in security assistance are more
interested in courses on U.S. foreign policy toward foreign areas than
attaches. My estimate is that attaches know they will be more fully
briefed during their later job-specific training, while those going to
security assistance are less likely to get additional training in this area.
F. AMERICAN NATIONAL INTEREST/DEFENSE POLICY
COURSES
Another area in which assumption was borne out by data was in
the area of how important courses on the interests and defense policy
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of the United States were to graduates. Like the previously discussed
course areas, one would assume the student officer, whether destined
to hold FAO jobs or not, would profit from studying the structures and
policies associated with the role of defense in pursuing U.S. national
interests as well as studying where our interests lie. Although courses
on the American national interests and defense policy were rarely
cited as the most important subject studied, these courses were often
placed in one of the top five slots. Overall, 71 percent of the respon-
dents placed this course area in the top five: 14 percent rating it first,
15 percent rating it second, 24 percent rating it third, 12 percent
rating it fourth, and 6 percent rating it fifth. The course ratings by
service and by FAO job are provided in Tables 15 and 16.
TABLE 15
RANKINGS OF THE IMPORTANCE OF AMERICAN NATIONAL
















RANKINGS OF THE IMPORTANCE OF AMERICAN NATIONAL




First 13% 14% 13% 16%
Second 19% 11% 18% 24%
Third 23% 20% 22% 32%
Fourth 9% 16% 27% 5%
Fifth 13% 2% 4% 2%
N/A 19% 34% 13% 18%
G. RESPONDENTS' RANKINGS OF OTHER COURSE AREAS
Of the remaining 14 course areas available for ranking, none was
ranked in the top five places by 50 percent or more of the respon-
dents as were the three areas just covered. Rather, what is notable in
some cases is the high percentage of absence from this table associ-
ated with some of the courses. For example, in spite of the prevalent
mood that terrorism is becoming an increasing threat in the world,
less than 12 percent of the respondents listed a course on interna-
tional terrorism as being one of the five most important. Similarly, the
higher importance economic factors have assumed in modern discus-
sions of security might lead one to suspect that courses in this area
would be viewed as important. However, less than 22 percent of the
respondents listed courses in domestic and/or international eco-
nomics in the top five. Courses on international relations did manage
to find their way onto the top five lists given by 41 percent of the
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graduates, but international law, which in the past was closely associ-
ated with international relations, received the worst rating of any
course area, being listed in the top five by less than 3 percent of the
graduates. Other course areas that were rarely rated among the top
five are as follows: arms transfers/security assistance (21 percent),
arms control (6 percent), intelligence systems and products (6 per-
cent), naval warfare/military history (14 percent), international nego-
tiation (4 percent), defense resource allocations (6 percent),
comparative foreign policy (22 percent), research/comparative analy-
sis (7 percent), and strategic planning (11 percent). The category of
"Individual Reading/Individual Study" was listed in the top five course
roll 22 percent of the time, meaning the students found it as helpful
to have the time to study on their own as it was to take a course in
comparative foreign policy and more helpful to study alone than it was
to take eight of the other course areas listed. A comparison of how
often these courses were absent from the lists of the five most impor-
tant courses in the responses given by the different service members
is given in Table 17.
The officers from the different services tended to agree much
more thain they disagreed as to the importance of various courses. A
few probably service-unique differences do appear, such as the much
more frequent appearance of courses on naval warfare/military history
on lists given by Naval officers over those given by their Army and Air
Force counterparts, who are not required to take Navy-oriented
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TABLE 17
ABSENCE OF COURSES FROM RESPONDENTS' LISTS
OF THE FIVE MOST IMPORTANT COURSES
TAKEN AS A REFLECTION OF SERVICE AFFILIATION
(Note: a rating of 100% would mean no officer from this branch listed
this course as one of the five most important courses offered.)
Army Air Force Navy
1. Arms Transfer/Security
Assistance 75% 73% 82%
2. Arms Control 92% 93% 93%
3. International Terrorism 95% 82% 80%
4. Intelligence Systems and
Processes 89% 93% 86%
5. Naval Warfare/Military
History 93% 88% 54%
6. International I^w 98% 100% 84%
7. International Negotiation 96% 93% 97%
8. Defense Resource Allocation 93% 93% 86%
9. Comparative Foreign Policy 71% 77% 71%
10. International Relations 51% 59% 54%
11. Research/Comparative
Analysis 92% 87% 95%
12. Economics 76% 76% 82%
13. Strategic Planning 85% 87% 86%
14. Individual Study/Reading 74% 73% 76%
courses in their program at NPS. Similarly, the slightly higher prefer-
ence Army and Air Force officers had for security assistance/arms
transfer courses might be a reflection of the fact that only two Naval
officer respondents have served on security assistance teams since
graduation. Regardless of these deviations, it is clear that the views
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expressed on all of these subject areas by officers from gill three ser-
vices clearly show that future graduates from all services have similar
needs. Those officials who are involved in designing and reviewing
curricula for providing graduate education for officers and those offi-
cers who choose which institutions student officers will attend should
both take note of these findings and consider their impact in future
decisions.
H. FAO OPINIONS ON THE IMPORTANCE OF VARIOUS COURSE
TYPES
Just as one might expect there to be differences In the rankings
given by officers of different services, so too might one expect there to
be differences in the responses given by FAOs who held different types
of jobs. In the preceding section, we found that few differences exist
between the responses given by officers from various branches, thus
the second hypothesis, that differences exist between answers given
by FAOs who have held different jobs, must also be tested.
Three course areas have already proven to be roughly equal in
their importance, as cited by FAOs in all job areas. Courses on foreign
countries and regions, courses on American foreign policy toward
these countries and regions, and courses on American's national
interest and defense policy all have been cited by the majority of the
FAOs in each area as being among the five most important. However, as
we found in the preceding section, there is little consensus among
FAOs as to what is important beyond these three areas. An analysis of
how the other courses fared in FAO rankings is in Table 18.
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TABLE 18
FAO RANKINGS OF THE IMPORTANCE OF
U.S. FOREIGN POLICY TOWARD A COUNTRY OR REGION
(Note: a rating of 0% means no FAO in this Job





Assistance 34% 15% 58% 19%
2. Arms Control 3% 4% 8% 4%
3. International Terrorism 7% 13% 13% 12%
4. Intelligence Systems and
Products 3% 11% 0% 6%
5. Naval Warfare/Military
History 9% 8% 8% 17%
6. International Law 0% 1% 0% 4%
7. International
Negotiations 3% 4% 0% 9%
8. Defense Resource
Allocation 3% 6% 8% 7%
9. Comparative Foreign
Policy 11% 22% 17% 24%
10. International Relations 43% 33% 49% 40%
11. Research/Comparative
Analysis 2% 12% 8% 4%
12. Economics 26% 18% 23% 28%
13. Strategic Planning 4% 16% 8% 17%
14. Individual
Study/Reading 35% 23% 21% 20%
Once again, the officers tended to rate the need for these courses
more similarly than differently, regardless of FAO Job held, reflecting
the fact that all FAO jobs have very similar information needs.
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However, to a greater extent than for the officer population as a whole,
specific differences did emerge. The best example was the fact that 58
percent of the FAOs who held security assistance Jobs rated their NPS
class on security assistance and arms transfers among the five most
important. Another instance involving this group, along with the FAOs
who held attache posts, was their tendency to rate international rela-
tions courses more highly. For the security assistance FAOs, this rating
was 49 percent, and the attaches followed closely with 43 percent. On
the negative side, it is noteworthy that no attaches or security assis-
tance team members and only 1 percent of the FAO intelligence offi-
cers rated international law in the top five. International negotiations
fared almost as poorly. In another example of answers being more
closely related to jobs than to branch of service, more FAO intelligence
officers rated their intelligence systems and products course among
the top five than any other type of FAO.
I. CONCLUSIONS
In this chapter, we have looked at the range of courses set up to
provide advanced education for U.S. military officers on overseas areas
from the period of World War II and today. The information provided
by the officers surveyed provides clear indications that the early
course designers were on the right track when they concentrated
their available class time on teaching officers about the areas of inter-
est, about U.S. policy toward these areas, and about how our own gov-
ernment operates and help the officer define what are the U.S.
national interests. By understanding ourselves, understanding our
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policies toward their areas of interest, and understanding the areas
themselves, the FAO is best prepared to carry out the missions he or
she may be assigned, be it in the attache world, as a member of a
security assistance team, in an intelligence assignment, or as a politi-
cal-military advisor. When looking for educational programs to help
prepare these officers for these duties, officials should look for strong
concentrations in the three areas cited and realize that the officer may
gain as much from being given time to study other subjects individually
(with the guidance of a professor) as he or she would gain from being
required to take courses not directly related to either this country or
the foreign area of interest.
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IX. THE FUTURE FOR FAOs
A. THE ROAD AHEAD
Another blue-ribbon commission whose findings should be of
interest to FAOs and those concerned with the tradning and employ-
ment of FAOs was President Reagan's Commission on Integrated Long-
Term Strategy. This panel, co-chaired by Fred C. Ikle and Albert
Wohlstetter and staffed by members who would fill a volume of Who's
Who in America, warned the American people in its January 1988
report that "the decades ahead are likely to bring drastic changes."
[Ref. 32:p. 1] In a summation of the commission's "main points"
(which reads like an obituary for the old bipolar world), we are told
that the balance of power in the coming years is likely to shift
dramatically. Rather than the superpowers merely declining, other
countries are likely to become increasingly important regional powers.
United States interests will more often ben endangered, these
dangers will occur in our own backyard, and the source of the threat
will more often result from regional pressures than from foreign
agitation. Additionally, even traditional friends and allies may be
unwilling or unable to join with us in meeting these challenges, just at
a time when our forward deployments, overseas basing rights, and past
agreements concerning overflights and treaties of mutual support are
disappearing.
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The commission goes on to make numerous suggestions con-
cerning how the United States should go about craifting a strategy to
meet these complex challenges, but the key point for those concerned
with the military aspects of this problem is the fact that virtually all
these suggestions require working more closely and more smoothly
with foreign nations. FAOs, who are best suited for this task, will be
needed in even greater numbers to help assess the new threats as they
arise and to help create the cooperative working relations this country
will have to develop with others to meet these needs. If the commis-
sion is correct in its prediction that future
U.S. forces will not in general be combatants...but our forces'
principle [sic] role there (in Third World conflicts, the most likely
arena of combat in the near future) will be to augment U.S. secu-
rity assistance programs. ..[specifically by providing] military
training, technical training and intelligence and logistic support
then the need for FAOs is certain to expand accordingly [Ref. 32:p. 16].
In this one section, we see two of the traditional FAO jobs being cited
as becoming increasingly important: security assistance and intelli-
gence. Of course, along with these two missions that directly interact
with the foreign military forces, the U.S. will also need officers who
can work with the foreign government to ensure that the military
objectives of the United States and the host government coincide, as
well as officers to advise the Pentagon on matters concerning the
region of interest. In other words, the roles of both the military
attache and the political-military staff advisor will likewise become
more important under this strategy. Therefore, all four of the roles
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commonly identified with FAOs are likely to become even more vital as
the bipolar world fades.'*'*
B. NEED TO CHANGE ATTITUDES
If quality officers are to be attracted to fill these important roles,
an effort must be made to change the attitudes held by many of the
officers currently serving in the military today. Just as during the late
sixties and early seventies, when Army officers avoided duty as military
advisors due to the perception that such duty was less than career
enhancing, officers today still appear to have a negative attitude toward
this and other FAO jobs (see Appendix C). Evidence of this attitude
exists in the resistance the Marine Corps FAO Proponent office faces
when it "captures" officers with FAO-like backgrounds, and this
problem served as a topic of discussion at the FAGC I attended at
DLI/FLC. One reason for the negative attitude many non-FAOs have
toward FAO assignments may be that so many of these assignments are
outside one's own service. This resistance on the part of quality offi-
cers to serve in a joint environment led, in part, to the passage of the
Goldwaters-Nichols Reorganization Act, creating the current require-
ment for flag officers to obtain education and experience in "joint"
organizations. Perhaps this piece of legislation will be all that is
required to change the minds of our future military leaders on the
44The consequences of U.S. and host government objectives not
coinciding can be seen in Neil Sheehan's A Bright Shining Lie... [Ref.
33).
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value of the non-txaditional training the FAOs require, but the answer
is still unclear.
C. BALANCING THE "SOLDIER" WITH THE "STATESMAN"
Perhaps the most difficult problem both FAOs and non-FAOs face
is the problem of balancing the need for the FAO to be politically aware
but retain the apolitical loyalty of the professional officer. In American
culture, the relationship between the civilian political world and the
military has been central to our self-identity as a unique society. Even
today, the highest ranking officers of this country face disciplinary
action if they cross the hazy line that lies between what is seen as the
proper relationship between the military and the civilian government.
The FAOs, who are charged with knowing not only a foreign land but
also our own. who are urged to be both soldiers and statesmen, and
who are likely to be placed in positions in which they are held up as
the representatives of the United States, must accept the fact that
political forces play as important a role in their success or defeat as
military forces.
General Joseph Stilwell, who is revered as one of the great FAOs
in our history, did not understand this point. General Stilwell
appeared to be the right man at the right place at the right time when
President Franklin Roosevelt sent him to take over the forces of
Chiang Kai-shek in World War II. Roosevelt needed a soldier to go to
China and get the Chinese Nationalist forces into the fight against
Japan. He needed someone who could both tie up the Japanese forces
on the ground there and who could protect the new airfields from
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which General Claire Chennault could begin bombing the Japanese war
machine as soon as possible. Stilwell appeared to fit all these needs.
He was an extremely well qualified infantryman with experience
commanding large forces at home and overseas. He spoke Chinese,
knew the country of China well from an in-country training tour, and
had interacted with the Nationalist Chinese fores. Who better could be
selected for this mission?
Stilwell's weakness was his inadequate understanding of the
political forces at work both in China and in the United States. This
liability would later lead to his removal, at the behest of Major General
Patrick Hurley (whose stars and position both were direct results of
Hurley's political relationship with FDR) and replacement by General
Albert Wedemeyer (whose highest ambition was to be made ambas-
sador to China after the warj.^s Stilwell's mistake was that he arrived
in China prepared to fight a real war against Japan and this ambition
directly clashed with the leader of China. Chiang Kai-shek, who was
more interested in killing his political rivals with the weapons
America was providing than in killing Japanese. By the time this fact
was clear to Stilwell and he began to complain to Roosevelt, Chiang
had already begun the process of getting him replaced. Roosevelt, who
had made public statements referring to Chiang as "the undisputed
45For more on Stilwell, Chiang, Hurley, and Wedemeyer, see
References 34 through 36.
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leader of 400 million people," found it easier to replace his general
than to change his policy of absolute support for Chiang.
Another FAO who was more politically astute owed the continua-
tion of his career to another Roosevelt. This was the Marine Corps FAO
hero from the same period, General Evans Carlson. Carlson, like
Stilwell, would today be called a China FAO. He also spoke Chinese and
had served on the ground in China with Chinese forces. The differ-
ences between Carlson and Stilwell were that Carlson served with the
Communist's Eighth Route Army and wanted to incorporate their
organization and tactics in an American fighting force, while Stilwell
had served with the Nationalists and was sent to China to organize
Chiang's forces along the lines of American warfighting doctrine.
Carlson's endorsement of the Communists* methods, including
the organization of forces into two groups— "fighters" and "leaders"—
and the election of the leaders by the soldiers, were not readily
accepted by the Marine Corps. Generally, Carlson was considered to
have "gone native" and lost the perspective on reality that should be
held by a professional officer. The conflict that grew between Carlson
and his fellow Marines, in fact, led to his resigning his commission. He
probably would have ended up a footnote in history if not for his
friendship with the President of the United States' son and the effort
to find creative ways to stop the flood of defeats that faced this nation
in the opening days of World War II. Jimmy Roosevelt's personal sup-
port and the rapid successes Japan had in capturing islands in the
Pacific both played a part in Carlson's return to active duty. Carlson's
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own powers of persuasion and leadership ability, in turn, led to his
being given the authorization to create Marine Raiders, who would
employ some of the "unconventional warfare" tactics Carlson had
learned in China. When these Raiders then captured the imagination
and support of the American voters, Carlson's place in history as a
successful officer and FAO was assured."^^
There are no clear-cut guidelines to help the FAOs determine
exactly how to be proper soldiers and statesmen without going too far
in carrying out one role over the other. Likewise, the FAOs are likely to
find their loyalties are suspect when dealing with other services. When
working in joint assignments, FAOs will find it not uncommon to be
accused of showing partiality toward their own service and being
accused of betraying their service's interests at the same time. All the
FAO can do is try to avoid the appearance of one vice or the other and
make decisions as fairly as possible. The future holds great demands
on FAOs and all military officers, for the days when most officers could
simply follow orders, look out for their own particular interests, and
rely on the overwhelming economic and military power of the United
States to ensure the security of our interests may be ending.
D. CONCLUSIONS
The United States Army. Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps are
rapidly running out of excuses for not working together. Arguments
46Reference 3 tells Carlson's story in greater detail.
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that services are too unique to cooperate very well may have been
plausible back when there was only a Department of War and a
Department of the Navy, but these arguments are hollow in the mod-
em world. Today, each of the services has expanded to have interests
in ground, air, and naval warfare. Concepts such as the Air-Land Battle
and the Maritime Strategy are grounded on the idea that the branches
of the Department of Defense can and must work together. The United
States can no longer afford to waste money on services duplicating
each other's efforts in procurement, research and development, and
other areas. This fact makes the current situation in which each ser-
vice muddles along on its own in training FAOs equally unsatisfactory.
Most of the men and women who pass through each of the service's
FAO training programs will eventually find themselves working
together in one of four areas: as attaches, in intelligence organizations,
on security assistance teams, or as political-military advisors on ser-
vice or joint staffs. Why, then, are these officers not trained in a like
fashion at centralized locations? Why is there not more cooperation
between the offices that select and train officers for these positions?
Why can each service not profit from the experiences of its sister
services?
The survey of FAOs used in this thesis has shown that the needs of
the FAOs in the field are very similar. More differences exist between
the requirements of the specific FAO jobs than exist between the
needs of the services. In other words, the Army FAO assigned to
attache duty has more in common with an Air Force FAO assigned as
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an attache in terms of specific levels of training than the Army attache
has in common with the Army FAO assigned to an intelligence billet.
Furthermore, all three have the same core education needs (as shown
in the chapter on education) and this need for policy-oriented educa-
tion (particularly with emphasis on security policy) is unavailable at
most civilian universities. Two government schools are available to fill
these requirements and both have language training facilities close by.
One is the Naval Postgraduate School and the other is the Defense
Intelligence College located on Boiling Air Force Base. These two
schools, if properly utilized in conjunction with the Defense Language
Institute/Foreign Language Center and the Foreign Service Institute
(also located in the Washington, D.C. area) could serve as west- and
east-coast centers of FAO training. Both sites offer a mix of language
training and policy-oriented advanced education that, when coupled
with the in-country training that is necessary to produce a FAO who
has an optimum mix of theory and practical experience, would result
in trained officers who could meet any projected need for FAOs.
If the appropriate officials from each service would spend some
time studying what their counterparts are doing in this area, if these
officials would meet with their counterparts to discuss the problems
they face in managing FAOs, and if they would replicate the survey
contained in this thesis on a much lairger and even more representa-
tive scale, the reward for their efforts would be better training pro-
grams, less unnecessary training, clearer objectives, more useful
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regulations and directives, and an officer corps that is better prepared
to meet the needs of this country in the years ahead.
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APPENDIX A
REGULATIONS AND DOCUMENTS ASSOCIATED
WITH THE CURRENT PROGRAMS
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY ^'^r'"*-




ATTENTION OF ^""wn •> *
DAMO-SSF
MEMORANDUM FOR: OFFICERS DESIGNATED INTO FUNCTIONAL AREA
48/FOREIGN AREA OFFICER
SUBJECT: Foreign Area Officer Development Prograni
1. Congratulations on your selection and designation as a
Foreign Area Officer I The criteria for designation into
functional area 48 are among the most stringent of all
functional areas. Your selection indicates you possess both a
competitive file and excellent potential for future service in a
demanding and highly visible career field.
2. The FAO selection process is stringent because the
profession of "Soldier-Statesman" demands that officers acquire
and maintain skills and qualifications unique to the specialty:
a. You are expected to be a SOLDIER. The professional
expertise and skills of your basic branch and the competencies,
ethics, and values demanded of all commissioned officers are the
foundation of your credibility as a FAO. Your assignments will
alternate between branch material and FAO functional area
positions.
b. You are expected to be a LINGUIST in a foreign language
of your designated regional area of concentration (AOC). Your
ability to communicate orally and in writing with foreign
officials involved in political-military affairs is critical to
your credibility and effectiveness, and will contribute
materially to accomplishing U.S. foreign policy objectives.
c. You are expected to be a POLITICAL-MILITARY SPECIALIST,
with an indepth knowledge of U.S. and foreign political-military
relationships. This knowledge includes understanding the
processes of formulating U.S. national security and foreign
policies, the political role of military forces in government,
and the interface of political, economic, socio-cultural, and
military environment in the development of national policies.
d. You are expected to be a REGIONAL EXPERT, with a
detailed understanding of the region's p>olitics, economies,
cultures, military forces, geostrategic importance, and
applicable U.S. interests/policies. The analysis of regional
Issues—as a basis for advice to policymakers--is the principal
function FAOs perform in the Army and the Department of Defense.
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SUBJECT: Foreign Area Officer Development Program
3. The FAO Management Section in TAPA will establish your
individual training/development program. FAO training will
begin shortly after you complete company grade qualifications
established by your basic branch (normally includes completion
of your advanced course and successful command of a company).
The standard FAO develop>ment program consists of four phases
over a 3-5 year period:
a. FAO Orientation Course (FAOOC). Held at the Defense
Language Institute (DLI) in Monterey, California, this 40-hour
course is designed to acquaint you with the roles, duties, and
responsibilities of a FAO, and to outline the goals and
objectives you should pursue during subsequent development
phases. All designated FAOs entering language training at DLI
will attend the FAOOC. Distinguished guest speakers supplement
the FAOOC curriculum throughout the year. Spouses are
encouraged to attend.
b. Initial Language Training. Normally conducted at DLI,
initial language training (6-12 months) provides you the basic
foundation to develop language proficiency. Spouses may attend
on a space available basis.
c. Advanced Civil Schooling (ACS). FAOs are required to
earn a Master's degree in Area Studies or closely related
discipline, normally under a fully-funded prograun at a selected,
high quality university. You will be required to gain admission
to one of these graduate programs based on your personal
qualifications and individual preferences. ACS must be
completed within eighteen months. A list of currently approved
schools and graduate school objectives is attached.
d. In-Country Training (ICT). The vast majority of FAOs
will complete a 12-24 month training assignment in a country
within their designated AOC. ICT normally includes advanced
language training, attendance at a host military school, and
extensive travel/study within the region. A list of ICT sites
and ICT objectives is attached.
4. The FAO development program is designed to be a progressive
educational opportunity, with each phase building upon slcills
and Icnowledge gained in previous phases. Your individual
motivation, initiative, and desire for excellence is the key to
success in acquiring the capabilities and expertise offered
during the four phases.
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SUBJECT: Foreign Area Officer Development Program
5. You are at the threshold of a challenging and rewarding
period of your military career. FAOs occupy key positions
throughout the Army and DOD; senior leaders involved in
political-military affairs rely daily on their analysis and
advice. I urge you to give your best effort in becoming a
skilled professional soldier, directly involved in accomplishing
the foreign policy goals of the nation.
6. Again, congratulations on your selection as a Foreign Area
Officer, and best wishes for a successful and fulfilling career
as an Army Soldier-Statesman.
- i\jij&^lzrdU
4 Ends ^. jpHN O. B. SEWALL





GRADUATE SCHCX)L EDUCATIONAL OBJECTIVES
FOR
FOREIGN AREA OFFICERS
The goals of graduate schooling in area studies are to
provide the officer with a solid base of regional knowledge across
a range of disciplines; the ability to perform research, analysis,
and synthesis; and, the capability to apply that knowledge to
his/her development as an area expert. Specific educational
objectives are divided Into three general areas:
1. LANGUAGE AND RESEARCH SKILLS ;
- LANGUAGE:
o Maintain expertise at the DLI graduation level in the
given language for the area.
oo Read newspapers and journals written in the language
of the area to be aware of current developments.
oo Use language as a tool of research.
oo Find courses or programs where oral expression in
the language is required.
o If already fluent in the major language of the area,
acquire an introductory knowledge of a second language used in the
region.
- ANALYTICAL AND RESEARCH SKILLS:
o Demonstrate scholarly skills in research and analysis.
o Refine oral and written expression.
o Be able to interpret and evaluate data.
o Know the elements of problem solving and decision
processes.
o Know modes of negotiation and debate.
2. SOCIAL SCIENCE PERSPECTIVES OF THE REGION ;
- HISTORY:
o Understand in detail the region's political evolution,
traditional enemies and conflicts, regional alignments and
historical antecedents of domestic issues.
- CULTURE AND RVLIGION:
144
o Know the region's class structure, ethnic, cultural and
religious values and ideologies.
o Understand how the area's culture and religious power
base impact on domestic and foreign affairs.
- GEOGRAPHY:
o Know major aspects of the region's geography.
o Relate the geography of the area to its national
development, transportation systems, economic sufficiency and
military posture.
o Understand the geostrategic implications and
geopolitical significance of the region.
- ECONOMICS:
o Know the political economy and institutions as they
affect society.
o Understand the economic bases for military capabilities,
industrial and social development.
o Understand the relationships between the political,
social, and economic environments.
- POLITICS:
o Know the political culture of the region.
o Understand current political institutions and processes.
o Understand the interaction of the local political system
with both western and communist governments.
3. U. S. FOREIGN POLICY AND CURRENT ISSUES :
- U. S. FOREIGN POLICY:
o Obtain a basic understanding of U. S. foreign policy and
the processes for its formulation.
o Understand U. S. policy toward the region.
o Know how U. S. policy towards the region/country affects
relations with neighboring areas.
- CURRENT ISSUES:
o Know present political, economic, and military issues
that affect the region.
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o Understand the impact of any social or economic reforms
to the status and well-being of the area.
o Know key leaders in the region and their relationships
to all elements of society.
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GRADUATE SCHOOLS FOR FAO STUDENTS

















































































































The goal of in-country training (ICT) is for the officer to achieve
regional expertise through the application of previous language and
graduate schooling. Objectives of ICT are to attain language
fluency; develop a detailed knowledge of the region; and acquire a
firsthand practical sense of country and region that will provide the
officer the means to serve effectively in key political-military
positions. Specific educational objectives Are divided into seven
areas:
LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY :
o Attain a professional foreign language ability through daily
reading, listening, speaking, and writing.
MILITARY :
o Know the service capabilities, present leadership, key
military contemporaries, operational concepts, and force
structure of host country forces.
o Gain familiarity with regional forces.
GEOGRAPHY :
o Acquire a detailed appreciation for the major physical
features of the country and a general appreciation of key
geographic features of the region.
o Understand spatial relationships of political, cultural/
ethnic, economic and transportation structures/patterns
in the country/region.
ECONOMIC :
o Gain a firsthand knowledge of the local economic structure
and the key features of the regional economic system.
o Understand the national demands placed upon the economic




Gain an in-depth understanding of social, ethnic, political,
religious, and economic issues perceived by the local
populace.
POLITICAL :
o Know in detail how the region/country functions, officially
and unofficially (who decides what and how), including the
mechanics of the bureaucracy in actual practice; know political
leadership.
INTER-PERSONAL SKILLS /CONTACT :
o Gain the ability to use conversations, news reports, visual
observations, first person and second person contacts to form
a clear understanding of the local/regional situation when
integrated with other background data.
o Develop professional contacts with both military and


















































*Due to shortage of ICT sites for Middle East FAOs, a small number
of FAO trainees are assigned to observer duties with UNTSO and
receive constructive ICT credit during their 1-year tour with
UNTSO. These officers conduct FAO regional travel when excused
from UN duties.
**ICT for Soviet/East European FAOs is completed through the
2-year program at the U.S. Army Russian Institute, Garmisch.
End 4
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MARINE CORPS ORDER 1520.11C
From: Commandant of the Marine Corps
To: Distribution List
Subj : Foreign Area Officer (FAO) Program
Ref: (a) MCO P1200.7H, MOS Manual
(b) MCO 1550.^D, Defense Foreign Language Program
(c) MCO 7220.52, Foreign Language Proficiency Pay (FLPP)
Program
End: (l) Sample Sources of Nonschbol Trained FAQ's
(2) FAO Performance Evaluation Chain
(3) FAO Study Program Application Format
ii) FAO Additional MOS Application Format
(5) List of Appropriate FAO Billets
1
.
Purpose . To provide information on the FAO Program and to
publish prerequisites for selection and assignment of Marine
Corps officers to this program.
2. Cancell2tion . MCO 1520. 11B.
3. Background . The FAO Program is designed to train selected
officers in the languages, military forces, culture, history,
sociology, economics, politics, and geography of selected areas
of the world. A secondary purpose of the FAO Program is to
identify those officers who, by virtue of family, academic or
professional background, already possess a level of linguistic
and area expertise comparable to that gained by those officers
trained under the auspices of the FAO Study Program.
a. The goal of the FAO Program is to identify and prepare
participants for future assignments to high-level Marine
Corps/joint/combined staffs in operations, planning, or
intelligence billets, and for duty with the Defense Attache
System.
b. Those designated as FAO's constitute a nucleus of Marine
Corps experts on specific areas of the world; per reference (a),
they will be assigned an additional MOS of 99ii, Foreign Area
Officer (by region/language), as follows:




(2) 99^2 - OSSR - Russian/Ukrainian
(3) 99^3 - People's Republic of China - Chinese
(4) 994i4 - Middle East/North Africa - Arabic/Hebrew
(5) 9945 - Sub-Saharan Africa - Swahili/French
(6) 9946 - Southwest Asia - Farsi/Afghan/Pushtu/Urdu/
Hindu/Bengali
(7) 9947 - Western Europe - Ronance/Germanic/Greek/ Turkish
(8) 9948 - East Asia (excluding PRC) - Japanese/Thai/
Lao/Vietnamese/Malay/Tagalog/ Indonesian
(9) 9949 - Eastern Europe (excluding OSSR) - Czech/
Polish/Bulgarian/Magyar/Ronani an/Serbo-Croatian •
• Other appropriate languages may apply to each region.
c. Officers designated as FAO's are expected to continue their
studies in order to maintain their foreign language capability and
related area expertise. Reference (b) contains information on
obtaining language refresher training material to enhance foreign
language skill maintenance. Accordingly, Defense Language
Proficiency Tests (DLPT's) will be retaken yearly, as required by
reference (c).
d. Those FAO's not qualified to receive Foreign Language
Proficiency Pay (FLPP), by virtue of their primary MOS, may receive
such pay as long as they hold a 994X additional MOS and remain
otherwise qualified as established in reference (c).
4. General
a. The Marine Corps FAO Study Program is oriented toward four
study areas and language sets:
(1) Middle East/North Africa Arabic
(2) Far East Chinese/Thai/Korean
(3) DSSR Russian
(4) Latin America Spanish/Portuguese
b. Two primary candidates and one alternate candidate will be
selected each year for each of the four areas of concentration
offered in the FAO Study Program. An alternate will replace a
primary selectee, should either primary candidate be unable to
enroll in the program.
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c. In addition to the four FAO Study Program areas, the FAO
Prograa also includes five additional linguistic/geographic areas
for which academic study is not currently funded, but for which the
FAO HOS can also be assigned. This facet of the FAO Prograa is
primarily geared toward identifying and designating those officers
who have already obtained the requisite linguistic and area
expertise by virtue of having lived in and/or studied about the
region previously. These areas and associated languages are listed
in paragraph 3b above.
d. It is emphasized that this experience-track aspect of the
FAO Program is to identify officers who are truly area experts, as
opposed to those who merely have a facility with a language from a
given region. Likely candidates would be officers who have, for
example., already served a tour in the region. (See enclosure (l).)
No further service obligation is incurred from this aspect of the
program, nor is any formal training or travel automatically
provided. However, per reference Tc), FLPP is authorized for all
qualified FAO's. Additionally, all FAO's may qualify to
participate in available language maintenance programs such as the




e. Any future expansion of the FAO Program will be
disseminated by change to this Order. Performance evaluation of




(1) Mideast (Arabic) . Phase I of this program is taught at
the Defense Language Institute, Foreign Language Center (DLIFLC) at
the Presidio of Monterey, California. Phase II provides regional
experience while based in Rabat, Morocco or other designated
locations.
(2) Far East (Chinese/Thai/Korean) . Phase I is taught at
DLIFLC. Phase II of training is conducted at the National
University of Singapore (Chinese), or at universities in Bangkok
(Thai) or Seoul (Korean), respectively.
(3) Warsaw Pact (Russian) . Phase I is taught at DLIFLC.
Phase II is conducted at the U.S. Army Russian Institute (USARI),
Garmisch, West Germany.
(l) Latin America (Spanish/Portuguese) . Phase I is taught
at DLIFLC. Phase II is conducted in residence in Chile (Spanish),
or Brazil (Portuguese).
g. Phase I training is provided at DLIFLC. It will be
preceded, ti'ming permitting, by a 1-week U.S. Army FAO Orientation
Course taught at DLIFLC. Basic courses in Chinese, Thai, Korean,
Arabic, and Russian will normally commence in July and last for 1
year; Spanish and Portuguese basic courses will normally start in
152
MCO 1520.11c
August each year and last for 6 aonths, and Portuguese/Spanish
InterDedlate courses nay be offered, pending quota availability, to
complete a year's Instruction at DLIFLC. Phase II training is
scheduled for 1 year in duration, and will coamence after
completion of study at DLIFLC.
h. The objective of Phase I language training is to give the
officer a language proficiency level of L2/R2/S2 (Listening/
Reading/SpeakingT on the Defense Language Proficiency Test III,
which will enable the individual to converse freely and read and
comprehend semitechnical publications and the contemporary press in
the target language.
i. Advanced Studies . All four areas of the FAO Study Program
include advanced language study and extensive travel. This allows
for total immersion in the language in its natural environment and
provides maximum exposure to the area of specialization for the
development of individual expertise to a level appropriate to the
goals of the FAO Program. All tuition costs associated with Phase
II are funded by this Headquarters. In the case of married
officers, Phase II overseas training is an accompanied tour of
duty, and the spouse is encouraged to participate in all areas of
training. Free language training for spouses is available at
DLIFLC on a space available basis. Language training for the
spouse during Phase II would be at the FAO's expense, as would be
travel costs, should the spouse accompany the officer during
periods of TAD travel.
j. It should be noted that funding constraints or changing
political-military relations with host countries could cause
modifications to Phase II training.
5. Eligibility Criteria
a. FAO Study Program . Any regular, unrestricted officer who
meets the following criteria is eligible to apply for the FAO Study
Program. (Reserve officers refer to paragraph 10 below.)
(1) Serving in the grade of captain or major, with at least
7 but not more than 1^ years of commissioned service.
(2) Agree to remain on active duty for at least ^ years
after completion of training.
(3) Possess a baccalaureate degree from an accredited
college or university and have demonstrated a high level of
academic performance. It is desired that the applicant have at
least 2 years of college level foreign language study, with a
minioum collegiate foreign language grade average of "B."
(^) Possess a record of prior assignments which reflects a
balanced background in command and staff assignments appropriate to




(5) Possess a final secret security clearance upon
application. Each primary selectee will submit for a Special
Background Investigation (SBI) upon notification of selection. An
SBI package should be requested from a local Special Security
Office (SSO), if not available, the package should be requested
from the CMC (INT/SSO Administration;.
(6) Have mmpetent medical authority certify that the
officer and all dependents are free from recurrent/chronic diseases
which require specialized medical care or extended routine
treatment. Officers with dependents who are mentally or physically
handicapped or require special facilities, or who have chronic
dental problems, should not volunteer for this program.
.
(7) Be a U.S. citizen. Members of an applicant's imaediate
family (including spouse, parents/step-parents, siblings, and
children) must also be U.S. citizens. Applicants should have no
near relatives or other persons to whom they may be bound by ties
of affection, kinship, or other obligation residing in a country in
which physical or mental coercion is known to be a common practice,
either against persons accused of acting in the interests of the
U.S. or against relatives of such persons. Near relatives include
parents, children, siblings, aunts/uncles, grandparents, in-laws,
step-relations corresponding to any of the above, and persons
acting in loco parentis. Furthermore, neither the applicant nor
spouse should have any commercial or other vested interest in the
country of assignment.
(8) Be free of abnormal family situations or business
complications which might divert attention from an intense study
regimen. Foreign financial interests and investments and continual
excessive personal indebtedness are possible causes for
disqualification.
(9) Attain a Defense Language Aptitude Battery (DLAB) score
of 110 or higher within the last 3 years, and/or demonstrate a
language capabilrty by obtaining a minimum score of L2/R2 on any
DLPT II, or L2/R2/S2 on any DLPT III. These tests are administered
by interrogation-translation teams, base education facilities, the
Marine Corps Recruit Depots, DLIFLC and the DLI East Coast
representative located in Washington, DC.
b. Experience Track . Any regular officer who meets the
following criteria is eligible to apply for the appropriate FAO
additional MOS. (Reserve officers refer to paragraph 10 below.)
(1) Serving in the grade of captain to lieutenant colonel.
(2) Possess a final secret security clearance upon
application.- Each selectee will submit for a Special Background
Investigation (SBI) upon notification of selection. An SBI
package should be requested from a local Special Security Office




(3) Be a D.S. citizen. Members of an applicant's ismedlate
family (including spouse, parents/step-parents, siblings, and
children) must also be U.S. citizens. Applicants should have no
near relatives or other persons to whom they Bay be bound by ties
of affection, kinship, or other obligation residing in a country in
which physical or mental coercion is kno\ni to be a common practice,
either against persons accused of acting in the interests of the
U.S. or against relatives of such persons. Near relatives include
parents, children, siblings, aunts/uncles, grandparents, in-laws,
step-relations corresponding to any of the above, and persons
acting in loco parentis.
(it) Demonstrate foreign language capability in an
appropriate target language by obtaining a minimum score of L2/R2
on the DLPT II or L2/R2/S2 on the DLPT III.
(5) Submit a concise summary of country/area expertise and
background related to the target language/region.
c. Upon completion of overseas tours with the Defense Attache
System in non-English speaking countries. Marine officers will be
awarded the appropriate FAO additional MOS.
6. Application . Officers desiring assignment to the FAO Study
Program should submit an Administrative Action (AA) Form (NAVMC
1027^), utilizing the format contained in enclosure (3)» to the
Commandant of the Marine Corps (MM0S-3i with a copy to CMC (INTM)).
Applications should reach the CMC by 15 July each year. Officers
who desire a FAO additional MOS based on prior experience should
also submit an AA Form, per enclosure (i), to reach the CMC (MMOA-
1/2, INTM) by 15 July of the year in which applying.
7. Selection
a. Applications will be screened by the Deputy Chief of Staff
for Manpower end Reserve Affairs (CMC (MM)) to determine an
officer's eligibility/availability for assignment to the FAO
Program or qualification for an FAO additional MOS.
b. The DC/S for Manpower and Reserve Affairs (CMC (MM)) will
convene a selection board in August to choose the primary and
alternate selectees for the FAO Study Program. The board will also
select experience-track FAO's for assignment of the appropriate FAO
additional MOS, based on prior language and area expertise as
reflected in the applications.
c. Upon notification of the results of the selection board,




8, Assignment Policy . Assignment to the FAO Study Prograa will be
for a maximum of 2U months. Requests for extension will not
nornially be approved. Graduates of the FAO Study Prograii will be
assigned a utilization tour, as soon as practicable, following
completion of Phase II training and consistent with a balanced
career pattern. This post-training utilization tour is designed to
derive maximum benefit from the FAO 's training, and is the central
purpose of the FAO Study Program. Those school-trained FAO's who
return to FMF duty after Phase II training will be assigned, to the
maximum extent possible, to commands which are operationally-
oriented toward the FAO's areas of expertise. Nonschool-trained
FAO's are encouraged to request assignment to billets in which they
can apply their linguistic and area expertise, both within the FMF
and without. Enclosure (5) contains a representative list of
appropriate FAO billets.
9. Action
a. Deputy Chief of Staff for Manpower and Reserve Affairs (CMC
(MM))
(1) Screen applicants to determine their
eligibility/availability for assignment to the FAO Program.
(2) Convene an annual selection board in August to select
eight primary and four alternate selectees for the FAO Study
Program, and to assign FAO additional MOS's to suitably qualified
applicants
.
(3) Announce selection board results via AUIAR.
(i) Ensure that officers who complete the FAO Study Program
or who are otherwise qualified are assigned the appropriate FAO
additional MOS per reference (a), and are subsequently assigned to
appropriate duties per paragraph 8 of this Order and other
applicable directives.
(5) Ensure the FAO's DLPT scores are entered into the
Manpower Management System.
b. Director of Intelligence (CMC (INT))
(1) Monitor DSMC participation in the FAO Program.
(2) Coordinate with the DC/S for Manpower and Reserve
Affairs (CMC (MM)) in FAO matters and provide a qualified
occupational field sponsor for MOS's 99^1 to 99^9.
(3) Act as the point of contact between the CMC and the





(j,) Provide board aembers for the annual FAO selection
board, as required by the DC/S for Manpower and Reserve Affairs
(CMC (MM)).
(5) Provide a detailed funding profile for the FAO Progran
to the ComDanding General (TE335)i Marine Corps Conbat Developsent
Conmand (CO MCCDC) by 15 August of each year for the next fiscal
year.
(6) Administer the disbursement of funds for Phase II FAO
students and report this information to the CO MCCDC (TE335)
monthly.
c. CG MCCDC (TE33)
(1) Obtain FAO Orientation Course and foreign language
?uotas. in coordination vith the Director of Intelligence (CMC
INTS)), for Phase I training at DLIFLC. Additionally, coordinate
with the DirInt for Phase II training quotas.
(2) Budget for the FAO Study Program and provide funding
data to the CMC (INTM), based on costing information provided by
the CMC (INTM).
d. Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff, Manpower and Reserve
Affairs (for Reserve Affairs) . Make appropriate Reserve Manpower
Management and Pay System (REMMPS) entries for those Reserve
officers selected for an FAO additional MOS.
10. Reserve Establishment . The FAO Study Program is not
applicable to the Marine Corps Reserve Establishment. However,
Reserve officers who have the requisite language and regional
expertise may apply for an FAO additional MOS (i.e., without
participation in the FAO study portion of the overall program), as
discussed above. Interested Reserve officers should submit their
applications per paragraphs 5b and 6.
11. Notification of Selection . Officers selected for either the
FAO Study Program or the FAO experience-track additional MOS will
be notified by ALMAR.









SAMPLE SOURCES OF NONSCHOOL TRAINED FAG'S
The following types of duty, in tandea with the corresponding
foreign language capability, are primary exaoples of the kinds of
experience which provide the linguistic-country-area expertise
requisite for an FAO additional MOS:
1. Military Advisory and Assistance Groups (MAAG's)
2. U.S. Defense Attache Offices (OSDAO's)
3. Marine Corps Foreign Personnel Exchange Progran (MCFPEP)
ii. Allied Professional Military Education Courses
5. Joint/Combined Staffs (Overseas)
6. Marine Barracks (Overseas)
7. Marine Security Guard (Overseas)
8. Olmsted Scholarship Program




FAQ PERFORMANCE EVALDATION CHAIN
1. Phase I : While in residence at DLIFLC, FAO Fornal Study
Program Phase I students will be evaluated by the Coamanding
Officer of the Marine Corps Administrative Detachment at the
Defense Language Institute, Foreign Language Center, who will serve
as their Reporting Senior (RS). The Reviewing Officer will be the
Assistant Commandant of DLIFLC.
2. Phase II ; In Phase II training, the FAO's RS's will be the
Defense Attaches (in Singapore, Thailand, South Korea, Chile, and
Morocco) and the Director of Training (at USARI). For all Phase II
FAO's the Director of Intelligence at HQMC will serve as the
Reviewing Officer.
3. Fitness Reports ; Fitness reports will be marked "Not Observed"
in Section "B"; other Section "B" markings are not appropriate.
Section "C" .should contain the following statement, "This report
and attachment are submitted per MCO Pl6l0.7." Other comments may
be included in Section "C," if the reporting senior so desires.







Welcome once again to the POL-MIL NEWSLETTER. Our purpose
here is to enhance your career planning and to foster better
communication within the POL-MIL community. There is much to be
covered this time, so let's get down to business.
This edition's contents:
1. XX2X Coded Billets by PRD
2. How to Get the Pol-Mil Job You Want
3. A Note for the XX27 Community
4. References
5. Harvard/Tufts Masters Degree Program
6. The Admiral Arthur S. Moreau Program
7. Subspecialty Selection Board
8. The Joint Scene
9. Future Editions.
1. XX2X Coded Billets by PRD
For the convenience of those who make long-term plans, and in
response to your comments on the June 1988 Newsletter, we are
including in this issue a listing of all XX2X billets. ' Within
each subspecialty - XX20, XX21, etc., - the billets are listed by
PRD; the first billets in each category are currently gapped (no
PRD listed). In reviewing this list, keep the following in mind:
The 1050 designator (BDESG) indicates billets which can be
filled by officers qualified in any warfare specialty.
The 1000 designator indicates billets which can be filled by
any line officer (usually unrestricted line).
The rank codes (BGRADE) are: G/CAPT, H/CDR, I/LCDR, J/LT.
The XX2£ subspecialty billets (BSOBl) are open to officers
with any Pol-Mil (XX2X) subspecialty.
160
l/!9/e« XXrX CODED BILLETt Jy «»RD
PRD iUIC BSC ACTIVITY •TITLE BDESC •GRADE •SU^l HOnEPT
*2091 14340 PG SCH PR0FE5TRC ASST CURR/NSA 1000 J • BZOP nOHTEY
42134 06300 NUARCOL NPTRIPnr STRATECY PROFESS looe N 7«iOP NEUPRT
«213<« 19100 NUARCOL HPTRIPKT DIRECTOR NSC 1050 7I20H NEUPRT
«I999 00100 FMSDEFIH5T SAH DEPUTY COnOT 1050 C ••20P URIGHT
41999 005O0 FMSDEFINST SAM INSTRUCTOR 1050 J • •2tP URIGHT
63415 01675 CEFIHTEL AOENCY FACULTY MEMBER 1630 M ••ZOP ARIINC
42547 42200 PEP USAF ACADEflT POL SCI INSTR 1000 J ••20P COISPS
ssos 00011 08130 OPNAV OP-eOK3 ASST FOR 1000 N ••28P ARLING
S80i 57011 05600 COniNEUARCOn ACOS ALLIED PLAN IBSO H 78203 CHARLE
8S09 41566 00300 NAVOTTSA FnS ADMIN OFFICER 1000 H 7820S ARLING
8811 00011 00130 OPNAV OP-00K3 ASST FOR 1000 N • 020P ARLING
8902 42134 52150 NUARCOL NPTRIPnr POLITICAL ANAIYS 1850 I 7020P NEUPRT
8902 41566 70400 NAVOTTSA FttS ASST E ASIA/PACI 1000 J • 0205 ARIINC
8903 68876 20100 NAVOTTSA UASH DC TECNNOLOCY TRANS 1050 I 7820S ARIINC
890« 42134 06600 NUARCOL NPTRIPtIT STRATECY PROFESS 1050 H 7e20P NEUPRT
8906 42134 32150 NUARCOL NPTRIPMT POLITICAL AHALYS 1050 I 7820P' NEUPRT
8906 65895 13325 CINCIBERLANT SA FOR CMD/CNIRL 1050 N 7020SI LISBON
8907 00161 .68200 NAVAL ACAD INST POL SCI 1000 I • 020PI ANHAP
8907
8907
42134 19100 NUARCOL NPTRIPnr DIRECTOR NSC 1050 7020HI NEUPRT
00011 01265 OPNAV OP-906E6 AST HD 1050 I 7020S. ARLING
8907 64590 02965 SACLANT STRAT BRIEF CDOR 1050 H 7020T NORVA
8907 42134 17200 NUARCOL NPTRIPMT ACADEMIC COORDIN 1050 H 7020H NEUPRT
8907 68876 1020O NAVOTTSA UASH DC DOC DISCLOSURE S 1110 I 7020S ARIINC
8907 42134 06500 NUARCOL NPTRIPMT STRATECY PROFESS 1000 H 7020P NEUPRT
8907 42134 19300 NUARCOL NPTRIPMT AVIATION WARFARE 1310 H 7020H NEUPRT
890S 42134 06100 NUARCOL NPTRIPMT STRATEGY PROFESS 1000 C 7020P' NEUPRT
8908 42134 06210 NUARCOL NPTRIPMT STRATECY PROFESS 1000 C 7020DI NEUPRT
8908 42134 06400 NUARCOL NPTRIPMT STRATEGY PROFESS 1000 H 7020P) NEUPRT
8908 42134 19200 NUARCOL NPTRIPMT SURFACE UARFARE/ 1110 H 7020HI NEUPRT
8909 OOOII 61215 OPNAV OP-603F STRATECI 1630 •020P' ARLING
8909 00011 60100 OPNAV OP-06C EXEC SEC 1000 H 7020R ARLING
8909 00161 65700 NAVAL ACAD DIRECTOR 1000 7020P AHNAP
8910 00066 34100 USCINCLANT DIR 50 1050 7020R NORVA
8910 64591 01020 JNTSTRATARPINSTF AIDE TO VICE 1000 I 7020S OMAHA
8910 65895 13327 CINCIBERLANT SUB OPS/EXERCISE 1120 J 0020T LISBON
8911 00011 60950 OPNAV OP-602 HD POLICY 1050 6 7020N ARLING
8912 00161 65800 NAVAL ACAD EXEC AST 1000 I 0020P AHNAP
8912 00161 68100 NAVAL ACAD CHMN/ASSOC CHMH 1000 H 7020DI AHHAP
9001 44069 79300 OSD UASH DC BRUS PLH OFF 1110 H 7020NI BRUSLS
9003 41566 50000 NAVOTTSA FMS SPECIAL PROJECTS 1000 H 70205 ARLING
9006 42134 17450 NUARCOL NPTRIPMT HCC/FACULTY 1050 H 7020H NEUPRT
9007 42134 26475 NUARCOL NPTRIPMT HAV-SCI RSCH/ASS iiie H 70205 NEUPRT
9007 41S&6 00200 NAVOTTSA FMS DIR OPS AND ADMI 1050 7020P ARIINC
9007 42134 17100 NUARCOL NPTRIPMT DIRECTOR HCC 1050 C 7020H NEUPRT
9007 42547 42200 PEP USAF ACADEMY POL SCI IK5TR 1000 J e020P COISPS
9008 57005 00200 COMNAVSURFCR MED CHIEF STF OFF 1110 C 0020S NAPLES
9008 42547 42150 PEP USAF ACADEMY USAF ACAD FAC IN 1000 I 0020P COISPS
9009 00011 60060 OPNAV OP-06A EXECUTIVE 1000 G 7020R ARLING
9009 42134 15300 NUARCOL NPTRIPMT HD STRAT/POLICY 1000 H 7020P NEUPRT
9010 42134 06300 NUARCOL NPTRIPMT STRATEGY PROFESS 1008 H 7020P NEUPRT
9010 57071 00110 CIHCHAN/CIHCELHT ASST COS OPERATI 1110 C 7020S N UOOD
9011 00011 60970 OPNAV OP-602C DEFENSE 1000 I 0020T ARLING
9011 00011 03530 OPNAV OP-095A1 AIDE/AD 1630 X 0020S ARLING
9012 42134 26420 NUARCOL HPTRIPMT ASST DIR STRAT 1 1000 H 7020R NEl.'PRT
9102 41566 70400 NAVOTTSA FMS ASST E ASIA/PACI 1000 J 0020S ARLING
910« 00011 63050 OPNAV 0P-6IB DEP DIR P 1000 C 7020O ARLING
9105 00161 68500 NAVAL ACAD INST POL SCI 1000 I 7020P AMriAP
9107 41566 90000 NAVOTTSA FHS DEP HEAR EAST/SO 1000 H 0020T ARllMC
9107 00011 61000 OPNAV OP-602D COMMAND 1050 H 7020P ARLING
9108 00011 61203 OPNAV OP-60S STRATEGY 1050 C 7020D ARLING
9108 00011 00125 OPNAV OP-OOKl ASST FOR 1000 C 7020P ARLING
9108 41566 oosoe NAVOTTSA FnS ORIENTATION TOUR 1000 J •020S ARIUIG
9108 00011 60090 OPNAV OP-06A1 AIDE/ADM 1000 I B020T ARLING
9108 41999 00200 FMSDEFINST SAN COURSE DIR - nAA 1050 M 0020P URICHT
9199 00066 30100 USCINCLANT DEP DIR SO 1050 C 7020R NOr.VA
9109 42134 06500 NUARCOL NPTRIPnr STRATEGY PROFESS 1000 H 7020P NEUPRT
9111 42134 06200 NUARCOL NPTRIPnr ADV CtS INST/STR 1000 G 7020P NEUPRT
9201 00029 85250 OSD CNT; Y DIR IRAN/I 1000 H 7020P ARLING
9201 65143 00550 INTERAHER DEF BD ADVISOR/INSTR 1000 C 7020P UASIIDC
9202 64590 02945 SACLANT STRAT BRIEF COOR 1050 H 7020T NORVA
9203 57020 32000 COMSUBPAC STF PLHS/STF MIN 1120 H 7020S PEARL
920<> 00161 68200 NAVAL ACAD INST POL SCI 1000 I •e20P AIIIIAP

























































































































0790S OIA ELE CENTC
•0670 DEFINTEL AGENCY












00210 USPAC JNT SA TNI
00200 con NAVFOR JAPAN
70300 NAVOTTSA FHS
12120 COnUSKOREA
10030 USCINCPAC I PHIL
42400 USCINCPAC






06720 COM NAVFOR JAPAN
63250 OPNAV
06710 con NAVFOR JAPAN
44220 USCINCPAC




00200 con NAVFOR JAPAN
TITLE •OESG BGRADE ISU^l MCnCPT
SCTY ASST STF It !•
COUNTRY OFF It
ASST NEAR E/S AS 11
COUNTRY OFF 10




CHIEF/NAVY DIV S I*
INTEL OFF(IRAN) It




ASST EUROPE AND 10
OP-illB ASST BR 10
ASSr EUROPE AND !•
MIL ASSTC PROG/0 It




TECH TRANSFER CO 11
TECH TRANSFER CO 10
ASST FOR JCS HAT 10
CHIEF/JHT EXER 11
CHIEF OF STAFF It
ASST E ASIA/PACI It
PLANS OFF SI It
STF NEGOTIATIONS It
CHIEF S21/ei 10
ASST JHT EXER OF It
FORCE PLANS 53 IS
PLNS/PDL PAC 51 10
UNC LIA OFF t 10
CHIEF St 10
PLANS OFF 521/03 10
P ( P CHIEF 13
0P-tl2 HO EAST A 10
P t P DIRECTOR 11
FORCE PLANS 53 11
P ( P DIRECTOR 11
0P-tl2D NORTHEAS 10
NATO/ALLIED PLAN 10
0P-612C ASST BR 10





















01000 US nriLOF barbad
00330 USCINSO IH/ANA C
00300 INTERAhER DEF BD
00300 INIERAnER DEF BD
00100 US niLCRP EL SAL
01460 DEFINTEL AGENCY
00350 IHTERAMER DEF BD
00330 USCIHSO IN/AHA C












CHIEF USnLO BARB II
CHIEF 103 It
STF nBR • 10
STF nBR • 10
NAVY REP Ol/tS 11
COUNTRY OFF 11
STF nBR • 10
CHIEF IBS It




0P-613C ASST BR 10
ASST E ASIA/PACI 10
ASST LATIH AHERI II
STRATtPOLICY SO 10






































H • •225 PEARL






































6J8<i9 00210 EUCOM US ELEH
«>12 62370 00902 JNTMIL HISS TURK
• 902 eOOIl 612<^0 OPNAV
8905 638«S 00«10 USCINCEUR
8903 00061 SOIIO CINCUSNAVEUR
8905 6<i590 00959 SACIAHT
8906 64771 02300 HQ AF SOUTH
8906 62370 00602 JNTfllL HISS TURK
8907 6S986 OOSIO NATO niL COrVIlT
8907 62370 01602 JHTHIl HISS TURK
•908 66030 02710 H« NAVSOUIH
•908 00011 63600 OPNAV
•910 63615 01610 DEFINTEL ACEMCT
•911 00011 6123S OPNAV
8911 <rlS66 90100 KAVOTTS* FHS
8912 00061 20110 CINCUSNAVEUR
8912 63415^2230 DEFINTEL ACEMCY
8912 <-l566 60200 NAVOTTSA FMS
9001 6! lis OieiO DEFINTEL AGENCY
9006 '^3419 00630 DEFINTEL AGENCY
9005 ^'Cll 05800 COniNEUARCOn
9006 <-I'j65 00810 JSOC
9007 OOO&I 50120 CINCUSNAVEUR
9007 64590 02810 SACLANT
9009 6-<766 00410 SOCEUR
9011 62370 00902 JNTMIL HISS TURK
9012 00011 61240 OPNAV
9012 41566 70100 NAVOTTSA FMS
9103 00011 63500 OPNAV
9106 41S66 60000 NAVOUSA FMS
9107 63415 01410 DEFINTEL AGENCY
9108 63849 00210 EUCOM US ELEM
9108 OOPIl 61235 OPNAV
9109 6-<l66 00350 SHAPE
9206 (3415 01420 DEFINTEL AGENCY
9209 6.':<;o 01602 JNTMIL HISS TURK
TITLE
PLNS/POL EUR 51
HD POLICY IR ADD
CHIEF OF STAFF
NAVY COORD OFF •
SURF t TRN PI/PR
0P-603K NATO RAT
SECTT STF OFF •




















CHIEF REG OPS 31

































































































































64590 02940 SACLANT FORCE ROUTS OFF 1050 H 0025PINOPVA
00011 66810 OPNAV 0P-652C ASST FOR 1000 H 702SPIARLIMG
8810 63845 07010 USCINCEUR STF OPS PLNS 66 1050 H 7025P|SIUTTC
8908 39096 02000 NAVLIAOFF BAHAMA LIAISON OFF AMBA 1110 I 702SP NASSAU
9001 68876 10100 HAVOTTSA UASH DC HD VISITS CONTRO 1300 I 702SSIaRLIHC
9002 659S6 00620 NATO MIL COMniT SO NAV BOMO (IN 1000 I 0025TIBRUSLS
9003 OOOIl 66815 OPNAV OP-652D ASST FOR 1000 I 7025P ARlltIC
9003 00011 66810 OPNAV 0P-652C ASST FOR 1000 H 7025P ARLIHG
9004 OOOII 66800 OPNAV OP-652 HD NUCLEA 1000 C 70250 ARLING
9007 65986 00610 NATO MIL COMniT US NAVY DELEGATE 1000 C 70250 BRHSLS
9903 44069 79100 OSO UASH OC 8RUS DEP DIR DEF OPS/ 1050 B02SH BRUSLS
9008 OOOll 06457 OPNAV 0P-132H4 ASST FO 1000 I 0025T ARLIMC
9008 00029 19300 DSD COUNTRY OIR/SPAI 1000 C 0025H ARLING
9012 64590 02940 SACLANT FORCE RQMTS OFF 1050 H 0025P NORVA
9105 OOOll 06457 OPNAV 0P-132H4 ASST FO 1000 I 0025T ARLING
9109 63845 07010 USCINCEUR STF OPS PLNS 66 1050 H 702SP'SlunG
9109 68876 30000 NAVOTTSA UASH DC DIR TECH TRANSFE 1000 G 702SH A7lltlC
9112 64122 00420 ARMCONIDISARMACY OPERATIONS OFF 1000 H 0025S U&fMD:
9203 00029 85030 OSD ASST FOR JAPAN 1000 I 0025P ARIIMC








8804 00070 14000 CIMCPACFIT
8810 000;0 19500 CINCPACFLT
8812 0001 1 60350 OPtlAV
8901 OOOll 61223 OPNAV
•901 00070 19500 CINCPACFLT
0P-6eiE UARMAPS 1000 I 7026S APLIIIC
OP-60F ASST FOR 1050 G 7026H ARLIHG
OP-iOIC2 JOINT F 1000 I 7826S ARLIHG
OP-605 BEN PUR F 1050 G 7026N ARLING
SPEC PIHS STF 31 1050 I 7026H PEARL
ASST FOR NATO OP 1050 H 7026S NORVA
STF MItlE URF-SE/ 1050 H 0026T PEARL
STF NUCIIEP/HUCIIE 1300 H 7026S PEARL
STAFF PLANS/FLEE 1050 G 7026R PEARL
OP-60D ASST FOR 1050 G 7026M ARIIMG
OP-603n STRATEGI 1000 I 0026S ARLIHG
STAFF PLANS/FLEE 1050 G 7026R PEARL
163
PID *UIC BSC ACTIVITY
atOl i<>S90 00660 SACLANT
efOl 3r798 73000 CIMCPACFLT/RPN
tfOZ 00011 iOdOO OPNAV
0*0) 00011 iZOIO OPNAV
8fO« S2791 72487 OPNAV/RPN
•««S 10061 90«10 CIMCUSNAVEUR
• fOS 10011 tCSJ5 OPNAV —
,
6109 (3852 OOSOO COnSTRIKEFLTL/TNT
a«04 00038 22SI0 USCINCPAC
atoi lOoeii ti202 OPNAV
'8*06 lOOOU 40320 OPHAV
6907 |<2134 12100 NUARCOl NPTRIPtIT
8907 >00070 20200 CINCPACFIT
8907 (4166 00490 SHAPE
6907 toon (0S3O OPNAV
6907 (4763 00110 COn CANIANT
6907 00066 34200 USCIHCIANT
8907 00070 21100 CINCPACFIT
8908 00011 (0490 OPNAV
6908 (473( 03220 NORAD HOOTRS
8908 00070 19900 CINCPACFIT
8908 00070 20300 CINCPACFIT
6909 00011 (3225 OPNAV
8909 42091 20200 PC SCH PROFESTRC
8909 00070 21450 CINCPACFIT
6909 42134 26449 NUARCOL NPTRIPHT
8909 00061 50210 CIMCUSNAVEUR
8909 (4166 01100 SHAPE
8910 46632 05550 DCA DSCO SACRAfI
8910 68869 07900 NSPECUARCEH CORO
8910 32791 72487 OPNAV/RPN
6910 45582 04200 SOCPAC
8911 42134 26450 NUARCOL NPTRIPHT
8911 00070 21400 CINCPACFLT
8911 00061 30130 CINCUSNAVEUR
8911 42134 26430 NUARCOL NPTRIPHT
9001 42134 26449 NUARCOL HPTRIPHT
9003 00011 61990 OPNAV
9003 00070 21500 CINCPACFLT
9003 00070 21700 CINCPACFLT
9004 32791 72480 OPNAV/RPN
9004 (3852 00410 COnSTRUEFLTLANT
9005 00011 61210 OPNAV
9005 00061 50140 CINCUSNAVEUR
9006 00011 61220 OPNAV
9006 00060 15300 CINCLAHTFIT
9006 46632 05530 DCA DSCO SACRAN
9007 OOOIl 62000 OPNAV
9007 (8869 07700 NSPECUARCEH CORO
9008 00011 (1205 OPNAV
9009 00061 50420 CINCUSNAVEUR
9009 00011 61208 OPNAV
9010 00011 (1080 OPNAV
9010 (514( 60185 OPNVSUPACT WASH
9010 42134 26460 NUARCOL NPTRIPtIT
9102 OOOIl (0535 OPNAV
9103 OOOn (2010 OPNAV
9104 00070 22400 CINCPACFIT
9106 (514( 50100 OPNVSUPACT WASH
9106 00070 19700 CINCPACFLT
9107 00011 (1090 OPNAV
9107 44081 00810 USCINCEUR ELE SH
9107 00011 (3625 OPNAV
9107 00061 50030 CINCUSNAVEUR
9107 64763 00210 COn CANLANT
9108 OOOIl 61225 OPNAV
9108 (4590 00((0 SACIANT
9108 00011 (0500 OPNAV
9109 9701( 08500 COnSUBLAHT
9109 OOOII (1230 OPNAV
9110 OOOII (2020 OPNAV
9110 32798 73000 CINCPACFLT/RPN
9111 42134 26459 NUARCOL NPTRIPHT
9111 00061 50040 CINCUSNAVEUR
9112 OOOII (0350 OPNAV
BTITIE








SPEC PLNS STF 31
OP-(02J OPS POll




























STF OPS t PLNS/G
stf opsiplns/ceh
op-601d mob poli




















STF OP PIN OFF
0P-(I40 ASST BR
NO PLNS BR/UAR P
PLANNING
OP-(03H STRATECI






















































































PRO AUIC BSC ACTIVITY
fZOl 6S146 50030 OPNVSUPACT UASH
9201 00070 19900 CINCPACFLT
»202 00070 21500 CINCPACFLT
«20« • •070 2BS0^ CINCPACFLT
»20« 64166 • •490 SHAPE
»2o; • •07* 2n«^ CINCPACFIT
9210 • 0046 342^^ USCINCLANT
9301 64736 • 322< NORAO HDQTRS




46632 05520 DCA DSCO SACRAM
B802 64591 11100 JNTSIRATARPIHSTF
8806 4-.59I 13060 JNTSTRAIARPIN5TF
8809 00011 .66770 OPNAV
8810 63345 • 4610 USCINCEUR
8901 59305 00100 CSUBGR 9 RN DIGN
8904 rooii 66750 OPNAV
890S 64166 00480 SHAPE
890i 64591 11010 JHTSTRATARPLNSTF
8907 • 0066 27200 USCINCLANT
8907 57020 60010 COMSUBPAC
8907 64591 06090 JHTSTRATARPLNSTF
8908 • 0011 66910 OPMAV
8908 64591 lOOIO JHTSTRATARPLNSTF
8908 • 0066 27100 USCINCLAHT
8909 • 0066 27600 USCINCLANT
8910 00011 66840 OPHAV
8911 00038 44400 USCIHCPAC
8911 63007 01450 NUCUEAPTRGR LANT
9001 00070 22000 CINCPACFLT
9001 57020 63000 COMSUBPAC
9002 57020 60040 COnSUBPAC
9003 64591 11150 JHTSTRATARPLNSTF
9003 57020 64000 consuBPAC
9004 57020 64200 COMSUBPAC
9004 64591 11300 JHTSTRATARPLNSTF
9006 00038 23100 USCIHCPAC
9007 00011 66820 OPIUV
9007 64590 02620 SACIAHT
9007 OOOU 66770 OPNAV
9009 64591 08020 JHTSTRATARPLNSTF
9009 57020 63100 COMSUBPAC
9010 00066 35100 USCINCLAHT
9011 63845 04610 USCIHCEUR
90II 00038 23400 USCIHCPAC
9101 79109 03005 CIHCUSCEHTCOn
9101 00061 50190 CINCUSNAVEUR
9106 65986 00910 HATO MIL COMMIT
9106 64166 00470 SHAPE
9107 00061 50180 CIHCUSHAVEUR
9108 46632 05520 OCA DSCO SACRAn
9112 64166 00480 SHAPE
9112 00011 66760 OPHAV
9203 OOOU 66730 OPHAV
BTITLE B0E5C BCRAOE 8SUB1 HOMEPT
STRATEGIC PLAHNI 1050 H
STF OPSIPLAHS/ST lUO H
STF OPS t PLHS/C 1120 X
STF OPS I PLANS/ 1000 N
STAFF OFF OOP l^S^ I
STF OPS t PLNS/A ISB^ N
SfRAIAPOLICT 5^ 1^5^ H
PLANS OFF 311 l^S^ H
0P-6SB OEP DIR S 1120
STRAT P1«NS • 13U I
nSL OPS STAFF OF 112^
OEP CHIEF<NOM) 1 IB^^ N
LIAISON OFF 1000 H
MSI OPS STAFF OF-1120 J
CHIEF. C OF E 1 1050 H
0P-651D SIRATEGI 1000 H
STF OPS PINS 52 1300 H
STAFF UEAPONS/CS 1120 X
0P-6S1 HD STRAT 1000 H
STAFF OFF OON 1120 I
MSL OPS STAFF OF 1120
DEP DIR NUC SO 1120 H
STF OPS t PLHS/A 1120 C
STRAT PLANS 1310 I
0P-654C4 SIOP/RI 1000 I
CHIEF (NOM) 1 1000
OIR NUC OPS 3a 1120
SS8N CURRENT 30 1120 H
0P-653D THEATER 1050 H
HUC SPEC PLHS 54 1300 H
IHSTR CONV UARF 1320 J
STF OPS t PIHS/A 1300 H
STF OPS I PLNS/S 1120 X
STF OPS I PINS/S 1120 H
DEP CHIEF(NOM> 1 1000 H
STF OPS I PLNS/S 1120 I
STF OPS I PLHS/A 1120 J
STRAT PLHS OFF 1 1120 J
CHIEF 320/01 1120 G
OP-653 THEATER N 1000 H
SPEC ASST HUC AF 1000 G
OP-6510 STRATECI 1000 H
ASST DEP OIR 1120 G
STF OPS t 1>LNS/S 1120 I
OIR HUC 50 1050 6
STF OPS PLHS 52 1300 H
SSBH OPS OFF 321 1120 H
OEP DIRECTOR 30 1050 G
ASST HUC PIHS/PO 1050 I
STF PLH HUC PLH 1000 G
STAFF OFF OON 1310 H
NUCLEAR PLNS/POL 1300 H
LIAISON OFF 1000 H
STAFF OFF OON 1120 I
0P-651C HD STRAT 1120 I










































































































2. How to Get the Pol-Mil Job You Want
Less than half of all Pol-Hil billets - the billets listed above
- are currently filled by officers with a Pol-Mil subspecialty. The
problem is not a lack of subspecialists (there are 327 Pol/Nil coded
billets and over 1500 Pol/Mil subspecialists) but rather that we
Pol-Mil types often lack the data we need to get the jobs we want
and for which we are coded.
The listing provided above goes a long way towards solving this
problem. To ensure that the list is as helpful as possible, a walk
through some of its more subtle aspects follows.
(1) Begin by turning to the section which exactly matches your
subspecialty code (e.g., XX26; ignore the first two digits). If you
do not yet possess a Pol-Mil code, look through the entire list for
billets coded with T (e.g., XX26T). These are entry level billets
(Pol-Mil code not required).
(2) Within that section, run down the left-hand column until
you reach your PRD. Mark off those billets with a PRD within three
months of yours.
(3) Of these billets, cross out those for which your designator
renders you ineligible (e.g., 1630 billets if you are a DHL).
Remember that 1050 billets are open to all warfare specialists, and
1000 billets to all line officers.
(4) Examine carefully the remaining billets. Do the activity,
billet title, and location (HOMEPT) of these billets appeal to you?
Highlight those which are of interest.
(5) By now, you probably have a very short list of potential
Pol-Mil jobs. Here's where some subtleties come into play.
(a) Grade/rank: Consider yourself a candidate for
billets with two ranks - yours and the next higher paygrade. Many
of these LCDR billets, for example, are currently held by LTs.
(b) Subspecialty suffix: The letter after each
subspecialty code designates a level of achievement within the
subspecialty; e.g. "P* denotes a Master's degree in the subject.
(For a complete list of these codes, see NAVPERS 15839F, Part E).
If you don't possess the requested amount of education or
experience, press on — after all, less than half of these billets
are currently filled by individuals with any background in Pol-Mil.
If you do have the qualifications for which the billet is coded, you
are a leg up on the competition. Remind your detailer of this fact,
early and often.
166
(c) other subspecialties: Glance through the listings
for the other Pol-Mil subspecialties. If you see any interesting
billets in these areas, remember again that most are filled with
nonspecialists. Your Pol-Mil code gives you an edge for any
Pol-Nil billet, whether or riot the fourth digits match.
(6) Finally, remember that detailing is an inexact science.
While no billets are specifically coded for 'hot runners', some
will in fact go only to these officers. Your reputation in your
warfare community, your 'fitness reports, your PRD, and the amount
of money available for PCS moves will all have as much impact on
your assignment as your subspecialty code. However, by
understanding the factors involved, approaching the situation
reasonably (and early), and knowing what the possibilities are,
you can tit> the odds in favor of the assignment you desire.
3. A Note for the XX27 Community
CP-06 is the community manager for all Pol-Mil
subspecialties. Since the OP-602 branch is assigned
responsibility for seven of the eight Pol-Mil codes, this
newsletter originates there. However, officers in the Strategic
Plans (Nuclear) community (XX27) should be aware that their
Primary Consultant is OP-651, the Strategic Nuclear Plans,
Policy, and Requirements Branch. The OP-651 point of contact for





The following publications provide much of the information
you'll need to properly manage your subspecialist career:
NAVPERS 15839F, Manual of Navy Officer Manpower and
Personnel Classifications;
Volume I: Major Code Structures
Volume II: The Officer Data Card
MILPERSMAN:
1420320 Country, Area, or Regional Specialist
(CARS) Qualifications
1430300 Officer Subspecialty System
OPNAVNOTE 1520, Fully Funded Graduate Education
Programs
OPNAVINST 1520. 34A, Admiral Arthur S. Moreau Program





Harvard/Tufts Masters Degree Program
(OPNAVNOTE 1520, Course #688)
Congratulations to the officers who were picked in a December
1988 board action to attend Harvard and Tufts for a year
beginning September 1989.
Harvard - LCDR Jeffrey L. Fowler, 1120
- LT Charles W. Fowler, 1320
Tufts - CDR VJilliam M. Dunaway, 1110




The Admiral Arthur S. Moreau Program
The Admiral Arthur S. Moreau Program for Post-Masters study
in International Relations and Strategy provides for one year of
Pol-Mil post-Masters study at a choice of six universities. For
more information see OPNAVINST 1520. 34A of 22 Nov 1988. Extended
deadline for applications is 15 Feb 1989; selections will be




The Pol-Mil Subspecialty Selection Board is convened by
Commander, Naval Military Personnel Command, to review the
Lieutenant Commander (select) through Captain unrestricted line
membership of the community and to identify proven
subspecialists . The Board convenes every two years and is
scheduled to meet 24 July 1989. Requests for any consideration




The DOD Reorganization Act of 1986 has changed the way Naval
Officers plan careers. The law, as amended in FY 88, requires a
Joint Duty tour (3 years) for an officer to be eligible for
promotion to 0-7. It also creates the Joint Specialty Officer
(JSO) designation, which requires Joint Professional Military
Education (JPME) and a Joint Duty tour. JPME was redefined in
January, 1989, as comprising any Service War College (Phase I)
followed by a Joint course (junior, 9 weeks; senior, 5 weeks) at
the Armed Forces Staff College, Norfolk, VA (Phase II). This
program will be effective for those commencing Service War
College in AY 89-90.
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9 . Future Editions
We welcome, even encourage, feedback from you, the Pol-Mil
community. Please tell us what you'd like to see in future
editions of the newsletter - it exists to serve your needs.
Career guidance. Pentagon rumors, estimates of important trends
in global Pol-Mil affairs - any and all of these, and more, can
be included, your questions, suggestions, and (short)
submissions are solicited for this ongoing communication.
The XX20-XX26 Community Manager is CAPT Ray Pigueras
(OP-602). The newsletter editor and POC is LT Christopher
McDonald (OP-602G1), Pentagon 4E516, (202 )-695-4726, A/V 225-4726.
Our next edition is scheduled for late summer, 1989.
CX>oa->OT.
e. M. ukmon
vm AouoMi. ii.a luvy
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FOREIGN AREA STUDIES PROGRAM
This regulation establishes the Foreign Area Studies Program (FASP) and prescribes Ihc education, training,
and use of ofHcers to meet the Department of (he Air Force requirements for ofHcers with specialized koowledge
of selected geographic areas and foreign languages. It applies (o all Air Force officers who are or may be as-
signed primary functional duties requiring knowledge of a foreign area and related foreign language. It alto ap-
plies to ofHces in HQ USAF, joint, speciried, uniHed, and major commands, separate operating agencies (SOA),
the Air Force Reserve (AFRES), and the Air National Guard (ANG) that use or train FASP officers or adminis-
ter the program. This publication is affected by the Privacy Act of 1974. Each form subject to AFR 12-35, Air
Force Privacy Act Program, paragraph 30, and required by this publication, conuins a Privacy Act Statement
either incorporated in the body of the document or in a separate statement accompanying each document.
Authority to obtain this information is 10 U.S.C. 8012.
Paragraph Page
Section A—FASP Management
Reference Material 1 2
Program Objective 2 2
Terms Explained 3 2
Assigned Responsibilities 4 2
Section B—Management of FASP Officers
Application and Selection S 3 '
Direct Designation 6 4
Special Experience Identifiers (SEI) 7 5
Selection and Assignment 8 S
Accession of Foreign Language Qualified Officers 9 5
Section C—Academic Programs
Nondegree Area Studies Academic Programs 10 S
Area Studies Graduate Degree Programs II 5
Section D—Training Programs
Foreign Language Training 12 7
In-Country Training 13 ' 7
Section E—Related Programs
Defense Advanced Language and Area Studies Program (DALASP) 14 8





2. Geographic Designations for Special Experience Identifiers (SEI) and Advanced Academic Degree
(AAD) Academic Specialty Codes (ASC) 12
3. In-Country Training by Region 13
Supersedes AFR 36-16, 3 August 1984. (See signature page for summary of changes.)
No. of Printed Pages: 13 [ ^
OPR: DPPE (Maj L. E. Hurlbut)
Approved by: Col Joseph C. Ramsey, Jr.






a. AFR 0-7, Index of Air Force Personnel
Tests.
b. AFR 3S-8, Air Force Military Personnel
Testing System.
c. AFR 36-1, Officer Classification.
d. AFR 36-19, Advanced Academic Degree
(AAD) Management System.
e. AFR 36-20, Officer Assignments.
f. AFR 36-23, Officer Career Development.
g. AFR SO-5. USAF Format Schools Catalog
(Policy, Responsibilities, General Procedures, and
Course Announcements).
h. AFR 30-40, Management of the Defense
Language Program.
i. AFR SO-50, Training for Security Assistance
Personnel.
j. AFR 700-20, volume I, Air Force Data Dic-
tionary.
2. Program Objective:
a. The FASP is designed to produce, sustain,
and effectively utilize a resource of qualified Air
Force officers for worldwide assignment to desig-
nated positions that require a special knowledge
and understanding of a country or geographic
area of the world and a related foreign language.
A key function of FASP officers is to provide
sophisticated linkage between, undersunding of,
and infiuence on, foreign and US political and
military institutions and personalities. Foreign
area officers, specifically, possess the comprehen-
sive, up-to-date knowledge of the language, mili-
tary services, geography, history, economics,
politics, culture, religion, and sociology of a spe-
cific foreign country or area required to make
sound decisions and estimates concerning US mili-
tary activities. The FASP designations should be
assigned to any Air Force specially position in
which the above knowledge would enhance mis-
sion accomplishment through an individual's abil-
ity to relate with foreign nationals and interpret
events and behaviors.
b. The FASP meets the above objective by pro-
viding training and assignments designed to satisfy
requirements for officers with specific levels of
training:
(1) Foreign language training only prepaffs
officers as foreign language specialists. They may
be assigned to billets requiring foreign language
proficiency but not country or area expertise.
(2) Area or country-specific academic train-
ing and foreign language training prepare officers
s country specialists who may perform duties as
required by security assisunce organizations and
Defense Attache offices.
(3) Area studies advanced academic degree
and foreign language training prepare area spe-
cialists to work country desks at various levels and
in assorted Air Force specialties.
(4) Area studies advanced academic degree,
foreign language training, and in<ountry training
or experience develop a resource of foreign area
officers (FAO). These highly trained area experts
may be attaches, advisors, politico-military affairs
officers, liaison officers, or key security assistance
organization personnel. They are frequently as-
signed in-coiintry or to billets at the Joint or DOD
level or at HQ USAF where their expertise can
most effectively be used.
3. TcmuEsplaiacd. Seeatuchmeni I.
4. Assigned RcspoDslblltties:
a. Program Manager. HQ USAF/DPP, as pro-
gram manager:
(1) Evaluates requests for direct designation
into the FASP as described in paragraph 6.
(2) Recommends to the Air Force MiliUry
Personnel Center (AFMPC) the award of a special
experience identifier (SEI) for direct designees.
(3) Consolidates annual graduate education
quotas for the FASP in coordination with using
agencies, AFMPC, and the Air Force Institute of
Technology (AFIT).
(4) Maintains liaison with AFIT/Cl on area
studies academic programs.
(5) Confers with functional sponsors and the
AFMPC FASP Uaison office (FASPLO) on the se-
lection, training, and assignment of FASP of-
ficers.
(6) Establishes policy and procedures for the
FASP under coordination with functional man-
agers.
(7) Reviews all AF Forms 1779. Request to
Establish/Change Advanced Academic Degree
Position, relating to the academic specialty codes
(ASC) listed at attachment 2.
(8) Reviews and monitors all administrative
and operational aspects of FASP academic, in-
country, and foreign language training.
(9) Works with functional managers to ar-
range In-country training.
(10) Monitors all FASP officers in cooper-
ation with the functional managers and AFMPC
FASPLO.
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b. Functional Manager. Each functional man-
ager must:
(1) Establish annual AFIT FASP graduate
education requirements in coordination with using
agencies, command and SOA managers, and the
program manager.
(2) Confer with assignment ofncert on the
selection, training, and assignment of FASP of-
ficers.
(3) Have administrative and operational re-
sponsibility for all FASP officers within their
functional conirol.
(4) Establish policy and procedures for
internal operation of the FASP in coordination
with other US Air Force and interested agencies.
(5) Develop specific career progression op-
portunities for FASP officers.
c. AFMPC FASPLO. The AFMPC FASPLO
serves as the single point of contact in AFMPC for
FASP policy and program matters.
d. AFMPC Assignment Officers. Assignment
officers not having responsibility for filling FASP
requirements, but who receive applications from
officers under their functional control who wish to
career broaden or crosstrain into a FASP position,
will forward a copy of the officers' AF Form 90,
Officer Career Objective Statement (if approved
for career broadening or cross training) to the ap-
propriate assignment officer for action. Each as-
signment officer responsible for filling FASP re-
quirements:
(1) Reviews each application for the FASP
for availability and qualifications.
(2) Notifies the applicant if qualified or
available for a FASP assignment.
(3) Requests academic evaluation of qual-
ified applicants from AFIT/RR if applying for an
advanced academic degree (AAD).
(4) Nominates academically qualified of-
ficers for entry into the AFIT area studies degree
program to HQ AFMPC/DPMRPC, when re-
quired.
(5) After conferring with the sponsoring
agency, determines the geographic area of special-
ization and foreign language for each selected ap-
plicant based on projected assignment and Air
Force requirements.
(6) Identifies individuals requiring in-country
training lo the functional manager and program
manager when they are selVcAd for the program.
(7) Schedules foreign language and area
studies training, when required.
c. Applicant. An officer interested in the FASP
must apply directly to his or her assignment of-
ficer according to the procedures outlined in para-
graph S. Those officers wishing to career broaden
or crosstrain from a non-FASP utilizing Air Force
specialty code (AFSC) lo a FASP utilizing AFSC
should indicate such on their AF Form 90. If ap-
proved, the respective assignment officer will for-
ward a copy of the AF Form 90 to the assignment
officer for action according to d above.
r. Using Agency. All joint, specified, unified,
major commands, separate operating agencies,
and HQ USAF, AFRES, or ANG offices thai
have FASP billets must ensure these positioiu are
validated and properly coded into Ihe command
manpower data system and Ihe unit manning
document. AAD positions are validated according
lo AFR 36-19 and language designated positions
(LDP) are validated in accordance with AFR
$0-40.
g. Air Force InsUlulc of Technology (AFIT).
As the Academic Program Manager and Evaluat-
ing Agency, AFIT:
(1) Establishes the academic ehgibility stand-
ards for entry into the FASP.
(2) Evaluates the academic eligibility of each
AAD applicant.
(3) When an individual is selected for an edu-
cation program, assigns him or her to the appli-
cable school.
(4) Monitors academic progress, provides ad-
ministrative support, and acts as the student's
point of contact while in the education program.
(5) Provides AFMPC information on Ihe
award of an ASC.
Scclloa B—Managcmcal of FASP Ofnccn
5. Application and Scleclion:
a. All officers applying for Ihe FASP must
meet the following prerequisites as well as those
listed in AFR SO-S, paragraphs 4-13 and 4-18d,
or applicable AFRES or ANG directives.
(1) Military Availability. Officers must:
(a) Have an outstanding military record.
(b) Be medically unrestricted for world-
wide duty.
(c) Have at least 3 years of intervening
service since last permanent change of station
(PCS) education assignment on the date of class
entry.
(d) Have, or be eligible for, a Top Secret
Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI)
clearance.
(e) Be in a Regular or career Reserve
status.
(2) Academic Eligibility. Officers must:
(a) Have undergraduate records which
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qualify them for admission to reputable graduate
(chools, if applying for an AAD program.
(b) Earn qualifying scores on the Graduate
Record Examination (GRE), if required. All fees
for the GRE must be paid for by the ofHcer and
are not reimbursable. Although undergraduate
grade point average (GPA) and GRE test scores
are considered in evaluations, strong credentials in
one area may compensate for minor dePiciencies in
the other. It may also be possible to qualify by
taking additional coursework.
(c) Achieve the minimum score required
for training for the category language of the area
of specialization on the Defense Language Apti-
tude Battery (DLAB) or obtain a skill level of L-1
,
R-l, S-l on the Defense Language Proficiency
Test (DLPT) in one or more languages of a spe-
cific geographic area.
b. If the officer meets the above listed prerequi-
liies, he or she then makes application to his or
her assignment officer using the AF Form 90, Of-
ficer Career Objective Statement or the AF Form
620, Colonel Resume. The remarks section should
include desired area and language; qualifications;
previous experience; GRE. DLAB, and DLPT
scores; educational background and GPA; and
desired follow-on assignment. Incomplete applica-
tions will be returned to the applicant without ac-
tion unless prior arrangement has been made with
the assignment officer. Application should nor-
mally be made 18 to 24 months before the date of
availability for PCS.
c. The assignment officer will review each
application.
(1) Determine the applicant's availability for
assignment to a FASP position.
(a) If the applicant is not initially qualified
and available, he or she must be notified in writing
stating the reasons.
(b) If the applicant is initially qualified and
available, the application must be sent to
AFIR/RR for an academic evaluation, if applying
for an AAD program.
(2) Nominate academically qualified FASP
AAD applicants to HQ AFMPC/DPMRPC. Each
nomination must include:
(a) Name, grade, SSN.
(b) Educational program and language de-
tired.
(c) Desired school entry date.
(d) Desired assignment on completion. '
(e) Projected duty AFSC, ASC appropri-
ate 10 the area of study, and foreign language
code.
(f) Certification from AFIT/RR that the
applicant is academically qualified for the pro-
gram. AFIT/RR will indicate the lota) number of
months of prior AFIT education, if any.
(3) Assign each officer selected for the FASP
geographic area of specialization and foreign
language based on the projected assignment of the
officer and the needs of the Air Force.
d. Once notified of selection, geographic area
of specialization, and foreign language, the officer
may decline training without prejudice and with-
out restriction from future application. If the of-
ficer concurs with the selection, he or the will (hen
be notified by AFIT of the training institution. Al-
though the officer may request a specific area
tludies program, foreign language, and institution
in the application, the assignment officer has final
determination of the area and language and AFIT
it responsible for selecting the most appropriate
academic institution.
e. Due to the ever changing international polit-
ical environment, the Air Force requirements for
assignments may change in the course of training.
If this occurs, the officer may respond according
to AFR 36-20. Alto, due to accelerated require-
ments, an officer may be ordered to a new duty as-
signment before completing the training.
6. Direct Dctlgaatlon. The Air Force hat a re-
tource of officers whose experience, training, and
education makes them eligible for direct designa-
tion into the FASP.
a. Officers eligible to be directly designated
must:
(i ) Have an outstanding military record.
(2) Have a minimum of a master's degree in
area studies or a similar bachelor't degree with ex-
tensive knowledge and experience in a specific
geographic area.
(3) Have a tkill level of L-2, R-2. S-2 ten-
guage proficiency on the DLPT in one or more
languages of the specific geographic area.
(4) Have in-country or in-area training and
experience.
b. Officers meeting the above criteria should
apply for direct designation to the program man-
ager. HQ USAF/DPP, by 15 January for the
winter board or by IS June for the summer board.
The application mutt include:
(1) Copies of all Officer Effectiveneu Re-
ports.
(2) A Report on Individual Personnel (RIP)
records review.
(3) One copy of a transcript from each col-
lege attended. The transcripts must bear the teal
and the Khool official's tignature. Phototlatic
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copies of the seal and signature are not acceptable.
(4) Evidence of language skill level.
(5) A double-spaced biography staling the
specific geographical area and. language of ex-
pertise and detailing the related cultural and mili-
tary experience.
c. The program manager will convene and chair
two selection boards a year, one in February and
one in July, to evaluate applications based on the
program defmitions in paragraph 3. The board
will consist of one major or above representative
from each HQ USAF and HQ AFOSI functional
sponsor office. The program manager will notify
AFMPC to award direct designation of the proper
SEI to qualified individuals based on the board's
recommendations.
7. Special Experience Idcnilflei* (SEI). SEIs are
used to indicate completion of a minimum of I
year in a FASP position or experience in a geo-
graphic area of specialization and skill level 2 in a
foreign language.
a. FASP SEIs. SEIs authorized for use in this
program are listed in attachment 2 and AFR 36-1.
Requests for the award or withdrawal of an SEI
are made according to AFR 36-1. The program
manager evaluates the individual's qualifications
and, if approved, requests AFMPC/DPMR to
add the proper SEI to the officer's record. Length
and recency of training or experience are key to an
individual's eligibility for designation of an SEI.
Failure to maintain the required foreign language
proficiency skill level 2 and failure to test for lan-
guage proficiency according to AFR 35-8 will re-
sult in the automatic withdrawal of the SEI. The
SEI may be reawarded when the individual is re-
designated language proficient at the proper skill
level and makes application as described above.
b. SEIs Id (he Officer Assignment Process. Al-
though there are no formally established programs
within the officer assignment process for using
SEIs, the assignment officer will use officer SEIs
in selecting and assigning officers into FASP posi-
tions. Officers with FASP SEIs should be consid-
ered for a FASP assignment before officers re-
quiring FASP training.
c. Unit Commander and Staff Responsibliillet.
Unit commanders and base level directors must
ensure that unit manpower documents are coded
with SEIs proper to the position requirements.
.This aides limrly designatikn^f SEIs to each indi-
vidual's recon', recording this experience for fu-
ture assignment considerations. If it is known that
an individual has acquired sufficient experience or
training while performing in a position that is not
coded or cannot be coded, that experience ihouli
be reported to the program manager who will eval-
uate the request for an SEI. Local commanders
and directors of staff agencies should ensure that
personnel selected to fill specific requirements by
virtue of their SEIs are indeed auigned to these
positions. Effective use of assigned resources
within their AFSC and specialized experience will
greatly enhance unit effectiveness and eliminate
unnecessary training.
I. SclcctloB »mi At^^tmmtnl. Assignment officers
ihould make every effort to use an officer with
FASP experience in more than one auignment
using their special experience, especially those who
volunteer for such assignments. Rotation into
FASP duties will follow career progression guide-
lines in AFR 36-23 and slated requirements of the
using agencies. The assignment officer should give
particular consideration to the lead time required
for an area studies and language training when
making assignments. A ratio of three officers to
each validated FASP position will provide the fol-
lowing utilization cycle: one in training, one per-
forming the job, and one available in the inven-
tory.
9. Accession of Foreign Laagaage Qvallfled Of-
ficers. Precommissioning sources, the United
Stales Air Force Academy, the Air Force Reserve
Officers' Training Corps, and Officer Training
School, should access foreign language qualified
officers based on the annual requirement estab-
lished by HQ USAF/DPP. This requirement
should be considered when establishing Kholar-
ship and recruiting programs.
Scclioa C—Academic Programs
10. Npndegrce Area Studies Academic Programs.
Nondegree area studies academic programs can be
designed by Air University to provide the amount
of academic training required for follow-on as-
signments. Some programs can be tailored to meet
specific officer and mission requirements by con-
tracting training through civilian institutions. The
Foreign Service Institute. Defense Intelligence
College, Defense Institute of Security Assistance
Management, and the Army Foreign Area Officer
Course can also provide area studies related
course work for FASP officers.
II. Area Siodlct Gradvalc Degree Programs.
AFIT/CI determines the graduate Khool to be
used for the area studies degree based on area of
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specialization, tuition costs, and quality of pro-
gram. Many officers selected for graduate educa-
tion in area studies attend the Naval Postgraduate
School (NPS) in Monterey, California. Complet-
ing the area specialty curriculum along with lan-
guage training at the Defense Language Institute
Foreign Language Center (DLIFLC) leads to the
degree of Master of Arts in National Security
Affairs. The program lasts from I to 2 years de-
pending on the curriculum and option selected,
the language studied, and previous educational
background. Officers are assigned to NPS for the
full duration of the combined program. Student
programs are individually tailored based on an of-
ficer's academic and professional background,
using agency requirements, and the area specially
and language concerned. Course mix and se-
quence will also vary according to lime of entry.
The four area specially curricula blocks at NPS
are: Middle East, Africa, South Asia; Far East,
Southeast Asia, Pacific; Europe, USSR; and
Western Hemisphere. These programs and related
curricula are designed to provide graduate educa-
tion in the Held of National Security Affairs with
particular emphasis on the following
areas: politico-military affairs, strategic and
operational planning, attache affairs, foreign in-
telligence, and area analysis. Listed below are spe-
cific educational skill requirements related to the
area specially curriculum that should be met by
students in the NPS area studies program, as well
as students in area studies programs at other insti-
tutions, at the conclusion of their academic pro-
gram:
a. Analytical and Research Skills. Students
should have achieved a high level of expertise in
scholarly skills, lo include effective oral and writ-
ten expression, research techniques, interpretation
and evaluation of complex data, problem solving,
forecasting, decision processes, modes of nego-
tiation and debate, the formulation of strategy
and politico-military objectives.
b. Culture and Religion. The students should
be cognizant of the influence of class structure,
ethnic, cultural, and religious values, and ideology
on domestic and foreign affairs. They should
understand the origins of current cultural and
religious differences and conflicts and how these
factors affect regional and national unity.
c. Current Imiuts. Students must be familiar
with the major security issues ii' the world, fhkse
Include, but arl$ not limited to, political, eco-
nomic, and military conflicts, insurgencies, social
problems and other issues that affect both the
status or well-being of nations. These issues
should be related to the formulation and imple-
mentation of US foreign and security policies.
d. EcoBomlct. Students must be aware of the
economic strengths and weakitestes of the major
power blocs and of economic phenomena which
influence ideology, military doctrine, industrial
and social development. The students must be
familiar with the principal resources, economic in-
fluence, industrial capacity, and major industries
of their region.
c. Geography. Students should have a grasp of
geography and its impact on national develop-
ment, agriculture, spatial relationships, transpor-
tation systems, economic sufHciency, and military
posture. They also should have detailed knowl-
edge of their geographic areas and the concomi-
tant strategic significance.
t. Geopolitics. Modern international politics is
deeply rooted in geography. Students should be
familiar with the geopolitical aspects of world re-
gions in terms of their global strategic importance.
They should understand how scholars view the in-
fluence of geography, climate, economics, polit-
ical culture, and demography on political thought
and foreign policy.
g. Historical Development. The student should
understand the historical trends and influences
that have shaped and provided the context for
interaction in today's international environment
and future developments. The students also
should acquire detailed knowledge concerning the
historical developments in their region of spe-
cialty, with particular emphasis on the political
evolution, traditional enemies and conflicts, re-
gional alliances, and domestic issues.
h. Language. Students must have sufficient
language proficiency to be able to maintain their
expertise in their professional area. This would in-
clude the reading of newspapers and journals writ-
ten in the language of the area in order to be
cognizant of developments as they occur. The
ideal area specialist should have proficiency in one
major language group and acquire working
knowledge of a second language of the region.
I. Military Forces. Students should understand
the roles, political influences, social positions,
composition, structure, capabilities, and vulner-
abilities of the armed forces. They should be in-
formed of current political and military develop-
ments, regional politico-military relations, and re-
gional defense agreements.
J. Politics. Students should have a knowledge
of the major political system, political culture and
governmental organizations, be aware of current
political doctrine and issues, and know the
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strength, appeal, and influence of communism
and other ideologies. The students also should
have a detailed knowledge of their area and be
aware of the current relationships, attitudes, and
perspectives toward both the United States and
potential adversaries.
k. Strategic Posture. Students should perceive
national strengths and weaknesses that affect a na-
tion's strategic posture and capabilities and be
able to identify and assess major military, po-
litical, economic, and sociological trends which
affect policy choices in domestic and foreign af-
fairs.
Section D—Training Programs
12. Foreign Language Training:
a. Knowledge of a foreign language is one of
the keystones of the FASP. The contribution of
language skill to military effectiveness in the inter-
national arena is significant. The length of lan-
guage training for FASP officers will vary accord-
ing to their current level of proficiency and the dif-
ficulty of the language required for the follow-on
assignment. Language training is provided to meet
specific using agency requirements and falls into
two basic categories.
(1) The first, basic language training which
includes basic, intermediate, and advanced lan-
guage training courses, is for positions where the
performance of the primary or technical specially
in the subsequent duty assignment requires foreign
language skill. Positions requiring foreign lan-
guage proficiency are coded on Unit Manpower
Documents and required proficiency levels are
stated by the using agency at the time the per-
sonnel requisition is submitted.
(2) The second, survival level language train-
ing (level I or less than level I) and cultural orien-
tation sufficient for some social amenities, is pro-
vided for positions where the incumbent has
limited interface with foreign national personnel.
b. Resident foreign language instruction will be
accomplished at DLIFLC. Requests for excep-
tions will be submitted in writing to HQ Air Train-
ing Command Technical Training (HQ ATC/
TTPPN),
c. The DLAB is designed to evaluate aptitudes
essential for successfully completing foreign lan-
guage training. The test is used in the screening
and preselection of potential foreign lan(<uage
trainees. Besides any tests and measurements ad-
ministered during the language training course,
officers are given the DLPT upon completion of
foreign language training. The DLPT is also used
on a periodic basis to reestablish profkienc)' lan^
level. This retesting is mandatory for all officers
who received foreign language training at Air
Force expense. The individual Is responsible for
language maintenance and may request refresher
training, if required, for a subsequent duty assign-
ment. Additional information on the DLAB and
DLPT can be found in AFR 35-8.
d. An officer desiring assignment to a position
with an established foreign language requirement
must apply to the appropriate assignment officer.
Before application, the eligibility requirements
listed in paragraph S must be met. Refer to AFR
50-3 and AFR 50-50 for additional information.
13. in-CouBlry Trainlag. The in-country training
and orientation phase is reserved primarily for
foreign area officers (FAO) as the final segment of
their education and training in foreign area stud-
ies. During this phase, the FAO continues aca-
demic studies in the area of specialization and
among the people of that area. The success of this
phase depends, to a great extent, on the facilities
available in the area and the attitude of the host
government. As a minimum, the program should
include continuation of foreign language training,
extensive travel throughout the region, and con-
tacts with military and civilian elements of the in-
digenous population. The FAO should participate
in individual reading and research, visits and ob-
server training, seminars, and, whenever possible,
formal military and civilian schooling to amplify,
clarify, and verify previous studies. The length of
this training will vary based on the country in-
volved, funding available, and Air Force require-
ments.
a. FAO students are attached to major overseas
commands. Their duty station is with the in-coun-
try monitor, the Air Force attache office, security
assistance or advisory group office, or another
designated US Air Force office while receiving cul-
tural orientation or attending a host country's
military service school, university, or other institu-
tion of learning with subsequent area travel and
research. The FAO students' sponsor, along with
the program manager, will select the in<ountry
monitor based on personnel availability in the spe-
cific country. The length and type of training vary
by country (see attachment 3).
b. FAOs are not accredited memben of the
diplomatic mission and, therefore, are not entitled
to diplomatic immunity. They are not to represent
themselves as assistant attaches.
c. Language fluency is a necessary tool If the
FAO is to achieve maximum benefit from training
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and orientation activities. Usually, additional
training can be accomplished at a school in-coun-
try, by using a local tutor, and immersion in the
host culture. The time devoted to language train-
ing will depend on the degree or difricully of the
language and the FAO's proficiency and language
aptitude. A comprehensive reading program will
also develop fluency and enhance area knowledge.
Duty with advisory groups also offers opportuni-
ties for daily language use.
d. Travel is an important part of in-country
studies and should be designed to develop a thor-
ough knowledge of the physical aspects of the area
and the total culture of the people. Travel will be
coordinated with US agencies by the program
manager sufficiently in advance to allow complete
access to the area and flexibility to attend educa-
tional and cultural events. Travel should also in-
clude visits to host country military units. These
forces should be viewed in the context of their po-
sition in relation to the other elements of the na-
tional composite. Suspicions may be aroused
among the host country military personnel toward
the FAO student unless clear training objectives
for the visit are communicated to the hosts by the
student and the US agency arranging the visit. The
student should clearly establish a preference for an
exchange of information type visit to aid mutual
understanding. ClassiHed information will not be
exchanged. To minimize misunderstanding of the
FAO mission by host country officials, FAOs will
not associate with, or engage in, any intelligence
activities. Student projects must be planned and
executed in such a way as to avoid even the slight-
est appearance that these projects are associated
with intelligence collection or advisory functions.
e. FAO students will establish a FAO library
and operational and administrative Hies at each
training site. Books, reports, and other materials
purchased or obtained for the FAO library will re-
main on station for use by future students. FAO
students are required to provide trip reports to the
program manager on an as required basis. Besides
trip reports, the FAO student may, under the
guidance of the in-country monitor, prepare re-
search projects. These should deal with current af-
fairs, be relatively short, and are of a lower prior-
ity than travel and language study.
f. FAO itudenu should attend embassy and
military aocial functions in order to become ac-
quainted with as many host country diplomats and
lenior military officials as possible.
g. Attendance at host country military schools
is encouraged, preferably at the company grade
level. In-country monitors are encouraged to seek
other proper courses for FAO students. FASP of-
ficers who meet basic eligibility requirements to
enroll in intermediate or senior service school cor-
respondence -or seminar courses may be nomi-
nated to attend intermediate and senior service
tchoob hosted by other nations and taught in the
host nation's language. Designation on the Air
Force intermediate or senior service school list is
not a prerequisite for these officers when attend-
ance at another nation's equivalent level school is
deemed to be in the best interest of the Air Force,
the Department of Defense, or the United States.
Section E—Related Programs
14. Defense Advanced Language and Area
Studies Program (DALASP). The DALASP is
sponsored by the Defense Intelligence Agency
(DIA) and is designed for mid-career officer and
civilian intelligence analysts. FASP officers may
be eligible for DALASP which provides an oppor-
tunity for up to 2 years of graduate level research
of the third world and the study of unusual lan-
guages. Funding provides for tuition, books, fees,
research, worldwide travel, and language tutoring.
The DALASP program manager is Air Force In-
telligence, Directorate of Force Management (HQ
USAF/INF).
15. Other Training Opportunities. The following
list of education opportunities and programs are
related to the area studies program and is provided
as information only. Contact base education offi-
cers for details.
a. Fellowships. Research Associates; Olmstead
Scholarship Program; East-West Fellowship; Har-
vard Fellowship; Woodrow Wilson Fellowship.
b. Training Programs. Defense Academic Re-
search Support Program; DLI Nonresident Lan-
guage Training; Defense Intelligence College Mas-
ter's Degree Programs.
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OFFICIAL LARRY D. WELCH. Oeoeral, USAF
Chief of Surf
NORMAND G. LEZY, Colonel, USAF
Director of AdminUtralion
SUMMARY OF CHANGES
This revision chui(es the Area Specialist Profram to the Foreign Area Studies Proffram; adds referenoes (para
I); expands the "Terms Explained" section (atch I); changes program manager OPR to HQ USAF/DPP; as-
signs responsibilities to applicable agencies (para 4); explains the application and selection processes (para S); ex-
plains use of special experience identiriers (para 7); lists educational objectives for the area studies degree pro-
gram (para 1 1); redeHnes the SEi and AAD geographic designatiotu (atch 2); adds sections on foreign language
training, in-country training (sect D), and accessions (para 9); and lists other training programs (sect E).
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TERMS EXPLAINED
Academic Program Manager. Air Force Institute
of Technology Civilian Institution Programs
(AFIT/CI) is responsible for managing the aca-
demic portion of the FASP.
Academic Speciality Code (ASC). A four charac-
ter code which defines an academic field of study.
Advanced Academic Degree (AAD). An academic
degree at the doctorate or masters level.
Air Force Military Penonnel Ccnlcr FASP
Ualson Office (AFMPC FASPLO). AFMPC/
DPMRSN is the AFMPC focal point for all FASP
matters.
Area Spcclallsl. An officer who:
a. Is operationally qualified in an AFS.
b. Holds a Master's Degree in Area Studies or
an approved related field, and has been awarded
the appropriate academic specialty code. The offi-
cer must be well versed in the political, economic,
cultural, and religious environment, threats to sta-
bihty, and US foreign policy toward the area.
c. Has a minimum foreign language proficiency
of L-2, R-2, S-2 in a principal language of the
area of specialization as evidenced on the DLPT.
Area Specialist Position. An authorized and vali-
dated advanced academic degree billet identified
by:
a. AN AFSC indicating the utilization field or
career area.
b. An advanced academic degree (AAD) aca-
demic specialty code (ASC) as authorized by AF
Form 1779. Request to Establish/Change Ad-
vanced Academic Degree Position, per AFR
36-19. The ASC specifies the geographic area of
specialization required for the position (see attach-
ment 2).
Assignment Officers. Those AFMPC officers re-
sponsible for the selection, assignment, and moni-
toring of FASP officers within their functional
control.
Command and SOA Managen. The office at a
Joint, specified, unified, major command, or SOA
that manages and is res(>onsible for tha fi^SP
within their command or SOA; may also interface
with the functional managers on career develop-
ment and Air Force Institute of Technology
(AFIT) degree programs. This office is usually lo-
cated in the DP community.
Covntry Spccialiit. An officer who has had area
or country-specific academic training or the
equivalent, has a minimum foreign language pro-
ficiency of L-2, R-2, S-2 in a language of the
country/area of specialization, and is operation-
ally qualified in an AFS.
Country Spcctallil Position. An authorized and
validated billet identified by an AFSC, foreign
language required, and specific area or country
academic training as noted on the manning docu-
ment.
DcfcBM Language Aptitude Battery (DLAB). A
standardized testing instrument designed to pro-
vide a quantitative estimate of an individual's
aptitude to learn a foreign language.
Defense Language Institute Foreign Langoage
Center (DLIFLC). The primary DOD facility for
foreign language training located at the Presidio
of Monterey, California.
Evaluating Agency. AFIT Admissions/Registrar
Directorate (AFIT/RR) is responsible for estab-
lishing academic evaluation standards, evaluating
transcripts, and maintaining academic specially
codes applicable to the FASP.
Foreign Area Officer. An officer who:
a. Has the qualifications listed under area spe-
cialist explanation.
b. Has a minimum foreign language profi-
ciency of L-3, R-3, S-3 in a principal language of
the area of specialization as evidenced on the
DLPT.
c. Has received in-country training or equiva-
lent experience.
Foreign Area Officer Position. An authorized and
validated advanced academic degree billet as de-
fined in area specialist position explanation with
an additional note on the manning document indi-
cating the kind of in-country training required for
the position.
Foreign Language Specialist. An officer who has a
minimum foreign language Hstening (L), reading
(R), and speaking (S) proficiency skill level of
L-2, R-2, S-2, defined in AFRs 30-40 and 33-8,
as indicated on the Defense Language Proficiency
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Test (DLPT) and is opfrationally qualiOed in an
Air Force specialty (AFS).
Fanclional Managcn. Those agencies in HQ
USAF, including intelligence (IN), programs and
resources (PR), and plans and operations (XO),
HQ Air Force Office of Special Investigations
(AFOSI). AFRES, and ANG that are directly re-
sponsible for the development and operation of
the FASP for career areas within their functional
control. The functional managers also act as stu-
dents' sponsors while the officer is in FASP train-
ing.
In-Country Training and Experience. Training
and experience in-country is crucial to the de-
velopment of a fully qualified FAO. This can take
one or more of several forms. Specially designed
orientation training in the area or country of spe-
cialization followed by independent study and cul-
tural familiarization is essential. This training and
experience can be augmented through attendance,
in-country, at a professional military school or
civilian institution, or assignment as an attache,
liaison officer, advisor, or exchange officer.
Language Designated Position (LDP). An
authorized billet requiring foreign language profi-
ciency identified by an Air Force specially code
(AFSC); a two-digit alpha code for the language
required according to AFR 700-20, volume I, part
.
V; a one-digit alpha code indicating the foreign
language proficiency skill level required for listen-
ing, reading, and speaking (minimum level 2) as
described in AFR 35-8, tables 19-1 and 19-2.
Language Proficiency Skill Level. Qualitative
ttaiemeni of the degree of skill in using a lan-
guage. Foreign language skill levels through S
are described in AFRs 35-8 and 30-40 and are
listed as alpha characters in the Advanced Pcisuii-
ne! Data System (APDS). AFR 35-S contains the
table converting the numeric scale to 3 to the ap-
propriate alpha code.
Langnage ProfktciKy Icsl. A standardized instru-
ment or measurement technique to determine the
degree of skill attained through experience or
training. These tests are listed in AFR 0-7.
Language Skill. Ability to perform specific lan-
guage activities, i.e., speaking, listening, writing,
reading, translating, and transcribing.
Program Manager. Headquarters USAF, DCS
Personnel, Directorate of Personnel Programs
(HQ USAF/DPP) is the office of primary respon-
sibility (OPR) for the FASP.
Service Program Manager. HQ USAF/DPP is the
Air Force focal point for all foreign language
training and represents the Air Force in the De-
fense Foreign Language Program.
Special Experience Idenllficrs (SEI). A three-char-
acter alphanumeric code set consisting of an activ-
ity code (first character) and an experience set (last
two characters) (see attachment 2 for applicable
SEls). SEls are used to identify an officer's special
experience or training that cannot be coded else-
where in the classification system. SEls comple-
ment other classification tools and provide the
means to retrieve specific experience or training
for use in satisfying resource management require-
ments. SEls are also required to indicate special
training and experience required for a position.
Using Agency. Any joint, specified, unified,
major command, separate operating agency, HQ
USAF, AFRES. or ANG office with FASP billets.
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GEOGRAPHIC DESIGNATIONS FOR SPECIAL EXPERIENCE IDENTUIERS (SEI)







ITB OYLB Eastern Europe
ITC GYLC Soviet Union
ITD OYLD North Africa
ITE OYLE Sub-Saharan Africa
ITF OYLF Middle East
ITG GYLG South Asia
ITH OYLH Mediterranean
ITI OYLJ Southeast Asia
ITJ DYLK Caribbean
ITK OYLL Utin America
ITL OYLM Far East
I ^
COUNTRIES
Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Federal Republic of Cennany,
Finland, France. Liechenslein, Iceland, Ireland, Laxem-
bor(, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland, United Kingdom
Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Oerman Democratic
Republic. Hungary, Poland, Romania, Yugoslavia
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
Algeria, Libya, Mali. Mauriunia. Morocco, Niger, Tunisia,
Western Sahara
Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burundi, Cameroon. Cape
Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo,
Djibouti, Ethiopia, Equatorial Guinea, Oal>on, Gambia,
Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Les-
otho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozam-
bique, Namibia, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe,
Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Africa, Sudan,
Swaziland. Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Upper Volta, Zaire,
Zambia, Zimbabwe
Bahrain, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordon, Kuwait, Leba-
non, Oman, Peoples Democratic Republic of Yemen,
Qatar, Saudia Arabia, Syria, United Arab Emeraies, Yeman
Arab Republic
Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Nepal, Pakistan,
Sri Lanka
Cyprus, Greece, Italy. Malta, Turkey
Australia, Brunei, Burma, Indonesia, Kapuchea, Laos, Ma-
laysia, New Zealand, Papau New Guinea, Singapore, Thai-
land, Vietnam
Antigua, Bahamas, Barbados, Barbuda, Belize, Costa Rica,
Cuba, Dominica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Gre-
nada, Grenadines, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica,
Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Saint Lucia, St Vincent, To-
bago, Trinidad
Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia. Ecuador. Guy-
ana, Paraguay. Peru. Surinam. Uruguay. Venezuela
China. Japan, North Korea, Philippines, South Korea, Tai-
wan
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1. Survey of NPGS NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS DEPARTMENT
GRADUATES
Please take a few minutes to answer the following questions on
the subjects you studied at the Naval Postgraduate School and on your
subsequent experiences as a graduate of our program. I am also asking
several questions about your foreign language skills because a large
part of my thesis deals with the need for foreign language skills in the
area specialist career field.
NOTE: This survey has been reviewed and approved by
Headquarters Air Force Military Personnel Center and the Air Force
Institute of Technology. A survey control number of USAF SCN 88- 11
5
has been assigned and is in effect until 1 May 1989. All responses are
strictly voluntary.
PLEASE PLACE AN "X" IN THE APPROPRIATE BLOCK
L Which service are you in? Army ()
Navy ( )
Air Force ( )
Marine Corps ( )
2. What was your age while attending the Naval Postgraduate School?
3. What was your rank while attending NPGS?
4. What was your undergraduate major(s)?
5. In which of the following subspecialty areas did you receive your Master of Arts
degree?'
a. Mid East. Africa. South Asia 681 ()
b. Far East. SE Asia. Pacific 682 ( )
c. Europe. USSR 683 { )
d. Western Hemisphere 684 ( )
e. Other (please specify)
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6. Have you passed a Defense Language Proficiency Test on a major language of
your area with a minimum score of SI, LI. and/or Rl?
YES { )
NO ( )
IF YOU ANSWERED YES TO NUMBER 6 ABOVE. PLEASE CONTINUE. IF NOT PLEASE
SKIP TO QUESTION NUMBER 15 BELOW.
Where did you get your foreign language training? (Note: Please "X" all appropriate
boxes)
a. The Defense Language Institute ( )
b. High School and/or College ( )
c. Taught by family member(s) ( )
d. Other (please specify)
8. What was your fluency level on your first DLPT?
a. Speaking: SO+( ) Sl( ) Sl+( ) S2( ) S2+( ) S3( ) S3+( ) S4( ) S5( )
b. Listening: L0+( ) Ll( ) Ll+( ) L2( ) L2+( ) L3( ) L3+( ) L4( ) L5( )
c. Reading: RO+( ) Rl( ) Rl+( ) R2( ) R2+( ) R3{ ) R3+( ) R4( ) R4( )
9. What was your fluency level on your last DLPT (last one taken)?
a. Speaking: SO+( ) Sl( ) Sl+( ) S2( ) S2+( ) S3( ) S3+( ) S4( ) S5{ )
b. Listening: LO+( ) Ll( ) Ll+( ) L2( ) L2+( ) L3( ) L3+( ) L4( ) L5( )
c. Reading: RO+( ) Rl( ) Rl+( ) R2( ) R2+( ) R3( ) R3+( ) R4( ) R4( )
d.*** I have not taken another DLPT since my first DLPT.( )
10. When was your last DLPT taken, what language was tested, what version of the




11. Have you. since the completion of training and your return to noneducational or




IF YOU ANSWERED YES TO NUMBER 1 1 ABOVE. PLEASE CONTINUE. OTHERWISE
PLEASE SKIP TO QUESTION 14 BELOW.
12. Please circle the choices that best complete the statements below as they apply to
your use of a foreign language in your official duties.
EDUCATION AND/OR TRAINING ASSIGNMENTS SUCH AS TIME AT DLI DO NOT
APPLY! IF YOU HAVE BEEN ASSIGNED AS A LANGUAGE INSTRUCTOR PLEASE
SKIP TO QUESTION 13 AND CONTINUE THE SURVEY
Circle more than one choice per statement if applicable (i.e. if you use speaking,
listening, and reading skills, you would circle all three choices in the first
subquestion).
a. I use foreign language (speaking) (listening) (reading) skills in my official
duties.
b. I use the above skills on a (daily) (weekly) (monthly) basis In my official
duties. (NOTE: If the above frequencies don't seem to be exactly right for
your job. please specify:
.)
c. Knowledge of a foreign language is (essential) (helpful) (unnecessary) to
carrying out my official duties.
d. I (am) (am not) called on to act as an interpreter and or translator in my
official duties.
e. I (am) (am not) called on to read and/or translate foreign documents,
technical manuals, and/or newspapers in my official duties.
f
.
I (am) (am not) called on to give briefings in a foreign language in the course
of my official duties.
g. I (am) (am not) called on to use aural translating skills in the course of
my official duties.
13. Please specify what foreign languages you use in your official duties, (examples:
Japanese. Russian. Spanish. Arabic, etc.)
14. Does the nature of your duties require that you maintain a specific fluency level in
one or more foreign languages?
YES ( )
NO ( )
If YES. what level? S L R
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FOR EACH OF THE FOLLOWING STATEMENTS PLEASE CIRCLE WHETHER YOU
AGREE STRONGLY (AS). AGREE (A). HAVE NO OPINION (NO). DISAGREE (DA).
DISAGREE STRONGLY (DS). OR THE STATEMENT IS NOT APPLICABLE (NA).
15. I feel getting an advanced academic degree has enhanced my ability to perform the
jobs I have held since graduation.
AS A NO DA DS NA
•** IF YOU ANSWERED THAT YOU DISAGREE (DA) OR DISAGREE STERONGLY (DS) TO
QUESTION #15 ABOVE, DOES THE FAULT LIE WITH THE EDUCATION YOU
RECEIVED OR WITH THE TYPE OF JOBS YOU HAVE BEEN ASSIGNED TO?
(a) Fault is with the education. ( )
(b) Fault is with Jobs held since graduation. ( )
(c) Other. please specify:
• * *
16. I think attending the Naval Postgraduate School for my advanced degree has
particularly improved my ability to perform the jobs I have held since graduation.
AS A NO DA DS NA
17. I believe taking courses that dealt with country and/ or regional studies improved
my ability to perform my subsequent mission(s).
AS A NO DA DS NA
18. I believe taking courses that dealt with U.S. foreign policy toward a country or
region helped me perform my subsequent mission(s).
AS A NO DA DS NA
19. I believe taking courses that dealt with U.S. National Interests. U.S. Security/
Defense Policy issues, and/or Arms Transfers helped me perform my subsequent
mission(s).
AS A NO DA DS NA
20. I believe taking courses that dealt with Arms Control issues helped me perform
my subsequent mission(s).
AS A NO DA DS NA
21. I believe taking courses that dealt with International Relations and/or
Comparative Foreign policy issues helped me perform my subsequent mission(s).
AS A NO DA DS NA
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22. I believe taking courses that dealt with Research. Comparative Analysis, and/or
Strategic Planning Issues helped me perform my subsequent mlsslon(s).
AS NO DA DS NA
23. I believe taking courses that dealt with Military History. Maritime Strategy,
and/or Naval Warfare Issues helped me perform my subsequent mlsslon(s).
AS NO DA DS NA
24. I believe taking courses that dealt with International Economics. Defense
Resource Allocation, and/or other economic Issues helped me perform my subsequent
mission(s).
AS NO DA DS NA
25. I believe taking courses that dealt with International Law, the Law of the Sea,
and/or International Negotiation issues helped me perform my subsequent mlsslon(s).
AS NO DA DS NA
PLEASE RATE THE FOLLOWING COURSES/AREAS OF STUDY AVAILABLE AT THE
NPGS BY HOW IMPORTANT YOU FEEL THEY ARE TO GRADUATES RETURNING TO
REAL WORLD MISSIO.NS. ON THE LIST ON THE RIGHT PLEIASE INDICATE WHICH
FI\^ COURSES ARE THE MOST IMPORTANT BY WRITING A NUMBER 1 BY THE MOST
IMPORTANT. A NUMBER 2 BY THE SECOND MOST IMPORTANT. ETC. THROUGH
FIVE. ON THE LIST ON THE LEFT, PLEASE INDICATE THE COURSES YOU FEEL ARE
LEAST IMPORTANT BY PUTTING A NUMBER 1 BY THE LEAST IMPORTANT COURSE.
A NUMBER 2 BY THE SECOND LEAST IMPORTAPJT. ETC. THROUGH 5. DONT WORRY
IF YOU DIDNT TAKE COURSES IN SOME OF THESE AFiEAS. THIS LIST SHOULD BE
BASED ON ;YOUR CURRENT KNOWLEDGE RATHER THAN YOUR TFiANSCRIPT.
MOST IMPORTANT COUFISE
Country/Regional Study Courses
American foreign policy toward a
country or region
American National Interest/Security
or Defense Policy/Arms Transfer
courses
Arms Control courses.
Courses on International Terrorism
Intelligence Systems /Product
Navy Warfare /History/ Strategy
International Law/Law of the Sea/
International Negotiation courses
Defense Resource Allocation courses





toward a country or region
American National Interest /
Security or Defense Policy/
Arms Transfer courses
Arms Control courses
Courses on International Terrorism.
Intelligence Systems/Product
Navy Warfare/History/Strategy
International Law/Law of the Sea/
International Negotiation courses
Defense Resource Allocations courses






Strategic Planning/ Deception or
Strategic courses














PLEASE ANSWER THE FOLLOWING
26. Since graduation from the Naval Postgraduate School have you worked as any of
the following: Foreign Area Officer, Area Specialist, Country or Regional desk
specialist in an intelligence organization, a Political-Military officer, or as a member


















28. Since graduation have you had one or more assignments in the geographic region






29. IF YOU ANSWERED "YES" TO 25. 26. OR 27 ABOVE. PLEASE FURNISH YOUR JOB
TITLE AND/OR ASSIGNMENT INFORMATION IN GENERAL TERMS (I.E. KOREA
DESK OFFICER AT DIA OR "ASSIGNED TO PACOM AS A SURFACE WARFARE
OFFICER") THEN GO TO QUESTION #29 BELOW. IF YOU ANSWERED "NO" TO 25.
26. AND 27. PLEASE SKIP TO QUESTION #29 AND CONTINUE.
30. Below is a "pie" for you to divide. Please draw boundaries to indicate the relative
importance of the PROFESSORS YOU HAD. the MATERIAL YOU WERE
PRESENTED IN THE COURSE, and the KNOWLEDGE YOU GAINED FROM
INDIVIDUAL RESEARCH OR STUDY In achieving an understanding of concepts
that have benefitted you in your subsequent assignment(s). PLEASE LABEL EACH
SLICE OF THE PIE AND. IF POSSIBLE. WRITE THE PERCENTAGE OF
IMPORTANCE YOU ARE ASSIGNING. FOR EXAMPLE IF YOU WEIGHTED ALL
THREE FACTORS EQUALLY. YOUR PIE WOULD LOOK LIKE THIS:
**Ebcample: Your "pie":
31. IF YOU TOOK THE COMPREHENSIVE EXAMINATION AT NPGS. do you wish you










33. What suggestions do you have for improving the curriculum offered by the
National Security Affairs Department at the Naval Postgraduate School and/or
the Defense Language Institute (if applicable)?
-Please continue on the reverse side of the paper-
*************************************************************
THANK YOU FOR TAKING THE TIME TO FILL OUT THIS
SURVEY. YOUR ANSWERS ARE NOT ONLY VITAL TO MY THESIS.
THEY WILL ALSO HELP THE NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
BETTER SERVE THE INTERESTS OF ITS STUDENTS IN THE
FUTURE. PLEASE RETURN THIS FORM IN THE ENVELOPE




SAMPLE OPINIONS EXPRESSED BY
SURVEY RESPONDENTS ON SUBJECTS
The following are examples of specific opinions given by FAO
graduates of the NPS area studies program. Each quote is followed by
the specific control number assigned to the particular respondent.
ARMY/JOBS
Track utilization (assignment into a FAO billet) and monitor actual
duties performed by speaking or communicating with the FAO.
1245]
Unfortunately, NPS is not viewed as a "prime" or "quality name"
institution by DA. This factor does not directly pertain to study but
is an important factor in the careers and subsequent assignments
of USAFAOs. [334]
NAVY/JOBS
Place higher restrictions upon Navy Detailing to ensure utilization
of masters study at NPS. 1503]
Would appreciate if sponsor would stay in contact with area spe-
cialist graduates. Keeping us in touch re jobs, further educational
opportunities, etc. Please use us! [507]
Perhaps the NSA curriculum could contain a "guarantee" of future
language training prior to a payback tour. Otherwise, why bother?
1 didn't speak much French working as a catapult officer on the
flight deck of the Midv'ay. [555]
AIR FORCE/JOBS
As Air Force Officers, we weren't "pipelined" into special billets
upon graduation. Instead, we went out job hunting, trying to find
billets which matched our training...a good number failed to get
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jobs which required our newly found specialties. It was very hard
to get excited about Polish when I knew I wouldn't be using it.
1115]
Too often an analyst is assigned to an area specialist billet initially
and then "reassigned" (without MFC's knowledge) to a non-area
specialist billet within the organization. [70]
Create "area specialist" AFSCs so as to track and develop area
specialists throughout their careers. As it is now, after one pay-
back tour they disappear into the Air Force. [138]
The Air Force could save a lot of money by identifying positions for
their graduates before they get to the field. In four years and four
months I never used my language ability on an official basis
(Swahili and Portuguese). On 5 occasions while at DIA, require-
ments existed for an officer to either act as escort or translator
for a foreign national officer who spoke Swahili or Portuguese. I
was never allowed to use my training because I wasn't a Major. In
four of the instances, a Major who could not speak the required
language was selected to escort. [214]
Follow-on assignments were a waste from my experience. I saw
many area specialists made into watch officers, briefers, or put
into planes. Two years of training seem to be ignored. Also the
AFIA people managing assignments for area specialists were per-
sonnel managers and not area specialists. [159]
For Air Force personnel... especially pilots, three years of school,
followed by a three-year "pay back tour" is a major career
depressant. [116]
Need a longer program. I know that the services are reluctant to
have people out of the mainstream for too long— that's too bad,
because NPS grads should be groomed and selected for the
"joint" assignments throughout the military departments. There-
fore. DOD as a whole needs these people in joint policy positions
more than the services need them in cockpits, foxholes, or
minesweepers. [144]
ARMY DLI
DLI taught a version of spoken Arabic used nowhere in the world.
[327]
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May FAOs arrive in country knowing how to say "howitzer" but
unable to order a meal in a local restaurant. [359]
In the case of Chinese, decrease DLI course for officers from one
year to six months and send the officer for in-depth language
training in Taiwan or Hong Kong or even the PRC. Anything
beyond six months at DLI is wasted because progress is slow,
standards are low, and Chinese teachers are ossified and incredi-
bly bureaucratic. (4091
DLI is a boring grind. Housing and support is severely limited and
expensive. DLI needs to take on the perspective that they must
support language skill development and retention after the stu-
dent departs. [242]
Separate the officers and enlisted. The former must learn to
speak, write, and listen. The latter should be exposed to or given
the opportunity to speak and write while concentrating on
hstening. [224]
All services should have a similar program of 1 year of studies, 6-
12 months of language training. It makes it easier for classes to
stay together throughout their training. Government housing
during language school is anther bonus for students. [506]
Orient courses to conversational use of language as opposed to
current emphasis on hearing skills required for [SIGINT]
assignments. [490]
I would like to see language as a mandatory part of the 681
through 685 curriculum. We sell ourselves short when working in
the joint business or as an in-country expert without having a lan-
guage background. Foreign nations' experts on our country will
most certainly be capable fo speaking, reading, and writing
English. [519]
Include language training as either a prelude or subsequent course
of study to area studies. Best option is prior to, allowing students
to use original source material during subsequent course/thesis
research. [507]
Incorporate into the Navy program language and in-country
training similar to the Army's FAO program. [503]
Let the students take some language courses for credit. Surely a
deal could be worked out with DLI. This could be in addition to
the regular NPS requirements for those students who could
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overload a little. (I was forced to hire a DLI instructor as an even-
ing tutor in order to take advantage of the talent there.) [496]
AIR FORCE/DLI
Complete the language training first. Several classmates and I
completed the language requirement prior to NPS and I had a
prior tour in Thailand— both of which put me way ahead of the
program. [87]
Focus on what it is we should be able to do with the lamguage, i.e.,
survive in the country using the language, know military terms,
etc. We spent too much time learning bird names, parts of the
car, etc. [61]
The Turkish course materials were extremely old when I went
through— many words from the text are no longer in use while
many words in use are not in the text. Otherwise the DLI course
was invaluable. The combination of the NPS Middle East courses
and DLI training made both my wife and I real experts on Turkey.
[185]
DLI was a big disappointment. Although there were only 2 of us in
the class, my wife was not allowed to audit the course. Also the
materials were very dated. [91]
DLI first. This would enable NPS students to research in the tar-
get language and to know more about their respective countries/
regions. [144]
The Japanese Basic Course is in severe need of modern/updated
lessons and materials. Also the sequence of instruction should be
changed so there is more continuity between the various phases.
[5]
The instructors in the Japanese department were certainly com-
petent, caring, and personable. However, I believe their hands
were tied by a system trying to make blanket policy instead of
operating an educational environment satisfying the needs of vari-
ous classes. The overriding objective of the school was to pass the
"military competency" test that included a multitude of military
terms and phrases that we really didn't need. [31]
Only send those students to DLI who will actually be assigned to a
foreign country (i.e., attaches, security assistance officers, etc.)
Intelligence analysts should forego language training and spend
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approximately 20 weeks TDY learning foreign military capabilities
before reporting to their next duty station. This could probably be
accomplished at the Defense Intelligence College, DIA.
Washington. D.C. (70]
For the Russian course— much less emphasis on the fine points of
grammar and much, much more on speaking idiomatic Russian.
I'm dying over here trying to speak to forklift operators, military
personnel...they don't quote Pushkin. [180]
DLI is a waste. Almost any other institution would prepare you
better in the Korean language. I have taken many courses from
many institutions and DLI is by far the worst. [178]
I give DLI a solid "D." The program in Japanese was far outdated
with an apparent emphasis on "Kanji" depicting military hard-
ware, of all things. Focus should be on conversation. [184]
Ensure that if the student is learning a language that he/she will
use it in the follow-on assignment. If he/she won't, make a thesis
mandatory instead. [152]
DLI was not so useful. I spent one year learning Japanese. It was a
skill I used not at all as an analyst. The course itself was too long
(after six months, a student needs a chance to go TDY to the
country and experience the language firsthand). [138]
ARMY/NPS
Continue to send Army FAOs to NPS. The curriculum is outstand-
ing and exactly what the Army needs. [450]
Soviet FAOs need a specific Russian history course for one term
and then a European history course (including Russia) for one
term. [418]
We should have absolutely top-notch instruction from a series of
visiting professors from all over the U.S.— something that is better
and less expensive than sending the students to a single civilian
university. [418]
Continue to hire high-quality professors. Professors who have
strong academic credentials and reputations and who have lived
in the regions which they teach about will always have the most to
offer their students. Academic credentials without practical expe-
rience in the region or country leaves a gap. [409]
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Keep attendance from all services— the "network" effect of
schooling with folks from the other services results in greater
efficiency and a more social group in later assignments. [224]
The Far East curriculum should include an introduction to the
U.S. command structure in the Pacific, possibly as a single briefing
during a core course. [291]
Require all students to attend 6 quarters and reduce the required
load to 12. 16 hours were simply too many, and led to "selective
neglect" and "garbage in-garbage out" work. [304]
Emphasize "Insider" opportunities at PG School and work to draw
key players to Monterey at least once a year to meet with students
(at assistant secretary level or ambassador level). [272]
The Army in particular has never come to grips with the true
value of an NPS education over its "rival" civilian institutions, i.e..
the cross-fertilization of the multi-service atmosphere in an aca-
demic environment. NPS should capitalize on the student body
more. [269]
Because of the limited time to cover many dimensions in a partic-
ular country or issue, the present situation and policies tend to be
briefly covered. I recommend recognition of this fact and more
priority to recent U.S. policy eind political events. [440]
When 1 talk with my peers who attended civilian universities—
their programs seemed to be lacking in substance and rigor. I
think if NPS keeps a good nucleus as permanent faculty and keeps
a top-quality flow of visiting professors, it will provide what we
need in DOD. [249]
AIR FORCE/NPS
Everyone should be obliged to do a thesis— it really forces the stu-
dent to "pull everything together." Writing a thesis has served me
well repeatedly since my graduation: all that I learned and all the
ideas/opinions I formed. [212]
Bring people in to tell you what it is really like in D.C.— it's not like
the books the professors have you read. [164]
Add guest lectures by military personnel who have attended NPS
and spent a duty assignment in the subject area. Officer-level Ph.D.
in National Security Affairs should be offered. [55]
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I don't believe now that one day of testing can adequately defend
several semesters of research. Thesis would have been more use-
ful to the Air Force. [143]
Now with the INF treaty a reality and START, conventional arms
talks on the horizon, the NSA department should be giving these
treaties the maximum attention in developing courses. Many NPS
grads are deeply involved in the INF business and are working on
negotiations or providing support to negotiators for the other
possible agreements with the Soviets. [129]
Increase greatly the area/country courses and reduce greatly the
"theory" courses, such as comparative analysis. [126]
Need cross-course arrangement to allow individual papers to be
chapters of a final thesis. More guest speakers in security cleared,
no-holds-barred sessions. [102]
I think all area specialists should be required to do a thesis. I
learned so much more from doing research on my region and
trying to assemble the data coherently than I could have from
taking tests. Writing a thesis forced me to use and expand on the
knowledge gained from formal instruction. [37]
Provide selected bibliography of readings to student as soon as
identified for a particular curriculum. This would help students
who have not been active in the curriculum to get a feel from the
program focus. [3]
When 1 arrived in Lisbon, I found myself more knowledgeable of
Portuguese history (particularly recent) and the Portuguese gov-
ernment and military than my State Department Foreign Service
counterparts. This background was invaluable to me and gave me
access to the host country which others were not so fortunate to
have. I really do not think that a Texas, Michigan, Tufts, or my old
alma mater, Georgetown, could have given me a better prepara-
tion for my two European assignments. [156]
NAVY/NPS
Don't do away with a thesis. This is very important to an area spe-
cialist. When you research amd write it, you don't forget it. [519]
Keep the high quality of visiting professors and lecture by people
with real-world experience outside the academic field. [519]
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Limit outside activity of NPS professors. They spend too much
time at other jobs. [512]
Because of payback tours often lasting 2 or more years, officers
must bring themselves back up to speed. This is not especially
difficult to do, but points out that a real requirement for NPS is to
ensure the student knows how and where to locate the current
information on his area. Personal contact with professors and a
good understanding of the literature by study is critical. [538]
Link the students directly to OP-06 for projects and thesis work.
[590]
Offer more in the South Asia region. In my 18 months, only 1
course specifically covered this important area. 1624]
For Mid-East students, it's imperative to have in-depth courses on
creation of the State of Israel and Israeli treatment of Palestinians
in '48. '67. and '88. [516]
Don't keep the Intel curriculum so sequestered. There were
courses I wanted to take but was not allowed to (no need to
know). A greater acquaintance with Intel would help a line officer.
[496]
Take note of National War College speaker program and try to get
similar level of expertise to NPS. [618]
Return Army Foreign Area Officers (FAOs) and add Marine Corps
officers. The education offered at the Naval Postgraduate School is
first rate, and more applicable than similar graduate programs at
private or state universities. For junior officers, it equates to a




1. Sun Tzu The Art of War. trans, by Samuel B. Griffith, p. 99, Oxford
University Press. London. England. 1963.
2. Tuchman, Barbara. Stilwell and the American Experience in China
1911-1945, The Macmillan Company. 1970.
3. Hoyt. Edwin P.. The Marine Raiders, Pocket Books. 1989.
4. "DLI Plans Language Cutbacks," The Herald, p. 1. 10 Jan. 1989.
5. Godson. John. Intelligence Requirements for the 1990's, Lexington
Books, 1989.
6. Davis. David W., "The Foreign Area Officer Program: An Overview
of the History of the Program." pp. 3-4. an unpublished paper
provided by the Army FAO Proponent Team.
7. McNaughton, Dr. James C. "Vietnamese Language Training in the
Department of Defense 1955-1973." unpublished paper. DLI/FLC.
Presidio of Monterey. California. November 1987.
8. Stoner, John, "Taking the Plunge: The Army's Foreign Area
Officers," unpublished paper written for an MPA program at an
unknown location (copy provided by Major John Cary).
9. Adolph, Major Robert B.. Jr.. "Functional Area 39: New Career
Management for PSYOP, Active CA Officers," Special Warfare,
October 1988.
10. FAO proponent team command briefing provided to the author by
Major John Cary, Chief of the Army FAO Proponent Team at the
Pentagon. 6 December 1988.
11. Department of the Army letter. Subject: Memorandum For:
Officers Designated Into Functional Area 48/Foreign Area Officers,
undated (also provided to the author by Major John Cary).
12. Briefing slide from the FAO Development Program briefing pro-
vided by Major John Cary.
199
13. Bigelow, Donald N.. and Legters, Lyman H., NDEA Language and
Area Centers—A Report of the First 5 Years, U.S. Department of
Health. Education, and Welfare, 1964.
14. Interview between Dr. Edward Laurance, Naval Postgraduate
School, Monterey, California, and the author, 15 May 1989.
15. Boyd, George G., letter printed in PACOM FAO News Bulletin, v. 1.
pp. 13-15, March 1987.
16. Marine Corps Order 1520. 11 C.
17. Interview between Major Walter McTernan, FAO Proponent Team
and Personnel Exchange Program, Headquarters, United States
Marine Corps, Washington, D.C., and the author, December 1988.
18. Stein, Major Les, U.S.M.C., "Promotion by Degrees: Myth or Magic
in the Marine Corps," Naval War College Review, v. XLI, no. 4.
Sequence 324 ed.. pp. 67-77. Autumn 1988.
19. Naval Postgraduate School, department catalog, p. 46. Monterey.
California.
20. Report in the Navy Times, v. 20, no. 39, 5 May 1971.
21. Air Force RegulaUon 36-23, 11 March 1985.
22. Air Force Regulation 36-16, 5 March 1987.
23. Ruchti, James R.. Foreign Service Officer, Department of State.
"The U.S. Government Requirements for Languages." President's
Commission on Foreign Language and International Studies
Background Papers and Studies, U.S. Government Printing Office.
1979.
24. Miele, Alfonse R.. Lieutenant Colonel. USAF, Armed Forces
Language Training in Peacetime, Ph.D. Dissertation. Columbia
University. New York City. 1958.
25. Matthew. Robert J., Language and Area Studies in the Armed
Services, American Council on Education. 1947.
26. Goulden, Joseph C. Korea, the Untold Story of the War, Times
Books. 1982.
27. McTernan III, Major Walter F., Tongue-Tied Leathernecks, Thesis,
Defense Intelligence College, 1988.
200
28. Layton, Michael L.. "English Language Training: An Essential
Component of Security Assistance,** The DISAM Journal v. 7. n. 6.
Summer 1985.
29. Sarkesian, Sam C. and Taylor, William J., Jr., "The Case for
Civilian Graduate Education for Professional Officers," Armed
Forces and Society, v. 1, n. 2, Winter 1975.
30. U.S. Department of Health, Education & Welfare, OE-56016
Bulletin, no. 41. NDEA Language and Area Centers: A Report on
the First Five Years, by Donald N. Bigelow and Lyman H. Legters,
p. 7, 1964.
31. Fuller. C. Dale, The Training of Specialists in International Relations,
American Council on Education, 1957.
32. Ikle, Fred C, and Wohlstetter, Albert, Discriminate Deterrence,
Report of the Commission on Integrated Long-Term Strategy, U.S.
Government Printing Office. January 1988.
33. Sheehan. Neil, A Bright Shining Lie, John Paul Vann and America in
Viet Nam Random House, 1988.
34. White. Theodore H.. The Stilwell Papers, Schochen Books. 1972.
35. White. Theodore H.. In Search of History, Warner Books, 1978.







1. Defense Technical Information Center 2
Cameron Station
Alexandria. VA 22304-6145
2. Library, Code 0142 2
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey. CA 93943-5002
3. Director of Research, Code 012 1
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey. CA 93943-5000
4. NSA Department 50
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey. CA 93943-5000




6. Deputy Under Secretary of the Na\y (Policy) 1
DUSN(P) Pnt Room 4E725
Washington. D.C. 20350
7. Deputy Under Secretary of the Navy 1
(Special Research & Analysis)
DUSN{SR&A) Pnt Room 4E780
Washington. D.C. 20350
8. Executive Director 1
CNO ExecuUve Panel Staff (OP-OOK)
4401 Ford Avenue
Alexandria. VA 22302-0268
9. Commander (NIC-01) 1
Naval Intelligence Command











12. Library- Bldg 420
Navy/Marine Corps Intelligence Center (NMITC)
Dam Neck. VA 23461-5605
13. Library
United States Naval Academy
Annapolis. MD 21402






16. Chairman, Campaign & Strategy Department
Naval War College
Newport, RI 02840
17. Strategic Studies Group (SSG)
Naval War College
Newport. RI 02840
18. Captain Robert Figueras
OP-602. Pentagon Room
Office of the CNO
Washington, DC 20350-2000
19. Major Walter McTeman
Head. FAO Sponsor
HQMC/INTM. Navy Annex Room 3229
Washington, DC 20380-0001
203
20. Office of the Secretary of the Air Force





Wright-Patterson AFB. OH 45433-6583
22. Library
Air War College
Maxwell AFB. AL 361 12
23. Assistant Chief of Staff (Intelligence)
AF/IN Pnt Room 4A932
Washington. DC 20330
24. Deputy Director for Planning Integration
AF/XOXl Pnt Room 4D1083
Washington, DC 20330
25. Commandant
Air Force Institute of Technology (AFIT-CIP/DPMPC)
Wright-Patterson AFB. OH 45433-6583




27. Lieutenant Colonel Stanley Wilusz
Chief. Regional Studies Division
USAF Special Operations School
Hurlburt Field, FL 32544
28. Captain Rebeca Taylor
Assignments Officer, Palace Sentinel
HQ AFMPC/MPCRSN5
Randolph AFB, TX 78150-6001
29. Major Robert Vento
AFIT/CISP
Wright-Patterson AFB. OH 45433-6583
204
30. Commandant of the Marine Corps
Attn: Director of Marine Corps History and Museums
Department of the Navy
Washington, DC 20380-0001
31. Director Plans Division
HQ USMC Code PL
Arlington Annex Room 2020
Washington. DC 20380
32. Deputy Director for Intelligence
HQ USMC Code INT
Arlington Annex Room 3233
Washington, DC 20380
33. Advanced Amphibious Study Group
P. O. Box 247
QuanUco, VA 22134-0247
34. Office of the Secretary of the Army
Attn: Army Historical Program




United States Military Academy
West Point, NY 10996
36. Major John Cany
Chief. FAO Proponent Team








Presidio of Monterey. CA 93944-5006





39. Director, Policy Research
ISP/Research Pnt Room 1E439
Office of the Secretary of Defense
Washington. DC 20301
40. Library and Information Directorate
National Defense University
Ft. Leslie J. McNair
Washington. DC 20319-6000
4 1 . Department of Military Strategy
National War College (NWMS)
Ft. Leslie J. McNair
Washington. DC 20319-6000
42. Office of the Commandant
Defense Intelligence College
Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA-DIC)
Washington. DC 20301-6111
43. Army Library
ANRPL Pnt Room 1A518
Washington. DC 20310
44. Long Range Planning Division
DAMO-SSL Pnt Room 3B521
Office of the Army Chief of Staff
Washington. DC 20310
45. Foreign Area Officer Proponent Team
DAMO-SSF Pnt 3D561
Office of the Army Chief of Staff
Washington. DC 20310
46. Library
Armed Forces Staff College
Norfolk. VA 23511-6097
47. Director Strategic Plans & Policy





U.S. Army Joint Support Activity
P. O. Box 11343
Washington, DC 20008-0543
49. Bureau of Intelligence & Research
Office of External Affairs
U.S. Department of State
Washington. D.C. 20520
50. Colonel John J. Hickey. Jr.
Strategic Studies Institute
U.S. Army War College
Carlisle Barracks, PA 17013
51. Dr. Steve Jurika
7927 Caledonia Drive
San Jose. CA 95135
52. Commander Charles Milsted
1809 Templeton Court
Virginia Beach, VA 23454
53. Captain Paul Schratz
141 Dalkern Glen
Arnld. MD 21012
54. Major General Perry Smith
7217 Van Ness Court
McLean. VA 22101
55. Captain Peter Swartz
USNATO/DOD
Box 102
APO New York. NY 09667-5028
56. Dr. Michael Vlahos
Director. Center for the Study of Foreign Affairs
Foreign Service Institute




57. Captain Jerome Burke
Associate Dean




58. Major General Ted Atkeson
202 Vassar Place
Alexandria. VA 22314
59. Captain Mike Holmes
USDAO Beijing
American Embassy
FPO San Francisco. CA 96655-0001
60. Lieutenant Colonel Kenneth Allard
Department of the Army-
Office of the Chief of Staff/DACS-ZBAS
The Pentagon. Room 3C641
Washington. DC 20310-0200
61. Dr. Robert G. Card. Jr.
President. MIIS
425 Van Buren Street
Monterey, CA 93940
62. Colonel Da\ad J. Andre
Office of the Secretar}^ of Defense
ODUSD (Planning and Resources)
The Pentagon. Room 3A7&8
Washington. DC 20301-2100
63. Dr. Fred Geissler
SAIC
10260 Campus Point Drive
San Diego. CA 92121
64. Dr. Jeffery S. Milstein
Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Plans and Policy Directorate (J-5)
The Pentagon. Room 2E949
Washinton. DC 20301
208
65. Richard F. Staar
Coordinator. International Studies Program
Hoover Institute on War. Revolution, and Peace
Stanford. CA 94305-6010
66. Dr. Franklin D. Margiotta
Pergamon-Brassey's International Defense Publishers, Inc.
8000 Westpark Drive. Fourth Floor
McLean. VA 22102
67. Lieutenant Colonel John Hines, U.S. Army (Ret.)
The Rand Corporation
2100 M Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20037
68. Professor Jlri Valenta
Department of Political Science
University of Miami
Coral Gables, FL 33124
69. Library
United States Air Force Academy
Colorado Springs, CO 80840
70. Chief of Staff
Assistant for Intelligence (AF-IN)
Department of the Air Force
The Pentagon
Washington. DC 20301
7 1 . Director of Attache Affairs
Department of the Air Force (AFIS-INH)
Headquarters Air Force Intelligence Service
Fort Belvoir. VA 22060
72. Chief of Staff
Deputy for Operatiosn & Plans (DAMO-2A)
Department of the Army
The Pentagon
Washington. DC 20301
73. Chief of Staff
(ADCOPS/DAMO-SSA, OACSI/DAMI-ISI)
Department of the Army
The Pentagon
209
74. Central Intelligence Agency






76. Director of Naval Intelligence
(NOP-092)











Fort Meade. MD 20755
80. Captain Randy P. Burkett
3486 Student Squadron (ATC)












specialist^ in the mili-
tary.

